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Potholes and Detours in the Road to Critical
Infrastructure Protection Policy
Ted G. Lewis Ph.D. and Rudy Darken D.Sc.
Abstract
The national strategy for the protection of critical infrastructure and key assets is not
working due to a number of failed strategies, which this article examines in detail: federal-
ism (separation of state and federal governmental controls) advocates that the first line of
defense is local first responders; two years after the creation of the Department of Home-
land security, and the consequent requirement that states perform vulnerability and risk
analysis on their critical infrastructures, DHS has yet to define basic terminology needed
for states to perform meaningful analysis (“vulnerability” “risk”), or precisely state the
objectives of such analysis; private ownership of the majority of infrastructure assets has
been used as an excuse to do nothing – a major myth that is not only wasteful of effort, but
dangerous to the security of the nation; and finally, the notion that critical infrastructure
sectors are so large and complex that only the highest-consequence, lowest-probability
events can be prevented has led to further missteps in the road to critical infrastructure
protection policy. This article ends with recommendations for policy changes that address
these issues.
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INTRODUCTION
One can frame the policies of the current national strategy for critical infrastructure 
protection using a number of colorful analogs, but transportation seems the most fitting
because transportation is one of the sectors identified by the National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, published by the White 
House in 2003.1  Beneath the title of this article is the reality that we have a long way to 
go to protect critical infrastructure assets – across all sectors – at even modest levels of 
security. Indeed, if a 1,000-mile journey begins with a single step along a well-defined 
road, then the national strategy road is badly in need of repairs. 
This paper exposes only a handful of the many myths, fallacies, and roadblocks 
preventing the nation from protecting its second-most important assets: the water, power, 
energy, telecommunications, information, and transportation systems that make up 
critical infrastructure (CI).2 We claim that the first step in this 1,000-mile journey is to 
fix the potholes and eliminate the detours promoted by the current strategy for protection 
of the country’s CI. To do so, we must understand how the national strategy fails to 
address reality. We couch these realities in metaphorical terms – as potholes and detours 
on the road to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructures. The term “pothole” is used 
to identify problems and barriers to making progress, and the term “detour” is used to 
expose wrong-headed myths, distractions, and bumps in the road to better infrastructure 
security.
This paper argues against a purely federalist approach to critical infrastructure 
protection and instead advocates that the federal government take greater responsibility 
(and control) over state and local decisions; it argues that the first step in this 
transformation is to set standards, beginning with concise and clear definitions of 
vulnerability and risk. We then turn to the arguments preventing action – specifically that 
government is helpless to correct security problems in critical infrastructure because most 
infrastructures are owned and operated by the private sector. Finally, we make four 
concrete recommendations on how to improve critical infrastructure protection through 
re-thinking and re-aligning current policies.
Think Globally, Act Locally
The national strategy is based on the idea that the federal government should set goals 
and policies, while the states should assume primary responsibility for homeland security, 
because incidents happen at the local level. Specifically, the National Strategy defines the 
relationship between federal and state/local governments as follows:
In addition to securing federally owned and operated infrastructures and 
assets, the role of the federal lead departments and agencies is to assist 
state and local governments and private-sector partners in their efforts to:
• Organize and conduct protection and continuity of government and 
operations planning, and elevate awareness and understanding of 
threats and vulnerabilities to their critical facilities, systems, and 
functions;
• Identify and promote effective sector-specific protection practices and 
methodologies; and
1Lewis and Darken: Potholes and Detours
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
• Expand voluntary security-related information sharing among private 
entities within the sector, as well as between government and private 
entities.3
Basically, the federal government is primed to assist state and local governments, but the 
state/local governments are responsible for implementation of “protection practices, and 
methodologies.” This strategy has a number of deficiencies as pointed out by the first 
pothole.
Pothole 1: CIP (Critical Infrastructure Protection) is a local problem and therefore the 
federal government should provide guidance and funding, but state and local jurisdictions 
must become the first line of defense against attacks on critical infrastructure assets. 
This policy is not only dangerous – because local jurisdictions will never have the 
capability to protect their critical infrastructure assets – but an unfortunate waste of 
money. In fact, the Government Accounting Office recognized this problem soon after 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was formed: “The challenges posed in 
strengthening homeland security exceed the capacity and authority of any one level of 
government.”4
Consider the case of the Alaskan telecommunications sector. Alaska’s 
telecommunication infrastructure supports local police, fire, and emergency management 
functions as well as consumer telephone and Internet access. Without it, Alaskans would 
be isolated from the rest of the United States. Naturally, it makes sense for the Federal 
government – through the Department of Homeland Security – to provide funding and 
training to Alaskans so they can strengthen their telecommunications infrastructure and 
harden it against potential terrorist attacks. However, this strategy is inadequate and 
dangerous, because Alaska’s telephone and most Internet services are dependent on a 
single building in Seattle! The Weston building in Seattle is the sixth largest telecom 
hotel in the nation, and it provides connectivity to the citizens of Alaska. Alaskan’s 
cannot protect this major asset no mater how much money the Federal Government 
provides, because it lies outside of their jurisdiction. 
In addition to the problem of an asset in one state being critical to another state, there 
is the overarching problem of Interstate Commerce laws that regulate and shape 
infrastructures such as telecommunications, energy, power, and transportation. States 
have little power over the Federal regulators when it comes to passing laws that might 
affect an element of one of these infrastructures and weaken the same infrastructure at the 
national level. Examples of this can be found in cross-sector interdependencies. For 
example, the largest electrical power plant in Missouri (New Madrid) is totally dependent 
on the rail system that delivers coal from Wyoming. Rail transportation and electrical 
power sectors are regulated by federal agencies – not Wyoming and Missouri – and yet, a 
policy that may ensure reliable electric power generation in Missouri could conflict with 
energy policies affecting Wyoming. For example, should Interstate Commerce regulation 
of Wyoming rail shipments of coal be implemented to raise money to harden the rail 
transportation system across the USA, the rate payers in Missouri (and other states) 
would be negatively impacted. There is nothing that the state and local governments can 
do to offset federal regulation of infrastructure industries.
What should be done to circumvent this pothole? The current strategy is a detour 
headed in the wrong direction:
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Detour 1.1: Allocation of funding for CIP needs to be decided at the state and local level, 
not the national level. 
The problem with this detour is simply the fact that what is critical to a state may not be 
critical to the nation. Separate funding of State and local districts is a waste of money in 
most cases because the funding does not address the true need – typically because states 
and cities do not have the expertise to evaluate risk. Two years after receiving funding 
from the Department of Homeland Security, most local governments have not spent most 
of their allocation. It isn't that they can't spend the funds, but rather that there are many 
restrictions placed by the federal government on the spending of these funds and, most 
importantly, there is no coherent linkage of these restrictions to an infrastructure 
resiliency plan. Americans want to know how they are safer because of this funding. 
There is no answer, but there needs to be one.
Once again, we can use Alaska as an example. The largest nuclear power plant in the 
nation is located in Arizona, but most of the power consumed by Alaskans comes from a 
much smaller power plant in Beluga Bay, Alaska.5 If we use size as a measure of 
criticality, then it makes more sense to harden the Palo Verde Power Plant in Arizona 
than the much smaller Beluga Power Plant in Alaska. The problem with this strategy 
from a national CIP perspective is that the Beluga plant is more important than the Palo 
Verde plant, because it supplies 60% of all Alaskan power, while the Arizona nuclear 
power plant supplies less than 3% of the power consumed by the Western Power Grid. If 
the nuclear plant shut down, it would not be missed, because the Western Grid obtains 
power from many sources. This is not the case with the Beluga plant. If it fails, most 
Alaskans will be left without power. Therefore, the Beluga plant is much more critical –
to the Western Grid as well as to Alaska – than the much larger plant in Arizona. Size is 
not always the best measure of criticality. 
Detour 1.2: Allocation of funding resources should be based on population, size of state, 
and other political factors as determined by the Department of Homeland Security.
According to Citizens Against Government Waste, “Funding ratios guarantee each state 
.75 percent of the funds available for homeland security.  This formula initially 
distributes 40 percent of the funds among the states, with 60 percent for other 
allocations.  Under this model, for example, California, a target-rich state containing 12 
percent of the nation’s population, received only 7.95 percent of general grants.  On the 
other hand, Wyoming, which received .85 percent of the funds, holds only .17 percent of 
the population.  That means Congress provided $5.03 per capita for California and $37.94 
per capita for Wyoming.  Similarly, data from the Public Policy Institute of California 
revealed that Alaska received an astonishing $58 per resident and New York got less than 
$25.”6
Once again, allocation of funding based on arbitrary or political considerations will 
not solve the problem of enhancing security. Instead, it is wasteful and increases the 
probability of a successful terrorist attack. A national perspective is needed in this risk 
analysis process as demonstrated by both of these examples. This would reorient funding 
towards allocation on the basis of risk reduction – hopefully where it can reduce risk the 
most.
3Lewis and Darken: Potholes and Detours
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
These examples illustrate why the National Strategy’s pressure to push responsibility 
for the protection of critical infrastructures down to the local level is flawed. States and 
local governments are often not in control of the critical infrastructure assets they depend 
on. Further, local analysis of local assets results in wasted funding. Arizona is likely to be 
concerned for its Palo Verde Power Plant when, in fact, the Alaskan power plant at 
Beluga Bay is more important. But Arizona is unlikely to transfer funding from Arizona 
to Alaska! These are only the top-level challenges facing the nation – there are several 
other significant problems lurking at a deeper level.
A Failure to Communicate
One of the most difficult challenges facing the field of critical infrastructure protection is 
the lack of shared terminology. There are too many people using too many ill-defined 
terms for the community of homeland security experts to communicate, properly. The 
lack of widely accepted definitions of terms used in homeland security leads to 
reinvention of the wheel, false starts, and more detours.
Pothole 2: There are as many definitions of “vulnerability” and “risk” as there are 
agencies in federal, state, and local governments, combined! Before we can take the first 
step in a 1,000-mile journey, we need a compass. Currently, there is no universally 
accepted definition of the most basic measures of criticality – vulnerability and risk. 
For example, the intelligence community typically defines “risk” as R = T + V (Threat 
plus Vulnerability). The FBI says “risk” is R = I * T * V (probability of an incident times 
threat times vulnerability).7  A number of other methodologies use arbitrary metrics to 
gauge risk. The most popular method of gauging criticality of an asset such as a port, 
telecommunications center, water treatment plant, or transportation terminal is to assign 
numbers to each asset and then add them together. In ranked ordering systems such as the 
U.S. Coast Guard’s port security and risk assessment tool, risk is computed by summing 
assigned numbers to various properties such as damage, casualties, vulnerability, and 
threat. These numbers are provided by subject matter experts who, in turn, rely on their 
individual judgment when rating “vulnerability” and “risk.” The port asset with the 
highest total is declared the most critical. 
The validity of this approach relies on subject matter experts, which does not address 
the problem of inconsistency across experts. This leads to uneven ranking, because every 
expert has a different idea of how to assign numbers. It also leads to meaningless totals, 
because of the different interpretations of what the numbers mean.
The intelligence community’s risk equation is difficult to apply because it is not clear 
how one compares a low-threat, high-vulnerability asset with a high-threat, low-
vulnerability asset. If we add threat and vulnerability together and get the same total, 
what is the difference? Clearly, a high-threat condition deserves closer scrutiny than a 
low-threat condition, regardless of the vulnerability, and yet R = T + V produces 
indistinguishable totals. 
The FBI metric cannot deal with combination incidents such as the 9/11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. What does risk mean when the attackers target 
two or three assets at once? The U.S. Coast Guard metric has no equivalent in the real 
world, because the numbers are without units. For example, the USCG ranking does not 
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measure risk in dollars, casualties, or probability. Hence, it cannot be standardized, so 
how do we compare the results obtained by assessing two different ports?
We need a standard, scientifically exact method of assessing vulnerability and risk. 
Only then will we be able to define vulnerability and risk. A standard definition means 
that states and localities will be able to compare apples to oranges, and that the result of 
vulnerability analysis will mean something – across the 50 states. We can even go 
further: we can fund projects in a meaningful and productive manner.
Detour 2.1: Individual cities, states, and regions are in the best position to make their 
own definitions of “vulnerability” and “risk”, without the interference of the federal 
government.
This approach pretty much sums up the current state of affairs. While the DHS has 
provided general guidelines, each state is left to its own devices when it comes to 
defining what is critical, and how each defines “vulnerability” and “risk.” In 2003, the 
first year all states were required to perform a complete vulnerability analysis in order to 
receive federal funding for CIP, the results were meaningless, because every state used a 
different method, with a different outcome. If was impossible to compare the risk 
assigned to a bridge, say, in California, with a bridge in Wisconsin.
The definition and terminology problem can be easily solved by establishing simple, 
yet scientifically valid, definitions. Suppose for example, “vulnerability” is defined as the 
probability that an attack will succeed and “risk” is defined as the expected value of the 
damage caused by a successful attack. Vulnerability is a probability (a number from zero 
to 100%) and risk is a cost (a number that represents the impact of an attack on an asset 
or entire sector). Mathematically, risk is V * D, where V = vulnerability and D is
typically in units of dollars, casualties, or some other loss. 
These definitions are easily applied to all kinds of critical infrastructure assets and 
they have meaning in the real world; probability and dollars are real-world metrics. 
Vulnerability is equivalent to ‘likelihood’, and risk is equivalent to the real-world cost 
associated with an incident.8
Now we can standardize the results so that an assessment made by one expert is 
identical to an assessment made by another expert. We can compare apples to oranges, 
and then make progress towards hardening the most critical assets: the higher the risk, the 
higher the criticality of an asset.
Vulnerability is relative to the threat; e.g. the vulnerability of the Federal Reserve 
Bank in Manhattan might be 10% relative to a car bomb, and 60% relative to a cyber 
intrusion. This means there is a 10% likelihood that a car bomb will do enough damage to 
close the bank and a 60% chance that a cyber attack will halt banking business. 
Therefore, our definition incorporates the threat as well as the weakness of an asset to a 
specific threat. A bank may be vulnerable to a cyber attack, but not so vulnerable to a car 
bomb attack.
Vulnerability is not risk, and risk is not vulnerability. Instead, risk is the product of 
vulnerability times damage: R = V * D. Risk can be measured in casualties, loss of 
equipment, financial loss, etc. But you can’t mix metrics in one analysis. If you use 
dollars you can’t switch to casualties. The important distinction is that “vulnerability” is 
the probability of a successful attack, and “risk” is the expected value of damage due to 
the attack.
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Suppose the estimated damage of a successful car bomb attack on the bank is ten
million dollars and the cyber attack, one million.  Since risk equals vulnerability times 
damage, the risk associated with a car bombing is one million dollars (10% of $10 
million), and the risk associated with a cyber attack is $600 thousand (60% of $1 
million). In tabular form, we have the following:
Threat Vulnerability Damage Risk
Bomb 10% $10 million $1 million
Cyber 60% $1 million $600 thousand
Notice that the bank is more vulnerable to a cyber attack (60%), but the risk of a bombing 
is higher (one million dollars vs. $600,000)! Risk and vulnerability represent different 
measures of “criticality.” In this case, the cyber threat is “more critical” because the bank 
has greater vulnerability to a cyber attack, but the bomb is “more critical” because the 
bank has higher risk to a bombing. It is important to distinguish between vulnerability 
and risk, because they can produce different definitions of criticality depending on their 
relative size. Vulnerability is not the same as risk, which means we must decide which is 
more important – to minimize risk or vulnerability. 
What is the most likely incident in the foregoing example? Is it more likely that the 
bank will suffer a bomb attack or a cyber attack? How do we decide? In most risk 
assessment methods there is no way to model all possible incidents or events. In this 
example, the most likely event is a cyber attack (54%), and the least likely incident is a 
car bomb attack (4%). In addition, there is a 6% probability that both attacks will occur! 
In other words, the assessment must consider all possibilities. Most risk assessments 
ignore the likelihood of multiple, simultaneous attacks. The attacks of 9/11 were 
multiple, simultaneous attacks overlooked by the intelligence analysts, perhaps because 
their methodology ignored combination events. In our simple car bomb versus cyber 
attack example, there are actually three threats as summarized below.
Threat Vulnerability Damage Risk
Bomb 10% $10 million $1 million
Cyber 60% $1 million $600 thousand
      Both 6% $11 million $1.6 million
Vulnerability and risk assessments must incorporate combination events such that they 
can be compared across sectors, jurisdictions, and agencies. One way to do this is to 
standardize the multiple-event model. For example, a rigorous and standard method used 
in reliability engineering is fault tree analysis. Unlike current techniques in use by critical 
infrastructure protection analysts, fault tree analysis reveals all possible combinations of 
events, and assigns each a likelihood and risk value. Fault tree analysis can then 
determine the best allocation of funds to minimize vulnerability or risk. Fault tree 
modeling is beyond the scope of this article, but it is an established technique, so why not 
adopt it?
Without a scientific definition of vulnerability and risk, there is no way to perform 
meaningful risk assessments. There is no way to compare the risk of losing the Palo 
Verde nuclear power plant with losing the Beluga power plant, and there is no way to 
decide how much money to spend on prevention of a car bomb attack versus prevention 
of a cyber attack against banks and government buildings. Existing risk assessment 
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techniques cannot compare apples to oranges, and when they derive a figure of merit, the 
numbers are meaningless because they are based on opinion, not scientific measurement.
The “Do-Nothing Policy”
One of the myths circulating among policy-makers suggests that local government is 
helpless when it comes to CIP, because most critical infrastructure assets are owned and 
operated by private companies that make up the private sector. How can government 
protect assets they do not own? The problem with this myth is that it leads to a ‘do-
nothing” policy. This assumption that private-sector infrastructures are beyond the reach 
of government agencies is not only wrong, but also dangerous, because it leaves the most 
critical of assets unprotected.
Pothole 3: Private companies own and operate most critical infrastructure, hence 
government cannot intervene on behalf of public safety. These owners and operators 
must provide critical infrastructure protection – not the government. However, because 
prevention is costly, the owners are unlikely to spend the money needed to protect these 
assets on behalf of the public they serve.
For example, the Congressional Budget Office states, in an introductory comment to 
“Why the Private Sector Might Spend Too Little on Security,” 
Businesses would be inclined to spend less on security than might be 
appropriate for the nation as a whole if they faced losses from an attack 
that would be less than the overall losses for society. A number of 
common circumstances can exist in private industry in which there is a 
gap between the private and public costs of a terrorism event.”9
This is one of the most prevalent misconceptions in critical infrastructure protection 
literature. It ignores the burdensome regulation that controls these industries. Most 
power, telecommunication, and energy companies have little control over their business 
because of inter-state commerce law and a long history of government regulation. The 
government still “runs” these sectors through extensive regulation. In nearly every case, 
these industries fall under inter-state commerce laws or regulation by various 
governmental agencies designated by the U.S. Congress as overlords. In the electrical 
power sector, for example, Congress exercises its control through the FERC (Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission) and in the telecommunications sector, Congress 
exercises control through the FCC (Federal Communications Commission). In other 
words, most critical infrastructure is controlled by the federal government, which dictates 
how each sector operates.
Let us take the telecommunications sector as an illustrative example. The telecom 
industry was recently re-regulated by passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 
This act reasserted detailed governmental control over this vast infrastructure. For 
example, telecommunications companies like AT&T, Verizon, and Nextel paid billions 
of dollars in license fees to the US Government for the right to “broadcast” cellular 
telephone signals through the air. Furthermore, state governments can set prices on 
telephone service, which leaves very little room for profit. The exercise of this federally 
and state-centered power suggests the opposite – that government does indeed exercise 
control over these sectors. In reality, government has the power to protect most critical 
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infrastructure sectors through existing regulatory agencies. For example, DOE 
(Department of Energy) sets standards of safety and security for all nuclear power plants; 
similar regulations control the safety and security of the nation’s energy pipelines through 
the Department of Transportation’s Office of Pipeline safety.
The current policy of the Department of Homeland Security appears to be “hands-off”
when it comes to dictating security standards in the telecommunications industry. This 
does not make sense when, in fact, the telecommunications industry is already heavily 
regulated by federal and state governments. Because the telecommunications business is 
an inter-state commerce business, there is virtually nothing preventing the addition of 
security standards to inter-state commerce policy. Indeed, the security standards of sister 
industries such as the electrical power industry, are dictated by federally run agencies 
such as the Department of Energy, FERC, and NERC (North America Energy Reliability 
Council). What prevents implementation of security measures in the telecommunications 
industry? It is certainly not the case that the telecommunications sector is owned and 
operated by the private sector. 
Detour 3.1: Critical Infrastructure Protection is too expensive to be provided by the 
companies that own and operate the CI, so we must increase taxes and provide financial 
incentives to the owners so they will harden their assets in the best interest of the country.
This myth is also widely believed by politicians and policy-makers, but once again, it 
defies logic and is dangerous because it distracts us from the task at hand – hardening the 
most critical assets in the various national infrastructure sectors. The first observation is 
this: most sectors bill consumers proportionally to services or products consumed. The 
electrical power companies bill by the kilowatt; the telecommunications industry bills by 
the minute; and the energy sector bills by the amount of energy consumed. In other 
words, these companies stop making money when services or consumables cease to flow. 
Continuity of operations already has its own built-in motive – the more reliable the 
operation, the more money received. Therefore, utility companies are motivated to 
increase continuity of operations. They do not need governmental incentives to reward 
them for doing what they do best: deliver services and consumables to the public.
The only thing more expensive than critical infrastructure protection is loss of 
continuity of operations. The notion that these industries will not protect the sources of 
their profit is a detour in the road to critical infrastructure protection. Instead of doing 
nothing, the national policy should be focused on solving the problem of continuity of 
operations and let the private sector pay for it, because they seek maximal profit. The 
profit motive works – it is maximized when the sector is operational 100% of the time.
And yet it cost something to harden critical infrastructure assets such as power plants, 
roads, and railways. Doesn’t this cost reduce corporate profits? We only need to look at 
the immediate past to show how the profit motive works in favor of private sector 
investment in security. Hurricane Katrina not only damaged much of the infrastructure of 
New Orleans, it also forced Entergy (the regional power company) to the brink of 
bankruptcy. Entergy lost revenues because its electrical power distribution lines and gas-
powered generators were flooded. The cost of stronger levees would have been much less 
than the loss of the company. But of course, Entergy has no control over levees – the 
Army Corps of Engineers does!
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The Big Bang Strategy
From the very outset, the strategy of the Department of Homeland Security has been to 
prepare the nation to respond to high-consequence (high damage), low-probability (low 
vulnerability) events.  One of the early critics of the federal government’s strategy 
identified three weaknesses:
1. Domestic preparedness is focused on highest consequence, least-likely attack, i.e., 
low-probability, high consequence WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) 
terrorism,
2. It is geared toward consequences of chemical/biological WMD attack, because 
WMD are becoming more accessible to terrorists, 
3.  It is geared toward federal investments at the state and local level due to 
Federalism and the belief that attacks will be local, not national; the US is too 
large to maintain a national operational capability at the local level; Federalism 
gives states extensive rights and responsibilities; and the division of labor across 
local, state, federal jurisdictions was compatible with the Stafford Act.10
The problem with this strategy is that state and local governments are woefully 
unprepared to meet such emergencies. Furthermore, they are unlikely ever to be capable 
of responding to big bangs such as a dirty bomb, pandemic, or mass transit emergency. 
The Hurricane Katrina disaster is the latest illustration of local governments being 
overwhelmed by a high-consequence, low-probability event.
Pothole 4: Critical Infrastructure assets are so vast and geographically dispersed that we 
can only protect against the highest-consequence, lowest-probability events.
Closer examination of this pothole shows how impractical it is. Consider the case of a 
smallpox attack launched in a major metropolitan area.11 Suppose the eight million 
inhabitants of Manhattan are exposed to smallpox via a scenario similar to the anthrax 
contamination perpetrated through the U.S. mail in 2002.12  Smallpox has a three day 
incubation period, which means vaccination is effective if given within three days of 
contraction of the virus. Vaccination is a non-trivial medical procedure that requires a 
trained person to carefully administer fifteen pinpricks to medically screened recipients. 
Working twenty-four hours per day, it is estimated that 4,000 health care workers would 
be needed to vaccinate one million people in a timely fashion. In other words, 32,000 
workers would be needed to vaccinate all eight million people living and working in 
Manhattan! 
Logistically, this is an impossible situation. The entire state of New York does not 
have 32,000 health care workers ready to vaccinate eight million people within three
days. Where might these 32,000 workers come from? The NYPD (New York Police 
Department) employees 34,000 workers, so why not turn this problem over to law 
enforcement? This leads to another detour.
Detour 4.1: Terrorism is a criminal activity and hence its prevention should be left to 
local law enforcement, fire fighters, and emergency management services. 
If terrorism is a criminal activity, then all our problems are solved! There are more than 
four million law enforcement, public safety, and medical emergency personnel in the 
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U.S., which makes the combined “EMS community” larger than the sum total of armed 
forces under the command of the Department of Defense. The problem is, they are 
dispersed throughout the country and lack the training, equipment, and intelligence 
information to leverage the entire community of four million “first preventers.” They 
would need to be coordinated at the national level in order to prepare them to respond to 
a high-consequence, low-probability event. If the strategy is to be prepared for the high-
consequence, low-probability event, then preparations must be national, not local. 
National readiness requires national organization and coordination. The lessons of 
Hurricane Katrina remind us that state and local preparedness is insufficient when major 
events occur.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Historically, most critical infrastructure failures have been caused by natural disasters, 
not terrorists, so why so much emphasis on the war on terrorism? Is terrorism, and critical 
infrastructure protection in particular, overrated? The answer must be ‘no’, because of 
9/11. Prior to 9/11 the U.S. considered the homeland safe; non-governmental 
organizations lacked the capacity to reach across the barriers provided by the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans. The asymmetric attacks of 9/11 changed our thinking from elimination of 
the improbable to careful consideration of unlikely high-consequence events. Second, the 
9/11 attacks were – among other things – attacks on critical infrastructure. Manhattan, 
and the twin towers in particular, are the center of banking and finance for the entire 
country. 
If we are to seriously consider critical infrastructure protection as one of the pillars of 
homeland security, then several policy adjustments will be required. As a start, the 
Department of Homeland Security must:
1. Establish itself as a security standards setter and enforcer and act quickly to define 
basic terminology such as ‘vulnerability’ and ‘risk’. In addition, these definitions 
must be applied uniformly across the nation so that true risk assessment can become 
a practical means of evaluation and allocation of funds.
2. The national strategy must leverage national assets to the advantage of high-risk 
areas of the country rather than distribute responsibility to state and local 
governments. The U.S. already does this in a number of other areas: the FBI is 
essentially a national police force; the Department of Interior’s forest fire fighters 
are essentially national fire departments; and the National Guard is essentially an 
interior army. While all of these must remain under civilian control, there is little 
reason to hold back; use these national resources to protect national assets.
3. The interface between government and private sector companies has long been 
established by inter-state commerce laws, regulatory agencies, and the utilities that 
own and operate most critical infrastructure sectors. There is no reason to do 
nothing. Legislation needs to be enacted to guarantee “target hardening” of the 
nation’s most critical infrastructure assets. 
4. Terrorism is not only a criminal activity – it is a military assault on the entire 
population. Hence, we must disavow the notion that local law enforcement agencies 
are capable of preventing acts of violence against critical infrastructure assets. An 
attack on the Weston building telecom hotel located in Seattle is not a criminal 
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activity against Seattle, but a military action against the entire country. It must be 
dealt with as such. 
It is time to re-evaluate the national strategy and replace state and local strategies with a 
national effort. This has been done within the Department of Interior and Forest Service:
large forest fires are fought across regional boundaries, largely by a federal force. It has 
been done to some extent within the food and agriculture sector: FDA regulators work 
with the private sector to ensure the safety of the food supply. And whether or not we 
admit it, the FBI is a national police force that transcends state and local borders.
1 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, Feb. 2003, 
Department of Homeland Security. http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical.html
2
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In 2003, President Bush’s Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) required 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary to develop a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal.  The intent was to establish measurable readiness priorities 
and balance threats and consequences with resources required to prevent, respond to, and 
recover from them.  The goal would include readiness measures, standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies, and a system to assess the nation’s overall 
preparedness to respond to major events, especially terrorist acts. 
Paying attention to the goal and related readiness priorities, particularly at the state 
and local levels, is vital, for at least one simple reason—federal funding.  Under the 
directive, state all-hazard preparedness strategies consistent with the national 
preparedness goal will determine federal preparedness assistance.
1
  This direction was 
affirmed when Congress subsequently cited HSPD-8 for preparedness requirements and 
funding in the fiscal year 2005 DHS appropriations’ language.  The National Intelligence 
Reform Act of 2004 also required DHS to set national performance standards and ensure 
state homeland security plans’ conformance with those standards. 
Responding to the HSPD-8 mandates, DHS adopted a capabilities-based planning 
approach (CBP) from the United States Department of Defense (DoD).  This article 
describes the approach, implementation practices from the DoD experience, and contrasts 
with the DHS strategies. 
 
CBP MODEL FOR HSPD 8 IMPLEMENTATION 
Capabilities-based planning is one approach that is intended to manage risk, set specific 
preparedness goals and priorities, make investment choices, and evaluate preparedness 
results.  Proponents describe CPB as developing the means—capabilities—to respond to 
a wide range of potential challenges and circumstances while mindful of costs and 
sustainability.  CBP uses intelligence, strategic studies, and experiences to describe 
potential future threats and specific event or longer-term scenarios.  The scenarios are 
used to define specific capabilities through an analytical framework starting with mission 
objectives and measures of strategic and operational success and ending with an 
assessment of options on factors such as risk.  Choices consider capability tradeoffs and 
impacts at multiple levels within and across organizational components.
2
 
All member nations of the defense community’s Technical Cooperation Program 
(TCP)—Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States—use 
capability concepts for long-term future defense force structure planning.  The central 
audience for the defense community’s CBP is the “combatant commander” who must 
achieve specific missions.  The TCP’s generic CBP process chart, shown in Figure 1, 
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starts with overarching guidance, identifies capability gaps, explores options, and ends 

















































DEFENSE CBP COMPONENTS AND DHS IMPLEMENTATION 
My review of the defense community’s CBP experience represented by the TCP 
highlights several components important for CBP implementation to contrast with DHS’s 
approach and provide “lessons learned” useful for future CBP implementation.
4
  In the 
following sections, I describe these components and briefly contrast them with DHS’s 
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Table 1. DHS Approach and the Defense Components 
Components DHS Progress 
Business Case for CBP Adoption:  Justify 
organizational commitment and investment 
Business case stated in terms of national 
preparedness in HSPD-8 and now in legislation; clear 
business case still to be made for adopting CBP. 
Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals:  Use 
top-level government guidance that cascades 
goals into strategic policy and operational 
documents and into CBP. 
Multiple sources of policy goals including national 
strategies, HSPD-8 and other presidential directives, the 
National Response Plan, and the National Incident 
Management System; integrated, single-source policy 
document for homeland security and national 
preparedness not yet available. 
Stakeholder Ownership:  Ensure 
stakeholder involvement, collaboration, and 
perspective-sharing. 
Inconsistent attention paid to state and local entities 
as primary stakeholders; primarily federal approach used 
in consultation with, not collaboration with those 
entities.  Private sector stakeholders yet to be closely 
involved. 
Top Leader Ownership:  Ensure top leader 
support, involvement, and decision-making. 
Federal leadership within DHS appears supportive; 
top leadership from other stakeholders still evolving.  
Decision-making processes not transparent and 
apparently fragmented. 
Specific Management Decision-Making 
Process:  Design and implement CBP decision 
process that captures mission tasks and 
capabilities, their priority, how they relate, 
solutions, and resource allocation. 
Process has evolved over time but is not formally 
structured with clear responsibilities, decision-making 
roles, and integration into stakeholders strategic 
planning, budgeting, program evaluation, and corrective 
action.  Interim documents extend the process. 
Risk Assessment Approach:  Use risk 
assessment in the CBP management process to 
determine investments. 
Risk assessment is not well-defined and presented 
as an integral part of DHS CBP decision-making similar 
to the defense communities. 
Different Planning Horizons:  Incorporate 
different planning horizons into CBP to stage 
the development of capabilities. 
No expression of planning horizons to date; DHS 
has promised to evolve CBP and planning horizons may 
be part of the evolvement. 
Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios: Have 
the right scenarios on which to base planning 
and/or exercises 
Selection of 15 scenarios for planning; concern the 
scenarios are much too focused on terrorism in contrast 
to a clearer all-hazards approach and do not include 
different timeframes, including very long term. 
Capability Development and Standard 
Categories:  Provide guidelines to craft 
capabilities and develop standard capability 
categories that fully reflect what effects the 
capabilities should generate. 
Limited guidance on how to develop capabilities; 
capability categories still in process; no clear direction 
provided as to what is the best way to structure the 
capabilities for use by most entities. 
Decision Rules for Lists:  Establish clear 
rules for the development of task lists and 
capability lists. 
Rules for development not explicit; changing 
categories and elements. 
CBP Evolution:  Evolve CBP depending on 
planning applications and developing maturity. 
Policy timeframes have precluded a more 
evolutionary approach to CBP and addressing differing 
maturity in capability areas. 
CBP Enablers:  Consider organizational 
and cultural enablers to support CBP adoption. 
Enablers may be recognized but have not been 
adequately addressed; process characterized by rapid 
spiral development with extremely limited timeframes 
for consideration. 
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 Business Case for CBP Adoption 
First, CBP adoption requires a strong business case to justify the organizational 
commitment and investment.  In the defense communities, the business case grew 
primarily out of the need to shift defense planning from a “threat-based” model to a 
“capabilities-based” model. Instead of planning for large conventional wars in a few 
distant theaters under the threat-based model, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review 
proposed identifying capabilities that relied on surprise, deception, and asymmetric 
warfare to deter and defeat adversaries. 
DoD used threat-based planning since DoD instituted the Planning, Programming, 
and Budgeting System in 1962.  However, threat-based planning meant strong response 
to a few situations while largely ignoring all other potential challenges.  DoD’s threat-
based approach and illustrative official planning scenarios for major theater wars served 
as specifications, defining necessary and sufficient characteristics of the force structure, 
thereby leading to consistent support of current programs.  The approach only considered 
conventional-wisdom threats and point-in-time versions of detailed scenarios, as though 
the circumstances of future conflict could be predicted.  In the foreword to the Joint 
Operations Concepts, Secretary Rumsfeld said a capabilities-based approach would focus 
more on how the United States would defeat an adversary’s broad array of capabilities 
instead of identifying who the adversaries were and where they might threaten joint 
forces or United States’ interest. 
While addressing the limitations of threat-based planning was the primary business 
case for DoD’s adoption of CBP, there were other reasons too.  CBP attempts to break 
down traditional single-service stovepipes allowing systems and concepts from multiple 
services to achieve capabilities.  A joint focus encourages decisions with broad defense 
force goals in mind instead of considering their own service.  CBP also compares options 
for achieving the same capability in an integrated fashion.  Before CBP, acquisition 
requirements often were developed, validated, and approved as stand-alone solutions to 
counter specific threats or scenarios with systems integration forced at the end.  The 
result was duplication, poor spiral acquisition practices, and problems in prioritizing joint 
warfighting needs.  CBP links procurement decisions to strategic goals and provides an 
audit trail for accountability. 
Thus, the defense community experience suggests the adoption of CBP requires a 
strong business case to justify the organizational commitment and investment, such as 
flexibility in addressing current and future adversaries and their strategies.  For homeland 
security, DHS officials assumed there would be overwhelming state and local support of 
a national preparedness goal simply because it was mandated in HSPD-8.  Beyond this 
almost “motherhood and apple pie” argument, very little attention was paid to significant 
benefits that might result, such as clearly defined levels of preparedness understandable 
across many organizations and useful for funding decisions.  In addition, a clear business 
case was not made in support of an all-hazards approach under the national goal.  The 
goal’s implementation clearly stressed counter-terrorism, with all-hazards a secondary 
emphasis. 
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Strategic, Cascading Policy Goals 
A second component is establishing specific strategic policy goals from top-level 
government guidance to derive high-level capability objectives.  These policy goals 
support the use of top-level doctrine or some overarching operational concepts that 
consider the way a force will fight.  Moreover, these goals cascade into strategic policy 
and operational documents, and then into the CBP process and its planning outputs.  For 
example, the foundation for Canada’s CBP was an early White Paper that defined 
governmental expectations, leading to a Strategy 2020 document that articulated the 
national defense vision.  In turn, the Canadian Forces concept of force employment was 
crafted to describe how the national defense vision would be delivered.  Force planning 
scenarios illustrated where and when the concept of employment would be applied, 
finally leading to Canada’s capability goals matrix and Canada Joint Task List (CJTL) for 
CBP.  In the United Kingdom, a defense white paper also set out the need to defend 
against future principal security challenges such as international terrorism, weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and weak and failing states.  The Australia 
Department of Defence also relied on a white paper on the future of Australia’s defense 
force. 
A similar process occurred in DoD in planning for joint processes and in individual 
services.  DoD built its strategic framework to defend the nation and secure a viable 
peace around four defense policy goals—assuring allies and friends, dissuading future 
military competition, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and if 
deterrence failed, decisively defeating any adversary.  These strategic policy goals are 
further defined in other documents.  For example, within DoD joint force decision- 
making concepts – Joint Operations Concepts, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional 
Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts – are translated into a capability level of detail, 
often using a time frame of 10 to 20 years into the future.  Military judgment is applied to 
those concepts to validate what collection of attributes and measures are needed, and thus 
a standard for critical functional areas.  Current programs are mapped against that 
standard to compare current capabilities against the standard, propose alternatives, choose 
a specific capability, and then move that decision into the investment strategy. 
In summary, specific policy goals, derived from top-level government guidance, 
should cascade into strategic policy and operational documents, and then into the CBP 
process and its planning outputs.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security provided 
the most central statement of homeland security intent, but was written largely in support 
of the formation of DHS.  It was joined by other sources of national policy goals, 
including other national homeland security-related strategies, HSPD-8 and other 
presidential directives, federal agency strategic plans, regulations and policy guidance, 
the National Response Plan, and the National Incident Management System.  In large 
part, these various documents are statements of federal perspectives because no clear 
mechanism exists to produce top-level “national” guidance that is accepted and 
applicable across all levels of government, non-governmental organizations, and the 
private sector.  Unlike what appears to be the case in the defense communities, these 
various federally-developed national policy documents stand alone.  They have not been 
systematically integrated into a cohesive policy whole.  That may be the role envisioned 
for the national preparedness goal and related guidance, but its current construction will 
not meet that need.  In some cases, there are conflicting objectives and requirements 
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across the policy documents.  DHS could solve this problem with a single-source policy 
document for homeland security and national preparedness. 
Stakeholder Ownership 
A third component is ensuring stakeholder ownership, especially important for joint 
planning and operations.  The TCP says that one of the first requirements for successful 
implementation of CBP is stakeholder involvement, described in collaborative terms.  
Stakeholders generally control the information, resources, and authority required to 
support CBP, and their requirements must be considered from the outset.  Key 
stakeholders—those responsible for identifying and deploying the capability envelopes—
will eventually control the CBP process, and it is important that they have ownership of 
it.  Each stakeholder should have an understanding of the perspectives of other 
stakeholders and an appreciation of different, if not competing, requirements.  Defense 
planners should be engaged at all levels.  As with other components, the decision-making 
process can help build in stakeholder ownership.  For example, the U.S. Air Force 
(USAF) uses its decision process to secure “joint acceptance” of capability selections. 
To summarize, the defense community experience shows that the stakeholders should 
own the process and take responsibility for its use and outputs.  Stakeholders generally 
control the information, resources, and authority required to support CBP.  For homeland 
security, DHS attempted to include stakeholders such as state and local government 
officials, national associations, and other federal agencies involved in homeland security.  
However, instead of taking a partnering, collaborative approach, DHS used consultants to 
develop voluminous draft material and then asked for stakeholder reaction.  DHS 
justified consultation rather than partnership on the tight national goal implementation 
timeframes in HSPD-8 and its requirement for federal development in consultation with 
others.  The end result has been “push back” from key state and local stakeholders, 
confusion about intent and requirements, and lack of understanding of CBP and what it is 
intended to do.  In hindsight, of course, a better approach would have been to partner and 
take a less complex approach to implementation if the HSPD-8 implementation 
timeframes could not be changed. 
Top Leader Ownership 
Another component is top leader support, involvement, and decision-making—
ownership—for the CBP process.  DoD’s Joint Integrating Concepts (Joint Concepts) are 
delivered with a detailed scenario, concept of operations (CONOPS), and a list of tasks 
with measures for a Functional Capabilities Board (Board) to perform a capabilities based 
assessment on each Joint Concept and perform a data call to services to match Joint 
Concept tasks to current, programmed, and planned systems.  Each Board is a key 
decision-making body. 
Only the high-level Joint Requirements Operation Council can charter a Board.  The 
Boards ensure new capabilities are conceived and developed in a joint warfighting 
context and proposals are consistent with an integrated joint force.  They also organize, 
analyze, and prioritize capabilities proposals, oversee the development and updating of 
functional concepts, and ensure integrated architectures reflect the functional areas.  Each 
Board assesses the Joint Concept against the baseline scenario provided by the author, 
and then may run it against additional Defense planning scenarios to refine the conditions 
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and standards for each task and aggregate capability.  The CBP output is a weighted list 
of capability needs, gaps, and excesses. 
In 2000, the USAF began developing six CONOPs to support its contribution to the 
joint defense strategy.  All USAF operations, programming, and budget decisions in turn 
are designed to support the capabilities defined by the CONOPs.  Six new CONOPS 
divisions on the USAF Air Staff in the Operations Requirements Directorate were created 
to connect CBP around these CONOPS.  Each of the USAF’s six CONOPS has an 
assigned advocate called a Champion responsible for the capabilities the USAF has, or 
needs to develop.  The CONOPS Champions play a key role in mitigating risk throughout 
CONOPS development.  They are charged with overseeing the entire development 
process and for communicating issues to senior leadership.  CONOPS assessment and 
analysis is conducted by subject matter experts under the critical jurisdiction of each 
Champion.  CONOPS Champions will integrate priorities among capabilities for review 
by the USAF corporate structure and participate in the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council via USAF challenges.  Oversight action and challenges ensure all CONOPS 
capabilities are addressed at the Boards to help ensure all programs are jointly accepted. 
Therefore, the defense community experience demonstrates that top leadership 
support, involvement, and decision-making are critical to CBP success.  For defense, 
support has truly started at the top of cabinet departments and ministries and been 
sustained.  Top military and civilian officials are responsible for CBP and are held 
accountable for its operation.  In contrast, DHS never established similar top leadership 
authorities and decision-making processes for CBP.  This could be corrected by 
establishing a formal board, similar to the DoD Functional Capabilities Board for top 
CBP leadership.  Such a board would include federal, state, and local representation with 
national state and local associations tasked to name representatives. 
Specific Management Decision-Making Process 
A fifth component is a well-designed and implemented decision process for CBP.  This 
process should capture tasks and capabilities needed to carry out missions and their 
priority, how they relate, solutions to meet those needs, and allocation of resources.  For 
example, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), the 
Defense Acquisition System, and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
process form DoD’s three principle decision support processes to transform the military 
forces to support the National Military Strategy and the Defense Strategy.  The JCIDS 
provides an enhanced methodology to identify and describe gaps and redundancies in 
capabilities, prioritize capability proposals, and improve collaboration with other 
departments and agencies.  The goal is to ensure that the joint force has the capabilities 
necessary to perform across the range of military operations. 
JCIDS analysis begins with a Functional Area Analysis that identifies the operational 
tasks, conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives.  As input, it uses 
the national strategies, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, Joint 
Integrating Concepts, Integrated Architectures, the Universal Joint Task List, and the 
anticipated range of broad capabilities that adversaries might employ.  Output consists of 
the tasks to be reviewed in the follow-on Functional Needs Analysis that assesses the 
ability of the current and programmed joint capabilities to accomplish the tasks that the 
functional area analysis identified, under the full range of operating conditions and in 
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compliance with designated standards.  The needs analysis produces a list of capability 
gaps or shortcomings that require solutions and indicates the time frame in which those 
solutions are needed.  A Functional Solution Analysis follows, which is an operationally-
based assessment of potential approaches to solving (or mitigating) one or more of the 
capability gaps (needs) identified in the Functional Needs Analysis. 
A capabilities review and risk assessment (CRRA) step following a functional needs 
analysis is the most important step for the Air Force.  In the CRRA, capability measures 
are developed from a variety of analysis tools such as current intelligence estimates, 
modeling and simulation, and wargaming.  Measures of effectiveness are assigned to all 
levels of required capabilities within a master capabilities list to score how well the 
USAF performs.  Scenarios are selected to assess the USAF’s ability to deliver effects 
needed.  Scenarios from the Defense planning scenarios are used and further refined by 
guidelines in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy.  The 
scenarios also are modified by more demanding requirements known as stressors to craft 
broad spectrum capabilities.  Analysis determines a definition of problems and capability 
shortfalls, presented to USAF senior leadership for decision-making and resource 
allocation. 
Thus, the defense community experience indicates a well-designed and implemented 
decision process for CBP is an element for success.  This process should capture tasks 
and capabilities needed to carry out missions and their priority, how they relate, and 
solutions for meeting those needs.  Homeland security, however, does not yet have a 
process similar, for example, to DoD’s Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System.  The homeland security CBP process at this point is not formally structured with 
clear responsibilities, decision-making roles, defined steps and expected inputs and 
outputs, and melding into formal organizational planning, budgeting, and procurement 
decisions.  It is not clear how CBP will be seamlessly integrated with existing 
management approaches for government agencies, non-governmental organizations, and 
private sector companies.  The linkage from results expectations to budgeting is 
particularly problematic for funders such as boards of directors, city councils, state 
legislatures, and Congress must accept and act on CBP’s analytical framework and its 
products for decision-making. 
Risk Assessment Approach 
A sixth component is using risk assessment in the CBP management process.  A key tenet 
of CBP is addressing affordability and sustainability, which means that not all 
capabilities can be deployed or maintained.  Affordability and sustainability requires 
addressing risk tolerances and priorities for capability development and deployment, and 
assessing capabilities and their impacts over time.  Balancing investments in CBP will 
require deletions and additions in elements such as force development as part of risk and 
priority setting. 
For example, the DoD developed a broad approach to risk management intended to 
ensure the defense establishment is sized, shaped, postured, committed, and managed to 
accomplish defense policy goals.  Managing risk means changes in operating practices 
and military and civilian personnel systems, business practices, and infrastructure.  These 
dimensions reflect DoD’s experiences over the last decade in attempting to balance 
strategy, force structure, and resources.  The risk management framework gives DoD the 
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ability to consider capability tradeoffs among fundamental objectives and fundamental 
resources constraints. 
The framework is made of four related dimensions: force management, operational, 
future challenges, and institutional.  Force management is the ability to recruit, retain, 
train, and equip sufficient numbers of quality personnel and sustain the readiness of the 
force while accomplishing operational tasks.  Operational is the ability to achieve 
military objectives in a near-term conflict or other contingency, with risk management 
considering not just additional force structure, but also assessing changes in capabilities, 
concepts of operations, and organizational designs to help reduce risk.  A future 
challenge is the ability to invest in new capabilities and develop new operational concepts 
needed to dissuade or defeat mid- to long-term military challenges.  The last dimension is 
institutional, the ability to develop management practices and controls that use resources 
efficiently and promote the effective operation of the defense establishment. 
Periodic assessment of existing and planned capabilities is part of ongoing risk 
assessment.  The TCP notes some nations that are practicing CBP will assess capabilities 
three or four times over an approximate fifteen year period.  For example, the Canada 
Department of National Defence uses a capability goals matrix to rank capabilities.  
There are four levels in the Canadian matrix—military strategic, operational, and tactical, 
with the operational level divided to identify goals in the domestic and international 
context.  The capability areas are rated as to importance (high, medium, and low) to the 
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces to achieve their overarching 
defense mission.  To reach high capability, the Department of National Defence and the 
Canadian Forces must be capable of exerting effective, unilateral defense ability in the 
majority of the applicable Canadian Joint Task List sub-tasks associated with that 
capability area.  The capability must be high and unilateral because it cannot be delegated 
to another nation or because experience and strategic circumstances dictate that high is 
the minimum acceptable level for overall success and risk management. 
Medium level capability goals, less easily defined, are those where an effective 
capability in most of the applicable sub-tasks is considered important and may also result 
from a conscious decision to assume some risk in that capability area.  For example, the 
Canadian Forces need to conduct joint and combined operations effectively and possess 
interoperability with major allies.  Canada’s risk assessment considers joint and 
combined operations as separate concepts.  “Jointness” is the art of combining 
capabilities from different military services to create an effect that is greater than the sum 
of the parts.  However, not all military functions or capabilities need to be joint: some 
will be combined. Canadian units more frequently will be combined (interoperate) with 
the units of another nation of similar capabilities, producing a larger formation and 
complementary capabilities coordinated in a specific situation.  Units may also need to 
assume a significant leadership role for medium capability goals, although this will not 
normally be necessary. 
A low capability goal indicates a minimum level of capability, depending on a 
specific strategic situation or an assessment of benefits in seeking a higher capability 
level for an assigned defense mission compared to costs.  Under a low capability goal, 
Canadian units must be able to take part in joint or combined operations, but not assume 
a leadership role. 
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In sum, the defense community experience points out that risk assessment is part of 
the CBP management process.  Risk assessment addresses affordability and 
sustainability, and thus risk tolerances and priorities for capability development and 
deployment and their impacts over time.  Assessment of risk is built into scenarios, 
capabilities review, and a consideration of benefits and costs.  Measurement systems are 
viewed as very important.  Other than scenario development and directions for states and 
localities to consider what is appropriate for their jurisdictions, risk assessment is not 
well-defined and presented as an integral part of homeland security CBP decision-
making.  Measures and evaluation systems are still in development.  Moreover, it will be 
difficult to develop and implement regional approaches where core capabilities can be 
supported and supplemented by other jurisdictions in the region.  Political considerations 
may encourage jurisdictions to have a complete set of core preparedness activities rather 
than rely on other entities.  As a result, many jurisdictions will be engaged in parallel 
activities within their own risk decisions, and there may be little opportunity to learn 
from one another or share resources as part of an overarching risk management approach. 
Different Planning Horizons 
An additional component is incorporating different planning horizons into CBP to stage 
the development of capabilities.  The timeframes should cover a sufficient span for action 
and changes to take effect, and then allow an assessment of risk over time.  To illustrate, 
the Canada Department of National Defence envisions three planning horizons, each with 
a different focus for CBP.  Horizon One is for a maximum of five years and seeks to 
deliver capability in already identified ways.  Horizon Two is for five to fifteen years and 
focuses on delivering already identified capabilities in better ways.  Horizon Three is for 
ten to thirty years and determines if capabilities are needed in the anticipated future, in 
addition to exploring radically new ways of delivering capabilities.  The time period is 
deliberately overlapping for Horizons Two and Three. 
Canada describes the first horizon as the most detailed because it executes an already 
developed plan and shapes near term program aspects.  It requires detailed programming 
of resources, determining if plans are unfolding as required, and developing the 
appropriate level of capability.  The second horizon optimizes how best to do what 
already is generally understood and ensure that introducing a more effective way of 
delivering a known capability transitions seamlessly into the more detailed plans from 
Horizon One.  The third horizon is the most challenging as it deals with introducing 
fundamental changes in the way a capability will be delivered and determining what 
developments promise to deliver the future necessary capabilities. 
Similarly, DoD describes the need for a two-pronged view of implementing CBP—
maintaining a military advantage in key areas while developing new areas of military 
advantage and denying asymmetric advantages to adversaries.  Thus, it entails adapting 
existing military capabilities to new circumstances, while experimenting with the 
development of new military capabilities.  More specifically, force development planning 
solves future capabilities by asking what top-down investment guidance is needed to 
address future strategic challenges.  Force development decisions also consider what 
DoD can provide in achievable technologies and methods of the future force.  In contrast, 
force employment decisions involve planning for today’s events, such as strategic 
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decisions as to how best to manage and posture DoD assets to support national interests 
and mitigate risks. 
In sum, the defense community incorporates different planning horizons into CBP to 
stage the development of capabilities for the near, medium, and long term.  The 
homeland security approach at this stage does not appear to have any similar expression 
of planning horizons.  The fifteen homeland security planning scenarios address an event 
in the “here and now” (bombings and bioterrorism) with an emphasis on national 
priorities.  DHS has promised to constantly assess and change CBP and thus the needed 
planning horizons may yet be addressed.  However, lack of attention to capabilities for 
varying horizons may result in implementing capabilities that may be appropriate next 
year, but not five years from now.  The result is poor investment portfolio planning and 
creating capabilities that may be obsolete or require extensive updating in a short time 
period.  The focus on national priorities may obscure or delay an emphasis on more 
valued planning horizons that anticipate possible future scenarios. 
Mission-Based, Phased Scenarios 
The eighth component is having the right scenarios on which to base planning and/or 
exercises.  Defense capability should be assessed using plausible situations encapsulated 
in planning scenarios.  These scenarios provide the context of CBP and should cover the 
full spectrum of military activities.  The scenarios help develop realistic capability goals 
and the provision of a defense force meeting government requirements at a minimum 
cost.  In addition, as mentioned earlier, scenarios should provide a series of time frames 
to facilitate capability assessment through time as part of risk assessment, rather than at a 
single arbitrary point in the future.  Scenarios also should be used in combination to 
assess simultaneous operations. 
Scenario types can be on a spectrum, ranging from real world planning scenarios to 
generic scenarios.  Whichever type of scenarios are used, the scenarios should reflect the 
type of tasks that the government may want its defense force to undertake.  In addition, 
scenarios used for CBP should be common across the defense force and detailed enough 
so that re-interpretation of the scenario does not occur. 
Australia uses one or more strategic scenarios to identify a capability requirement and 
then operational scenarios determine the operational requirements for a proposed 
capability.  Strategic scenarios represent strategically endorsed scenarios, high-level 
descriptions of situations with a brief history of preceding events and their context.  Each 
scenario typically will describe a conflict situation, an opposing force, a military setting, 
a theatre of operations and the events leading up to the conflict situation.  They specify 
the international setting and the attitudes of allies, allies of the enemy and neutrals.  They 
also detail the political aims of the Australian government and its military strategic 
objectives.  All strategic scenarios, taken together, in principle largely define overall 
defense requirements. 
Australia’s strategically derived operational scenarios are reference scenarios that 
have been extended from strategic scenarios, to provide sufficient detail for rigorous 
evaluation and descriptions of defense requirements for and use of capabilities.  One 
scenario example is evicting an enemy from an overseas territory with phases 
representing the buildup, the establishment of sea and air dominance, lodgement, the 
tactical battle, and the post-battle phase.  The Australian operational scenarios are more 
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detailed extensions of the strategic scenarios, often detailing a force structure with 
equipped capabilities to be applied to achieve the particular mission.  Strategic and 
operational scenarios form a link between strategic planning, futures analysis, 
experimentation, capability development, force development, contingency planning and 
preparedness. 
The United Kingdom Ministry of Defence builds in what it calls “concurrency” in its 
use of scenarios for force structure development.  The Ministry of Defense establishes 
what is needed for a particular operational scenario and then maps the conclusions 
against a number of operations that should be conducted at any one time.  For example, 
the United Kingdom should be able to respond to a medium scale operation at the same 
time as an enduring small scale operation and a one time small scale intervention 
operation. 
The Canada Department of National Defence uses operational research tools in a 
scenario operational capability risk assessment model to identify how often different 
types of capabilities are called upon in the scenarios.  While there are arguments for using 
a broad range of scenarios in CBP to thoroughly test force structure for a wide range of 
situations, the Department of National Defence argues for a small number.  The 
Department believes that while a more comprehensive list of scenarios may theoretically 
add more precision to the force planning process, they may not as there are so many 
uncertainties. 
Thus, the defense community emphasizes that defense capability should be assessed 
by using plausible situations in planning scenarios to cover the full spectrum of military 
activities.  In addition, scenarios used for CBP should be common across the defense 
force and detailed enough so that re-interpretation of the scenario does not occur.  Many 
state and local officials are concerned that the national planning scenarios focus too much 
on terrorism and, as mentioned above, the scenarios do not include different timeframes, 
including very long term. 
The homeland security CBP approach makes the assumption that preparing for 
terrorist events, representing the vast majority of the planning scenarios, will prepare 
jurisdictions for all-hazards events.  Many would argue that it might make more sense to 
develop capabilities for more probable all-hazards that can be “ramped up” for large-
scale terrorist events or large-scale natural or non-intentional human-caused disasters.  As 
a result, capabilities would cover a full spectrum of homeland security activities.  
Capabilities then could be scaled to what is affordable and sustainable (and more likely to 
be used) at the state and local level, and then supplemented by regional and/or federal 
capabilities if an event overwhelms those capabilities.  This approach anticipates that in 
most catastrophic situations, even a full complement of capabilities at the local or 
regional level will be quickly overcome. 
Capability Development and Standard Categories 
A ninth component is providing guidelines to craft capabilities and develop standard 
capability categories that fully reflect what effects the capabilities should generate.  For 
example, the DoD’s Battlespace Awareness Functional Capabilities Board provides 
guidelines to craft capability descriptions.  The descriptions must indicate 1) what the 
capability is to do, such as “track” or “determine,” 2) identify a target or subject, such as 
a person on a battlefield, 3) the size or range of the subject, such as a large vessel, 4) the 
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domain of the target systems, such as air-breathing targets, 5) the area of action, and 6) 
the range to area, or the distance over which effects must be made or action taken.  
Capabilities are seen as the end of a “waterfall” of lower levels of mission used in 
functional area analysis, illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Battlespace Awareness Waterfall Example 
 
Regarding categories, the TCP recommends standard groupings such as capability 
clusters or capability partitions to make the CBP process more manageable.  There are 
many ways to define the boundaries between capability partitions.  These partitions are 
based on the ability to perform tasks, or to deliver effects, such as the control and denial 
of underwater battle space.  A key enabler for successful CBP is getting the partitions 
agreed to by the key stakeholders and account for synergies and dependencies across 
partitions.  The capability partitions should not be aligned to inappropriate organizations.  
If they are aligned, then organizational stovepiping is encouraged.
5
 
It is suggested at least two fundamental military capability categorization options can 
be used independently or in combination.  One is functional or means-focused.  These 
capabilities would include battlespace awareness, command and control, logistics, and 
force management.  Another option is operational or ends-focused.  Operational 
categories might include strategic deterrence, homeland defense, civil support, and land 
combat operations.  Each category then would be further defined. To illustrate, force 
management would include force employment and force deployment. Homeland defense 
would include capabilities such as continuity of operations, securing domestic approaches 
and territory, and population protection.
6
 
The defense communities have taken similar approaches to capability categorization.  
For example, as described by the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, military tasks 
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provide a framework for detailed defense planning for the size, shape, and capabilities of 
the United Kingdom’s Armed Forces.  The military tasks reflect the broad types of tasks 
and operations in which the United Kingdom is likely to be involved and then provide an 
output-focused framework for developing force structure requirements.  The eighteen 
military tasks are in the four areas of 1) standing strategic commitments, such as nuclear 
deterrent and strategic intelligence gathering, 2) standing home commitments, such as 
security at home in support of other government departments, 3) standing overseas 
commitments, such as commitments to international alliances and partners, and 4) 
contingent operations overseas, such as humanitarian assistance and peace support 
operations.  Military capability is divided into six key capability elements, such as 
maritime, land, and logistics.  The Canada Department of National Defence divides 
military tasks into eight capability areas, such as Command, Information and Intelligence, 
and Corporate Policy and Strategy. 
The defense community experiences indicate that an important component is 
providing guidance on crafting capability descriptions and developing standard capability 
categories fully reflecting what effects the capabilities should generate.  DHS policies 
and guidance do generically define a capability, but guidance is lacking as to how to craft 
a capability description.  The homeland security capability categories should be agreed to 
by key stakeholders and account for interrelationships across the capability categories. 
At present, there does not appear to be a clear sense and rationale as to the best way 
to partition the homeland security capabilities for use by most entities.  The task list 
categories, still in draft, initially indicated capabilities will reflect primarily an indirect 
organizational categorization—federal, state, and local responsibilities, and then later on 
those for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and citizens.  This may have 
created organizational stovepiping of capabilities, which the defense community 
cautioned against.  The latest draft documents use “mission areas” for emphasis—
prevention, protection, response, and recover.  The IED prototype uses mission areas with 
critical tasks drawn from the organizational tasks lists, adding to the confusion of what 
categories are in play or may be the final form.  The categorization across task lists and 
capability areas should be clarified, justified, and stabilized. 
Decision Rules for Lists 
In another component, the defense communities establish clear rules for the development 
of task lists and capability lists.  These rules include the source for compiling the lists, 
what criteria will be used in selecting candidates for the list, and how they should be 
arrayed.  For example, the universal joint task list for DoD’s CBP is the result of fourteen 
years of spiral development.  Many sources of information from the task list to individual 
service sources to interagency information regarding tasks, conditions, and standards are 
being filtered for DoD’s universal capability library.  The library structure consists of a 
capability library—a master database of capabilities linked to current, planned, and 
roadmapped forces, units, and equipment—and a task library.  The task library is the 
master database of all doctrinal and conceptual tasks. 
The Australia Department of Defence has followed several principles for designing 
its Australian Joint Essential Tasks: joint, enduring, essential, and containing relevant and 
current content.  Joint tasks are those that require the contribution of two or more forces 
working together to achieve the desired outcome.  Enduring tasks capture how the 
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Australian Defence Force operates currently and might undertake joint operations in the 
future.  Essential tasks capture what are required for the conduct of an operation.   
In addition to the design principles, Australia Department of Defence has set two 
further design goals for future Joint Task development—uniqueness and hierarchical.  
For any given level of command, a task only appears once in the task hierarchy.  No tasks 
should be duplicated, although some related tasks might appear in more than one place.  
The requirement for uniqueness is analogous to the United States’ UJTL requirement that 
tasks be mutually exclusive, that is, that any task performed by any joint organization or 
service unit will fit into only one place in the task structure.  Thus common tasks were 
abstracted out of their natural parent task and were grouped together. 
In addition, the Joint Tasks, similar to other defense agencies, are intended to 
maintain a hierarchical structure.  For a high level task, its subordinate tasks, taken 
together, comprehensively define all of the activities in the higher-level task.  For 
example, the Australian Joint Tasks and Canada’s joint task list have three levels of joint 
tasks—strategic, operational, and tactical.  The tasks within each level are further 
disaggregated into two additional layers of sub-tasks with each layer more detailed and 
specific. 
However, opinions differ about hierarchical and uniqueness design for the lists.  
Some recommend that hierarchies should not be imposed because these require 
preconceived notions about what criteria are more valuable or useful for segregating data.  
Hierarchies require frequent changes or alternate versions of lists.  Mutual exclusivity 
also may not be required, at least at the operational level as no real force, unit, equipment, 
or system falls entirely within any one category. 
To summarize, the defense communities establish clear rules for the development of 
task lists and capability lists, such as uniqueness and hierarchy.  For homeland security, 
publicly available documents indicate a lack of explicit rules for decision-making.  As 
part of CBP implementation, DHS could easily formulate such rules.  Explicit decision 
rules should help the further development and revision of the detailed and lengthy lists 
over time.  For example, a rule regarding uniqueness would ensure developers would 
independently assess each task and whether its description is similar to or actually part of 
another task. 
CBP Evolution 
Another component is evolving CBP depending on planning applications and maturity.  
Each defense organization is in various stages of implementing CBP, both on a national 
joint and individual service level.  However, each organization has tailored CBP and 
taken a staged approach to implementation.  For example, as described by the Australia 
Department of Defence, allied CBP approaches are similar, but emphasize different 
outcomes over time: 
• The United Kingdom has primarily focused on immediate operations and long 
term planning.  The United Kingdom has used a list of essential joint tasks as an analysis 
tool for exercises with more recent efforts to integrate the tasks into mission analysis and 
operational planning. 
• Canada’s tasks are closely linked into force planning scenarios and future 
planning and are used in joint department structuring so each department uses the same 
criteria for operations and to translate tasks into capability.  Canada uses its joint task list 
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for force employment and capability development and has developed eleven force 
planning scenarios to link their capability development and planning. 
• The United States joint task list has aided in the development of planning 
requirements for joint exercises since 1993.  The joint task list was developed specifically 
for training but is now linked into readiness and preparedness reporting and capability 
development. 
CBP also will progress at a different pace in the organization, creating different levels 
of maturity overall.  Thus, some capabilities needed for the defense community of a 
nation may be delayed compared to others.  The Canada Department of National Defence 
points out that over time CBP improves commonality among defense planners by 
introducing a common way of describing and discussing capability elements.  As the 
different national defense organizations in Canada adopt the common terminology, it 
becomes easier to link different plans providing various capability components.  In the 
beginning, certain plans will be more mature or more vital for integrated planning.  
Canada’s long-term plan for major equipment is the most mature in employing CBP.  The 
development of long-term plans for personnel resources, research, concepts, information 
technology, and infrastructure is likely necessary before more encompassing capability 
planning can be done in Canada. 
Thus, the defense community experience includes evolving CBP to reflect planning 
applications.  CBP will progress at a different pace in different parts of the organization, 
creating different levels of maturity.  For homeland security, current policy timeframes 
have precluded a more evolutionary approach to CBP and imposed extremely limited 
turnaround time for stakeholder comments on various draft products.  DHS does plan on 
enhancing the approach, but it will be very hard to dismantle earlier structures once the 
homeland security grant process “institutionalizes” around capability categories and 
tiered requirements.  A comprehensive CBP system is expected to be up and running in a 
timeframe of months.  While adoption initially will be based on one scenario—explosive 
devices—for initial planning, federal funding guidance indicates that in less than two 
years, all scenarios will be part of state and local planning.  In addition, the CBP as 
currently being adopted does not directly address differing maturity in capability areas 
that may impede overall progress in homeland security preparedness.  DHS would be 
well-served to consider such maturity considerations in its CBP implementation 
decisions. 
CBP Enablers 
The last component is additional organizational and cultural enablers for effective CBP 
adoption.  These are other necessary and sufficient factors, which along with components 
already mentioned, such as stakeholder ownership, create and sustain the environment for 
implementation.  Many practitioners and students of CBP have highlighted 
considerations for CBP design and deployment that cover a wide range of factors, from 
mindset changes to the practicalities of resourcing CBP planning and execution. 
Davis and Jenkins write that CBP’s complexity requires a passion for adaptiveness 
and substantial analysis leading to a combination of incentives, standards, and policies for 
CBP.
7
  They cite the need for major studies on how to modify economic and other 
incentives to encourage more adaptive and recoverable systems.  Feaga recommends 
developing new languages in risk management and effects once it is known what 
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capability proficiency and sufficiency levels are needed.
8
  The Australian experience 
indicates attention is needed to address conflicting processes, the lack of suitable 
analytical tools, excessively prescriptive requirements, and the recognition of functional 
linkages and dependencies between related capabilities. 
Similarly, DoD recommends a broad and long-term strategic perspective, a greater 
appreciation of the operational and strategic environmental factors, and a rigorous 
analysis of the capabilities needed to achieve defense policy goals.  The Technical 
Cooperation Program lists the need for consistent cost estimates and resource provision 
for both the development and execution of the CBP process.  Moreover, joint force 
personnel will require a joint and expeditionary “mindset” reflecting a greater level of 
deployability and versatility to avoid organizational stovepiping.  Canada’s Department 
of National Defence identifies the challenge of developing and maintaining capabilities to 
conduct operations independently in domestic situations and alongside alliance and 
coalition partners for international obligations.  Canada believes the focus must remain 
on combat-capable units because these units can be employed in other security activities, 
such as peacekeeping, while those with non-combat capabilities cannot meet combat 
needs. 
Therefore, additional organizational and cultural enablers are needed for effective 
CBP adoption.  The defense experience indicates many facilitative factors come into play 
for effective CBP, many analytical and skill-based, but others such as incentives, the 
rationality of processes, and a deliberative approach.  For homeland security, enablers 
such as these may be recognized but have not been adequately addressed, perhaps 
because they are the difficult “softer” issues or the assumption is that they will be dealt 
with by stakeholders individually.  In addition, the rapid spiral development process has 
forestalled more careful consideration of CBP and what is needed to support its 
successful implementation. 
CHALLENGES IN ADOPTING THE DOD APPROACH 
While this article has highlighted many components important to CBP implementation if 
the DoD experience is the model, DHS will face further challenges in implementing 
CBP.  My analysis indicates that four key factors differentiate homeland security and the 
national defense mission that will pose challenges for DHS adoption. 
Mission Scope and Coverage 
A first challenge is mission related.  In defense, the mission scope is more clearly 
defined for national defense, most often military action and civil support.  While many 
rightly argue that the national defense mission has broadened considerably in recent 
years, for homeland security, the mission is arguably broader for prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response and recovery responsibilities.  Actions are required at home and 
abroad, from dealings with individual citizens to negotiations with nation-states as border 
protection is extended overseas.  Homeland security also stresses all-hazards 
preparedness, requiring attention to a wide range of events, from small-scale earthquakes 
to catastrophic terrorist events.  CBP should allow Homeland Security to consider these 
multiple and diverse missions, the common and unique capabilities they require, and 
what tradeoffs in priorities and resourcing might be necessary. 
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In addition, the defense experiences emphasize full mission coverage.  At present, it 
is not clear if the homeland security CBP approach is emphasizing prevention and 
deterrence.  While draft DHS task lists have included prevention efforts such as 
intelligence development and providing strategic and threat intelligence, the task lists 
focus much more attention on vulnerability reduction and response and recovery.  
Emergency response—after an event—appears to take the lion’s share of analysis and 
preparation with clear emphasis on first responder roles and responsibilities. 
The constrained homeland security mission scope and coverage may be the result of 
several factors.  Gilman observed that there has been a major DHS focus on weapons of 
mass destruction and terrorism, and not on all hazards and events that happen all that 
time, such as explosions.
9
  Prevention has been “under the radar screen” for DHS as it 
might be considered the purview of other agencies, such as the Department of Justice or 
the Central Intelligence Agency, or state and local law enforcement officials.  In addition, 
DHS’ Office for Domestic Preparedness has had a mission of emergency management, 
not other aspects of homeland security, and it would be normal to see this office 
maximize its area of strength or understanding.  Perhaps more importantly, since 
September 11, first responders have been front and center, their needs expounded, and the 
results in terms of new equipment and capabilities much more visible. 
Organizational Perspectives 
A second challenge involves organizational perspectives.  One perspective is a federal 
department versus a national view.  The defense community normally contains 
decisions within a cabinet department and White House sphere, with input from other 
federal agencies and to a lesser extent, international partners.  In contrast, homeland 
security is presented as national in scope, not a federal responsibility of primarily just one 
executive department or agency.  A national perspective requires a much more 
collaborative approach, particularly in a federalist system, and a fairly clear distinction 
between public and private spheres. 
Moreover, even within the federal homeland security establishment there is 
fragmentation.  Federal agencies other than DHS can act autonomously, buoyed by their 
own sources of support and direction.  Even when collaborative decisions are made, the 
vehicles for enforcement are very limited or unwanted.  The homeland security 
organizations represent different disciplines and perspectives, levels of public, private, 
and nongovernmental organizations, and even horizontal relationships such as the 
involvement of different federal, state, or local cabinet agencies.  Defense has a central 
core of military services that perform its activities that share a common culture and 
perspective to support and deploy the warfighter.  CBP should allow Homeland Security 
to change its unit of analysis from organizations and requirements to capabilities and 
their delivery. 
In addition, chain of command and exercise of authority are different.  Defense 
normally has a top-down command and control structure with a highly disciplined 
attention to authority.  The homeland security CBP approach at present does not 
adequately guide analysis when assets and capabilities to accomplish a mission are not 
under one jurisdiction, may be unknown, or may ebb and flow over time.  The draft 
national preparedness rating scheme indicates that a group of organizations can be rated 
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collaboratively under a mutual aide or an assistance compact to perform prevention, 
response, or recovery tasks for a specific scenario. 
For CBP, it is crucial that relationships are driven by strategic alliances among equal 
partners where all stakeholders—strategic partners—are identified, their needs clearly 
represented in collaborative decision-making, and incentives provided for decisions not 
to unravel.  Capability planning is always tied to sustainability analyses and funding 
support favors multiple-use capabilities and multiple sources of capabilities to reduce the 
funding burden on any one organization.  Additional work is needed to better understand 
how to apply the framework where there are networks of organizations that work 
homeland security issues or are discrete sets of organizations that handle specific 
homeland security functions.  Contingency planning is necessary in the event individual 
organizations or sectors will not meet their capability obligations.  This will be even more 
important when the CBP framework is expanded to address private sector and 
nongovernmental organizations who are critical players in prevention, vulnerability 
reduction, and response and recovery strategies and actions. 
Resource Development and Leveraging 
A third challenge is the resources that can be brought to bear for homeland security in 
contrast to the defense community.  To start, resource leveraging requires the 
understanding of assets that compose capabilities and in general what they can 
accomplish.  Capabilities include a diverse selection of elements, such as plans, 
procedures, personnel, equipment, and activities.  Defense organizations have paid 
considerable attention to the assets that can be combined for capabilities, where they are 
deployed, what their maintenance or skill condition is, and when they will become 
obsolete or require renewal.  This is not yet the case in homeland security, where asset 
identification and control is dispersed to thousands of organizations who may or may not 
have a complete and accurate inventory.  Many homeland security contingency plans 
draw on mutual aid or regional agreements, often without full identification of assets and 
how they will work together.  CBP provides a mechanism for asset identification, but 
initially CBP will be hampered as Homeland Security officials gather and assess this 
information and their contribution to capability planning. 
In addition, resources include planning resources, skills, tools, and experiences.  
Defense communities normally have decades, if not centuries, of planning experience for 
concrete events and contingencies.  These communities bring to bear a wide range of 
tools such as wargaming, exercises, and simulations, and a small army of skilled and 
experienced planners devoted to such work.  Exercises and actual field experience are 
rapidly fed back to planners.  In contrast, homeland security is in the early stages of 
planning and is often not well-resourced with dedicated staff, particularly in smaller 
jurisdictions.  Tools and skills are still in development in government organizations.  
While emergency exercises have been the norm for a number of years, a systematic 
collection, evaluation, and dissemination of lessons learned and better practices has only 
recently picked up speed.  The private sector in some critical infrastructure areas and for 
some companies, may have the requisite resources, skills, tools, and experiences, or can 
draw on combined sector practices, but not all.  Non-governmental organizations, with 
limited resources, may also have difficulty in adopting CBP.  It can be expected there 
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will be a slower identification of current and required capabilities and under what 
scenarios they are effective. 
A tiered CBP approach in homeland security may not adequately address the very 
wide variety of structures, skills, and processes for homeland security activities across the 
nation.  For example, Gilman noted that DHS does not understand, or chooses not to 
understand, that there is a major difference in homeland security or emergency 
preparedness operations and capacities between the rural and urban areas in a state or 
region.
10
  He said that many homeland security and emergency management contacts are 
in rural areas, and many are volunteers or handle homeland security along with many 
other tasks.  These officials often have limited infrastructure support, such as access to 
good communication services.  Rural areas also have more difficulty forming mutual aid 
compacts and, if they do, may get limited help because of geography or limited regional 
assets and liabilities.  Rural areas may have to wait many hours for mutual aid help to 
arrive because of the distances involved. 
Target Audience 
A final challenge is the differences in the target audiences for CBP.  For the defense 
community, the clear customer for CBP outputs is the combatant commander who must 
carry out the defense missions and relies on mission capability packages.  For homeland 
security, the target audience at present is broadly described by DHS as the “homeland 
security community,” which can cover federal, state, local, private, and nongovernmental 
organizations, and even to the level of the individual citizen.  Thus, there is not a discrete 
set of homeland security “combatant commanders” under the current DHS CBP 
approach.  This has added to the complexity and confusion surrounding CBP that will 
require further attention. 
Federal national policy is primarily directed at state and local jurisdictions at this 
time, with some attention paid to limited regional compacts.  It may be that CBP 
development over time will clarify that the combatant commander should be those state 
and local government officials responsible for direct prevention, vulnerability reduction, 
and response and recovery activities.  While private sector and non-governmental 
officials have direct homeland security responsibilities as well, the CBP process may 
need to stop at the governmental level.  Governmental CBP outputs can be planning 
inputs to these other jurisdictions for their own planning processes. 
Instead of supporting the combatant commander, the capabilities-based approach 
might get bogged-down in a checklist mentality of responding to lists of many tasks 
represented by the UTL (Universal Task List) and a targeted list for critical capabilities.  
“Checking off” the tasks forces attention to discrete activities, and not to capabilities and 
homeland security results for an organization and its homeland security partners.  State 
and local officials at the October 2004 capabilities workshop noted that the task lists and 
defined capabilities can easily become a standard of care to which they will become 
individually accountable.  A defensive posture might be to manage to the lists, and not to 
the overall results that must be achieved within a risk assessment decision-making 
process.  As a result, developing envelopes of capability for specific operational 
challenges for the combatant commander will be lost. 
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As a maritime nation, the United States is economically and strategically reliant on
its ports, a fact well known to our potential enemies in the Global War on Terror. A
successful attack against maritime critical infrastructure in our ports has the potential
to cause major economic disruption and create mass casualties and conflagration. The
United States has faced military threats in its littoral before, and lessons from the past
offer value in determining how to defend ports in the modern era. But these lessons must
be considered in light of the new asymmetric terrorist threat. By examining lessons from
the past and considering current maritime multi-agency capabilities, a logical command
and control solution can be devised to effectively fuse agency efforts in tactical defense of
maritime critical infrastructure.
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Throughout its history, the United States has been a global maritime nation, dependent 
upon the oceans for economy, welfare, and defense.  In the modern era emphasis on 
globalization and the world economy has increased this dependence considerably.  There 
are some 95,000 miles of United States’ coastline and 3.4 million square miles of 
territorial seas and exclusive economic zones in the U.S. maritime domain.
1
  Connecting 
the continental United States to this zone are over 1,000 harbors and ports, 361 of which 
are cargo capable.  Through these ports enter approximately 21,000 containers daily, 
representing ninety-five percent of the nation’s overseas cargo, including 100 percent of 
U.S. petroleum imports.
2
  In addition to commerce, there are seventy-six million 
recreational boaters in the United States. Six million cruise ship passengers visit U.S. 
ports annually. In the strategic/military sense, a substantial portion of U.S. national power 
relies on the sea, both in the form of traditional Navy Carrier Strike groups that deploy 
from ports in the continental United States and the subsequent ability to reinforce 
deployed forces overseas.  Without unimpeded access to the sea, the ability of the United 
States to project national power is extremely limited. 
     Maritime infrastructure is crucial in maintaining this link to the sea.  From naval bases 
to commercial ports, maritime infrastructure is well developed nationwide and is crucial 
to both the economic sector and military strategy.  Maritime infrastructure is critical to 
the employment of national maritime power and as such is a logical (if not desirable) 
target for acts of terrorism by our enemies.  A successful attack against a port could incur 
serious economic and military damage, present an enemy with the opportunity to inflict 
mass casualties, and have serious long-term detrimental effects on our national economy.  
      Maritime Critical Infrastructure Protection (MCIP) presents many challenges in an 
asymmetric environment.  Previous models of maritime defense have focused on 
protecting ships from traditional naval attack; even when ports and supporting 
infrastructure have been considered targets, emphasis was on defense against a military 
threat.  The Global War On Terror (GWOT) has created a number of heretofore 
unconsidered vulnerabilities in this traditional outlook. Many targets that would not be 
considered legitimate (economic, symbolic, etc.) in a conventional war must now be 
considered in strategic defensive planning.  In conducting these attacks the unimpeded 
use of the sea is a force multiplier for an enemy dedicated to striking a wide range of 
potential targets.  Possible threats from the sea are wide-ranging and diverse, relying on a 
combination of asymmetric offensive tactics while exploiting the variety of the littoral.   
     This asymmetric nature of GWOT requires a multi-agency approach to devise 
effective command and control for modern port defense.  The Coast Guard and Navy 
have made important strides in this area by devising experimental Joint Harbor 
Operations Centers (JHOCs) as a component of maritime anti-terrorist force protection.  
The expansion of this concept into multi-agency maritime homeland security is a logical 
next step in the evolving problem of port security and defense.  This is made evident by 
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examining likely terrorist threats to ports and studying the lessons of the past that apply 
in this environment which can be used to expand the current command and control 
system to meet the new threat 
 
New Threat Matrix: Ports as Targets 
The GWOT threat to ports is a relatively new element in the spectrum of naval warfare.  
This is largely due to the evolving nature of the shipping industry and the nation’s 
growing reliance on sea power.  Historically, a nation’s maritime strength has been 
measured by the size and capability of its merchant fleet and Navy; attacks against a 
nation’s sea power meant the physical destruction of these ships.  Ports, until quite 
recently, were composed of infrastructure that was relatively easy to replace or replicate, 
making them relatively low priority targets for an enemy dedicated to striking at maritime 
strength. 
     This has changed in the modern era of containerization and the increased size and 
technical nature of ships.  In modern times ports have become centers of highly technical, 
well-integrated infrastructure designed for the rapid loading and unloading of cargo, an 
evolution that has become highly complex in the era of containerization.  Commercially 
efficient, port cargo operations are also highly dependent on networked operations, 
making the disruption of the process far simpler for a potential attacker.  Additionally, the 
complexity of this evolution, combined with the increasing size of seagoing merchant 
vessels (and warships), has greatly reduced the number of commercial ports available for 
use by global shipping.  This has the duel effect of making major ports more important 
economically and strategically while simultaneously making them more attractive targets 
for offensive action. 
     The attractiveness of ports as targets for terrorists can be summarized as follows:  
 
A. Economic Impact:  An unprecedented amount of trade – both imports and exports – 
relies on shipment by sea.  A successful attack on maritime infrastructure would affect 
this trade in far greater proportion than the actual damage.  It is likely that an attack on 
one port would have a cascade effect on others as increased security measures are applied 
nationwide.  The recent impact of the London bombings can be seen as illustrative of this 
effect; although there was no indication of additional terrorist activity, security measures 
were increased at transportation hubs worldwide.  Increasing security alerts at a train 
station is one thing; closing a huge economic entity such as a port is quite another.  Delay 
of shipping in loading and offloading cargo is one of the most costly elements of the 
shipping process. We must also consider the impact to the shipping industry itself.  
During the Persian Gulf re-flagging operations of the late 1980s, for example, analysis 
showed the greatest impact to the shipping of oil was not the damage to tankers inflicted 
by the warring Iraqis and Iranians (which was, in fact, minimal), but the increased 
insurance costs of operating in that area.
3
  An attack on a U.S. port could have a similar, 
if not larger, effect.   
 
B. High visibility/High Casualties:  Ports are not isolated areas, but rather major centers 
of commerce, usually surrounded by large cities and economic centers.  An attack on a 
port could be highly visible and potentially the scene of mass conflagration.  As a result 
of urban development, most major ports are no longer confined to strictly industrial areas, 
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but rather have become well-developed centers of commerce and entertainment, 
surrounded by built up waterside areas dedicated to tourism and recreation.  Many of 
these facilities are located next to volatile maritime infrastructure (fuel tanks, docks, etc.) 
that could create mass conflagration if attacked through large explosive force.  
Sympathetic detonation, fires, and other catastrophic effects would certainly create mass 
casualties. 
 
C. Ease of attack:  Commercial ports are not fortresses.  The ocean itself presents a 
number of distinct advantages to a dedicated attacker, especially when employing 
maritime suicide terrorism or means to rapidly deliver large explosive force.  Water is not 
only a tremendously efficient transport medium (allowing for rapid transit), but the large 
amount of legitimate commercial and recreational traffic in ports allows for an enemy to 
mask movements prior to an attack, making effective defense difficult. 
 
Given the importance of ports to our economy and military power, the potential for 
creating mass casualties, and the ease by which an enemy can attack, a strong case can be 
made that ports will become a target for future terrorist attacks.  If this is the case, we can 
apply the military planning process to meeting this threat.  The first step in this process is 
looking for lessons learned that could be used in the current scenario: have we faced this 
threat before, and if so, what can we learn from the experience? 
 
Cold War Model  
Port defense is not a new concept, but during the later stages of the Cold War port 
defense theory underwent considerable revision.  In the mid-1980s the “long war,” or 
prolonged NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional war scenario came into vogue with NATO 
planners.  In such a conflict re-supply of Europe would become a top priority.  If Europe 
was to be re-supplied from the United States it was assumed that, given the noted strength 
of the Soviet submarine fleet, the historical “Battle of the Atlantic” scenario would repeat 
itself using modern technology.  If this were the case it was assumed the coastline of the 
United States would be a logical target for attack; historically, the Nazi U-boat offensive 
against the coast during the Second World War was particularly effective, destroying 
over 400 ships in an almost completely undefended littoral, a lesson that would not be 
lost on Soviet planners.
4
  But unlike the historic scenario where ships were subject to 
conventional torpedo attack, it was argued that the targets of Soviet offensive power 
would likely be ports due to the large array of unconventional weaponry that could 
effectively target port infrastructure (mines, special operations teams, etc.) and the impact 
that such an attack would have on the overseas war effort.
5
     Accordingly, an entirely new Coast Guard-Navy command structure was designed to 
meet the anticipated threat.
6
  In 1984 the Coast Guard and Navy stood up the Maritime 
Defense Zone (MDZ), a combined USCG-USN command tasked with the maritime 
defense of the United States 200nm seaward.  Ports, especially strategic out load ports, 
were given a high priority in defensive planning in recognition of the high tech 
infrastructure that was necessary to load-out mass military supplies.  This was arguably 
the first time since the Second World War that the defense of ports became a significant 
part of the national maritime strategy.  Reflecting this priority, a new command and 
control system was designed and implemented for tactical defense.  Ports and outload 
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operations were placed under Navy-Coast Guard “Sub-Sector” constructs that effectively 
combined defensive operations between the Services by co-locating Coast Guard and 
Navy personnel in operations centers that would oversee all military operations 
(including load out operations and critical infrastructure protection) within the port 
during time of national emergency. 
     Since we once again face a threat from the sea, it would be tempting to simply 
implement a defensive structure similar to that used in the past.  But there are key 
differences between then and now that make this problematic.  In the Cold War defense 
model, risk was very much a matter of proportionality and the threat to critical maritime 
infrastructure was distinctly military.  In considering the “worst case” scenario, planners 
envisioned enemy actions in the littoral focusing on submarine attack, offensive mining, 
and special operations attacks against critical military infrastructure—in other words, 
attacks “from” the sea by conventional military means.  It was assumed that “terrorist” 
actions would be sponsored by the enemy state and, as part of the enemy strategy, would 
not be directed against targets with limited or no military significance. 
     These core assumptions aided the defense effort considerably.  In the re-supply of 
Europe scenario, “risk” was by no means an equal proposition.  Ports were rated in 
strategic priority based on the amount of support they provided military forces overseas, 
the ports with the highest priority receiving the lion’s share of the defensive forces.  This 
strategy worked on a “floating” scale and was subject to change based on the evolving 
scenario; when New York City, for example, had completed its out load operations the 
priority (and subsequent defensive forces) shifted to the next port, allowing for a 
strategically “phased” defense.
7
 In other words, we only needed to be strong in areas that 
were important to the war effort overseas—and this defensive strength was transitory at 
best. 
     The difference between “then and now” is telling when we consider potential targets 
and the subsequent effort required for defense.  In the “old days,” a strictly civilian target 
such as the WTC would not have been considered a valid target in New York City.  The 
major weapons out load point at Earle, NJ, however, was Priority One for infrastructure 
protection.  Obviously this has changed; targets in GWOT can be anywhere or anything. 
Maritime infrastructure that would not be considered critical in a Cold War scenario now 
has the potential to be targeted as a means of obtaining an economic or psychological 
victory. In this “new” scenario with its plethora of non-military targets and the potential 
offensive power of the enemy, there are not enough defensive forces to go around.  This 
requires that we consider force multipliers beyond simple assets to improve the viability 
of the defense. 
     This is not to say that the Cold War model is completely invalid, or that we cannot 
learn from the lessons of history.  What worked in the MDZ era was the establishment of 
a construct that emphasized joint communications, multi-service planning, and, above all, 
a multi-agency approach to defense of the port and its infrastructure.  Force multipliers 
that can be employed in the current scenario revolve around the collection and use of 
multi-agency intelligence in a similar command and control construct for the protection 
of critical maritime infrastructure.  In the “old” model, military intelligence sufficed to 
deal with a specific military threat against known target areas, with a response that was 
distinctly military.  The new threat requires that we expand this model to consider all 
agencies within the port vital for total protection. 
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 New Defensive Strategies 
Maritime law enforcement (and by extension, protection of maritime critical 
infrastructure) is traditionally a Coast Guard mission.  This has obviously evolved 
considerably as a result of the events of 9/11.  When examining current port command 
and control proposals, it is useful to examine this evolution and how previous 
relationships can be employed in current operations. 
 
A. Pre-9/11 Port Operations: Prior to 9/11 the Coast Guard port and offshore tactical 
constructs were divided into two separate areas of responsibility based on the type of law 
enforcement being conducted.  In major ports the traditional Captain of the Port (COTP) 
position was assigned to a respective Marine Safety Offices (MSOs) responsible for the 
regulatory functions, such as vessel inspection, environmental response, licensing, etc.  
COTPs were (and are) responsible for merchant vessels entering and leaving port, 
conducting vessel inspections for maritime safety, and coordinating incident response.  
Maritime law enforcement conducted by MSOs was distinctly regulatory in nature; many 
vessel inspectors and recreational boating safety personnel performed their duties 
unarmed.  Operations of a more traditional law enforcement variety, such as counter-
narcotics or fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, and other offshore operations were 
the responsibility of a “Group” that maintained command and control of subordinate 
“Stations” in the Area of Responsibility (AOR) assigned that Group.
8
  While this 
description is admittedly overly simplistic, it would be fair to say that MSOs “owned” the 
ports and all responsibilities for large merchant vessel and container operations that 
traditionally required regulatory attention, while Groups focused offshore and conducted 
law enforcement operations dealing with smaller maritime traffic or search and rescue.  
Afloat operational assets (utility boats, patrol boats, and small cutters) were generally 
“owned” by the Groups and used offshore in traditional law enforcement, although there 
was limited cooperation with the MSO for close inshore operations that required these 
assets.
9
  It is important to note that both MSO/COTP and Group organizations maintained 
extensive relationships with other agencies working within the port and their respective 
areas of responsibility. 
     While this relationship and division of responsibility made sense prior to 9/11, the 
new asymmetric threat altered the equation considerably, requiring a merging of 
traditional responsibilities across established lines of command.  The expanded threat 
spectrum now reached directly into the ports.  Pure regulation, although still important 
for security, no longer sufficed; a direct law enforcement response capability 
(traditionally the role of Groups) was now required in the ports.  Tracking and intercept 
of large merchant vessels, traditionally an MSO function, took on a new meaning as these 
vessels represent a potential threat to the security of the United States.  Subsequently, 
merchant vessel regulation focusing on maritime security was “pushed” far offshore with 
the establishment of a layered defense.
10
  The new threat also affected other agencies 
with maritime security concerns.  Ports with a high Navy interest (including ports with 
Navy bases, research facilities, critical infrastructure, and out load responsibilities) that 
traditionally had some degree of Navy security immediately implemented extensive anti-
terrorist force protection (ATFP) procedures to prevent, among other things, a “USS 
COLE” style attack on potentially vulnerable warships.  U.S. Customs immediately 
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implemented increased forms of container and cargo security measures that were 
completely lacking prior to 9/11.  It is clear from these new multi-agency security 
requirements that the somewhat laissez-faire command system exercised in the ports 
prior to 9/11 would no longer suffice in light of the new threat. 
      
B. Post 9/11 Reorganization: The Coast Guard’s answer to the post 9/11 threat was a 
merging of responsibility under a newly designed “Sector” organization, an effective 
combination of responsibilities and assets that has sole responsibility for all Coast Guard 
missions in one geographic area.
11
  Sectors represent a merging of traditional Group and 
MSO/COTP functions, a significant cultural shift to “one mission” from several within 
each port.  This re-organization soon took on a multi-agency nature.  As noted, Coast 
Guard commands traditionally have close ties to other agencies in the ports, including 
Customs, Immigration, commercial organizations, and local, state, and federal law 
enforcement.  This was reflected in the design of the new Sector Command Centers 
(SCCs).  Tailored to meet local requirements, most SCCs possess either electronic links 
to other agencies operating in the port or staff positions for representatives from agencies 
to work in direct liaison with Coast Guard personnel on a daily or continuous basis.  
There are currently 44 SCCs operating or nearing completion. 
 
C. JHOCs:  SCCs perform traditional port security and regulatory functions, but do not 
generally coordinate with DOD.  In terms of critical maritime infrastructure protection 
this can be problematic, as much of the infrastructure is located in ports with a DOD 
presence, or is considered essential to DOD, and will therefore potentially fall under the 
auspices of Homeland Defense.  This was recognized early in the SCC design process; 
the solution was similar to that employed during the MDZ era and stressed multi-service 
cooperation.  Building on established infrastructure, Coast Guard and Navy designed a 
specialized SCC called the Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC), an experimental 
fusion center that quickly demonstrated its utility in providing for tactical operations 
between the Services.  Recognizing a mutually beneficial interest in coordinating 
operations, the first JHOCs focused on fusing Coast Guard and Navy operations in port 
protection and ATFP in ports where the Navy had a large fleet presence.
12
  Given their 
multi-agency approach to port security and littoral operations, JHOCs are a natural choice 
for the implementation of tactical port operations for maritime critical infrastructure 
protection.  As such they can serve as a model for future execution of this mission. 
     JHOCs are far more than a merging of CG traditional roles and responsibilities with 
USN security procedures.  Rather, they represent an important model for the fusing of 
intelligence and coordination of all multi-agency operations necessary for maritime 
critical infrastructure protection.  As we have seen, Coast Guard and Navy cooperation is 
neither new nor particularly unique.  Since the earliest days of each organization, both 
have used similar equipment and procedures in order to effectively operate together 
during time of war.  But despite overseas operations in GWOT, U.S. ports are not on a 
war footing; rather, commerce and port operations continue at the normal pace, albeit 
under increased security procedures. Recognizing the number of agencies that operate in 
ports and the vast information requirements for maritime security and infrastructure 
protection, an effort was made to make JHOCs truly inter-agency by providing linkage to 
these agencies, including the establishment of formal liaison positions and data sharing 
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protocol, effectively merging regulation, law enforcement, and anti-terrorist force 
protection data and procedures.        
     The first experimental JHOCs were constructed and successfully tested in San Diego 
and Norfolk, ports that represented high strategic interest due to major Navy presence and 
the volume of overseas commercial traffic.  These JHOCs’ multi-agency design was 
based on relationships the Coast Guard had previously established during its normal 




Figure 1:  JHOC Structure 
 
Sector Command Center - Joint 
 
 
JHOCs possess several unique capabilities that contribute significantly to port and critical 
infrastructure protection.  As command and control centers for ports and their immediate 
vicinity, JHOCs have inherent surveillance capability that can be fused into one multi-
agency common operating picture (COP).  Using the San Diego JHOC as an example, 
these systems include: 
! USCG Coastal Radar 
! USN Port control/offshore radar system 
! Automated Identification System processors 
! San Diego port control camera system (civilian) 
! Navy waterside security system 
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The initial success of JHOC San Diego and Norfolk led to a joint Coast Guard-Navy 
study to expand the project to all ports of strategic interest, using a three-tiered approach.  
Ports with navy presence, high commercial infrastructure, and ‘outload’ capability 
(loading of wartime material and supplies critical for overseas efforts) were considered 
for JHOC installation.   
 
The Next Step: JHOCs as an Element of MCIP 
Although there are only two fully functional JHOCs today, their evolving construct 
serves as a model for a future development of multi-agency cooperation in maritime 
critical infrastructure protection.  Given the importance of our ports to national strategy, 
MCIP is a critical vulnerability that must be addressed by both DHS and DOD in one 
coordinated effort.  We must recognize that this mission goes beyond traditional port 
security operations or anti-terrorist force protection, and as such demands a command 
and control construct that can truly fuse the myriad of responsibilities and operations in 
ports.    
     Multi-agency JHOCs offer several advantages for merging effective port operations 
and critical infrastructure protection.  This is evident in the areas of intelligence fusion, 
coordinated planning, and tactical command and control. 
 
A.  Tactical intelligence fusion   
In the post-9/11 analysis one of the greatest weaknesses cited by the 9/11 Commission 
was a lack of intelligence fusion between respective government agencies.  JHOCs are 
designed to address this weakness on the tactical level, serving as fusion centers that 
effectively merge the various intelligence databases of each respective agency 
participating in the JHOC.  Currently, these databases include the Coast Guard’s 
Maritime Information Safety and Law Enforcement system, the Automated Regional 
Justice Information System (Naval Criminal Investigative Service), and intelligence from 
the local Joint Terrorism Task Force.
14
  As JHOCs expand to include other agencies, this 
fusion function can naturally expand to include additional databases.  In addition to using 
established databases, JHOCs also use inter-agency sensors and local inter-agency liaison 
to collect, fuse, and disseminate information that is critical for achieving a multi-agency 
tactical picture. This increased multi-agency awareness provides for streamlined 
operations between all port agencies, while the use of multi-agency sensors and databases 
allows for a tremendously enhanced capability for surveillance and anomaly detection, a 
crucial element in maritime critical infrastructure protection. 
 
B.  Coordinated planning for MCIP  
One of the great advantages of a JHOC is the joint personnel structure that allows for 
both rapid and long-term on-scene multi-agency cooperation.  Although primarily staffed 
by Coast Guard personnel, billets are being established for personnel from all agencies 
that have responsibility in the port, representing a unique merger of personnel with 
regulatory, law enforcement, and military expertise.
15
  This liaison system is fundamental 
to the success not only for coordination of operations, but also to reach an understanding 
of multi-agency procedures and practices and infrastructure that each agency allots 
priority for protection.  This is critical for tactical multi-agency planning.  Given the large 
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number of regulatory agencies operating in each port, there are a number of procedures 
specific to each agency that can impact other multi-agency operations.  Customs 
container inspections, for example, are a critical part of vessel tracking and re-routing 
performed by the Coast Guard; FBI tracking of potential terrorist suspects is a key 
element of ATFP for the Navy and facilities security forces. This type of information and, 
perhaps more importantly, how these procedures are carried out, can be provided 
immediately by effective liaison that merges agency operations into one efficient 
cooperative effort. 
 
C.  Multi-agency Command and Control 
Ultimately maritime critical infrastructure protection is about the tactical coordination of 
multi-agency assets conducting port security and defense operations.  JHOCs are first and 
foremost operations centers, possessing considerable command and control capability 
that can be used by multi-agency assets.  By acting as combined, multi-agency fusion 
centers, JHOCs provide a unique tactical picture that all users can employ at the port 
level.  Through its command and control apparatus, it is possible to coordinate tactical 
actions not only in crisis, but also in day-to-day port operations and exercises meant to 




Access to the sea is vital for economic expansion and as a means to project national 
power.  Ports are essential in maintaining this link.  But ports are not fortresses; as open 
industrial and commercial centers, port infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to a 
dedicated enemy.  An effective attack against critical maritime infrastructure has the 
potential to cause major economic disruption nationwide, create mass casualties, and 
limit or halt deployment of naval power.  As such, ports are logical targets for terrorists 
bent on striking at vulnerabilities; the destruction of ports would have significant impact 
on our nation.  
    Lessons from the past indicate that the key to effective defense is tactical coordination 
through dedicated multi-agency command and control.  During the Cold War, the Coast 
Guard-Navy model for command and control was to deal with a military threat from the 
sea, but this has changed with the new asymmetric threat of GWOT.  The diversity of the 
threat against our ports and the number of regulatory agencies that oversee critical 
infrastructure requires an expanded comprehensive command and control system that 
fuses multi-agency intelligence, has understanding of multi-agency capabilities, and can 
provide direction to these forces in the field.  The JHOC concept has proven to be 
effective in multi-agency intelligence fusion and coordinated tactical port operations 
essential for maritime critical infrastructure protection and should be considered a model 
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Abstract
FEMA was used once before, under President Reagan, for counter-terrorism and as a
result, natural disaster response and mitigation suffered. It was repaired under President
Clinton, but again, counter-terrorism has eaten up FEMA’s natural disaster budget and
skills.
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY: Charles Perrow is a Research Scholar and Emeritus Pro-
fessor of Sociology at Yale University. The author of several books and many articles on
organizations, he is concerned primarily with the impact of large organizations on society
(Organizing America: Wealth, Power, and the Origins of Corporate Capitalism, 2001)
and their catastrophic potentials (Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies,
1999). His current interests are in the vulnerabilities of the country’s critical infrastruc-
tures to natural, industrial, and deliberate disasters.
KEYWORDS: organizations, politics
Introduction*
Organizations are tools; their masters need not use them for their nominal ends.   The focus of 
FEMA under President Clinton was natural disaster emergency relief and preparedness.  Under 
the Bush administration the focus was shifted to combating terrorism, and disaster relief 
capabilities decayed.  That left us unprepared for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  This lack of 
preparedness led to the massive organizational failures we have been treated to by a shocked 
media.  
For days following Katrina, air conditioned trucks with no supplies drove aimlessly past 
“refugees” who were without water or food or protection from the sun.  Reporters came and went, 
but food and water and medical supplies did not.1 The Red Cross was not allowed to deliver 
goods because it might discourage evacuation.2 Evacuation by air was slowed to a crawl because
FEMA said that post 9/11 security procedures required a (prolonged) search for more than 50 
federal air marshals to ride the airplanes, and to find security screeners.  At the gates, inadequate 
electric power for the detectors held things up until officials relented and allowed time consuming 
hand searches of desperate and exhausted people.3  Their only food, emergency rations in metal 
cans, was confiscated because the cans might contain explosives.4  Volunteer physicians watched 
helplessly; FEMA did not allow them to help because they had not been licensed in the state.5
Without functioning fax machines to send the required request forms, FEMA would not send help 
that local officials begged for.  Perhaps a fifth of the New Orleans police force simply quit, 
exhausted and discouraged, under fire from looters, or were themselves looting.  A large National 
Guard force hid behind locked doors in the convention center, saying they were unprepared to 
help.  A Navy ship idled off-shore, waiting for days to be called.  Almost five days after Rita
struck, at least one severely damaged Texas town remained without any outside help, out of 
power, water and food, with an alerted TV camera crew being the first to arrive.  And so on.  
Did these failures reflect what has been called “prosaic” organizational failures such as all 
organizations are likely to have in times of stress?  Were the organizations simply overcome by 
an unprecedented challenge?  Or had the resources for meeting natural disasters decayed or been 
diverted towards terrorist disasters?  If it was the latter, decay and diversion, we will have to 
explain why relief organizations other than FEMA also failed. 
* This is a section of a manuscript in preparation, “Disasters Evermore? Reducing U.S. Vulnerabilities to Natural, 
Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters.”  Thanks to Lee Clarke for many suggestions and corrections.  For other 
sections of the manuscript see “The Department of Homeland Security, our second great disaster after 9/11,” 
forthcoming in Homeland Security Affairs and “Disasters Evermore?  Reducing U.S. Vulnerabilities…” 
forthcoming, Havidan Rodriguez, E. Quarantelli and R. Dynes, eds., Handbook of Disaster Research (Springer, 
2006).
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The failures involved government agencies and the military at all levels, not just FEMA.  But 
FEMA was the organization most responsible for disaster response.  What happened to it?  It 
seemed to have performed reasonably well the previous year when four hurricanes struck Florida 
(though there were charges of gross mismanagement in the dispersal of funds). A review of its 
history is not encouraging, and will offer some possible explanations for its failures in 2005.
FEMA’s rocky history
FEMA got off to a modest but fairly good start when it was founded by President Jimmy Carter in 
1979, in one of his last attempts to restructure the federal government.  But the bungled Iranian 
hostage crisis drove him from office and put Ronald Reagan in.  When it was first formed by 
Carter the agency had two goals. The main one was disaster relief, prevention, and mitigation.  
The secondary ones were coping with a nuclear attack and, vaguely, national security, something 
normally in the hands of other agencies.   Under Reagan the first goal was neglected and starved
of resources, while the secondary ones flourished.  FEMA set up a “Civil Security Division” with 
a training center for over 1,000 civilian police to handle riots and political disturbances (not 
disaster relief).  A file was gathered on U.S. left-wing activists and internment camps were 
planned.   One national training exercise envisioned incarcerating 100,000 “national security 
threats”.6 A top secret National Security Directive (NSDD 26) that Reagan issued in 1982 
effectively linked FEMA with the military and the National Security Council (NSC).  Within 
FEMA, a small division, the National Preparedness Directorate (NPD), was charged with 
developing a classified computer and telecommunications network to insure the continuity of the 
government in the event of a nuclear attack.  The network was developed by the National Security 
Council and subsumed within the broader DOD national defense information network.  Though 
originated by FEMA, and drawing upon more and more of FEMA’s budget, FEMA’s disaster 
relief personnel could not have access to the network.  It was “top secret;” only the DOD and the 
NSC could access it.  Congress could not examine the activities or budget of the Civil Defense 
part of FEMA.7   As a result, “FEMA developed one of the most advanced network systems for 
disaster response in the world, yet none of it was available for use in dealing with civilian natural 
disasters or emergency management.”8
The FBI was jealous and alarmed, and so was the Justice Department.  The head of FEMA, 
Louis Giuffrida, was forced to resign when the Justice Department brought suit in 1985 over 
cronyism in the agency’s contract awards and a lavish bachelor pad for Giuffrida in Manhattan
using FEMA funds. His collaborators, Lt. Col. Oliver North and the equally controversial 
General Richard Secord, had already left FEMA.  But the organization continued to ignore 
natural disasters and, when disasters came, the personnel were poorly trained and funded and 
quite possibly inept.  Hurricane Hugo in 1989 prompted U.S. Senator “Fritz” Hollings to declare 
that FEMA was “the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses I’ve ever known.”9 The next year,
when disasters hit California, Representative Norman Y. Mineta of California declared that 
FEMA “could screw up a two car parade.”  Two years later, when Hurricane Andrew hit in 1992,
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the primitive communications system of the agency forced it to buy Radio Shack walkie-talkies in 
last minute preparations, while the state-of-the-art system FEMA had paid for remained 
unavailable.  President Bush had to call in federal troops and move the FEMA director aside.  If 
this sounds familiar to those who watched the Katrina disaster, recall that the agency had been 
hijacked by those preoccupied with nuclear defense and domestic radicals.  Its failure helped 
William Clinton push the first President Bush aside. 
FEMA recovered remarkably well under the leadership of James Lee Witt, an experienced 
disaster manager appointed by President Clinton in 1993, and performed as well as we might 
expect any agency to perform.  It not only handled emergency relief well, but set up far-seeing 
programs to minimize damage from future disasters, for example, buying up vulnerable land to 
prevent the establishment of settlements – the “mitigation” program.  Employees performed well 
and shared the goals of the organizational masters.  It had a minimum of political appointments.
FEMA under a Bush
But FEMA swerved abruptly to the right again under President G.W. Bush, emphasizing 
privatization of disaster response and counter-terrorism rather than natural disasters.  FEMA's 
Project Impact was a model mitigation program created by the Clinton administration; it moved 
people out of dangerous areas and retrofitted structures.10  For example, when the Nisqually 
earthquake struck the Puget Sound area in 2001, homes that had been retrofitted for earthquakes 
and schools with FEMA funds were protected from high-impact structural hazards.  The day of 
that quake was also the day that the new president, G.W. Bush, chose to announce that Project 
Impact would be discontinued.11  Funds for mitigation were cut in half, and those for Louisiana 
were rejected.  Disaster management was being privatized, with the person who was to be 
promoted to head the agency, Michael Brown, saying at a conference in 2001, "The general idea 
– that the business of government is not to provide services, but to make sure that they are 
provided – seems self-evident to me."12  The administration tried to cut federal contribution for 
large-scale natural disaster expenditures from seventy-five percent to fifty percent, but Congress 
balked.  
Worse still, when a Department of Homeland Security was forced upon President Bush by
Senator Joseph Lieberman and other Democrats, FEMA lost the cabinet status President Clinton 
had given it and was folded into the new department.  The Government Accountability Office, 
Congresspeople, the Brookings Institution, and others warned that this could hobble the agency’s 
natural disaster programs, and it did.  Top personnel left (some to the companies that privatization 
of emergency relief and preparedness enriched); a union survey of eighty-four union personnel 
found eighty percent saying it was a “poorer agency,” and sixty percent said they would leave if 
they could get the same salary in another agency; and the GAO rated its morale as one of the 
lowest of any government agency.13 While funds for the agency have actually increased 
somewhat in the last two years, those for disasters have shrunk while expenditures for 
counterterrorism have soared.  FEMA has lost control of the federal preparedness grants to local 
3Perrow: Using Organizations: FEMA
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
and state governments.  Those are distributed by a separate office and, as a result, three out of 
every four grants are now spent on counterterrorism.  (Much of the money spent on 
counterterrorism goes to corporations and private businesses; natural disaster money is more 
likely to be spent on training first responders, hardly a corporate feeding place.)  This has been a 
major blow to states such as Louisiana that are prone to weather disasters. 
FEMA, it is charged, not only shifted from natural disasters to counterterrorism, but to 
political favoritism, another example of using organizations, and it had consequences.
Representative Bennie Thompson of Mississippi, hard hit by Katrina, said that during the Bush 
administration, "FEMA went back to being treated like a political resting place for favors that 
were owed," and called for the resignation of FEMA head Michael Brown.   Brown was brought 
into the agency in 2001 by his college roommate, Joe M. Allbaugh, who had run Mr. Bush’s first 
presidential campaign.  Even Brown’s small claim to have disaster experience turned out to be 
fabricated.  He  said on a Thursday evening TV appearance, three days after Katrina struck, that 
he had just learned of the plight of thousands stranded at the convention center in New Orleans 
without food or water.  They had been there since Monday, but that Thursday Mr. Brown told an 
incredulous TV interviewer, Paula Zahn, “Paula, the federal government did not even know about 
the convention center people until today.”14
It also did not know where the ice was.  Ninety-one thousand tons of ice cubes, intended to 
cool food, medicine, and victims in over 100 degree heat, were hauled across the nation, even 
from Maine, by 4,000 trucks, costing the taxpayers over $100 million.  Most of it was never 
delivered.  In an age of sophisticated tracking (FedEx, DHS, Wal-Mart, etc.), FEMA’s system 
broke down.  Asked about the vital ice, Mr. Brown invoked privatization, and told a House panel 
"I don't think that's a federal government responsibility to provide ice to keep my hamburger meat 
in my freezer or refrigerator fresh."15 The ice was not needed for his refrigerator, but to keep 
drugs and medicine fresh, to treat people with heat exhaustion, and to keep the sick, old, and frail 
cool.
Some explanations of recent failures
FEMA was not the only organization to fail so massively, but it, and its parent organization, the 
Department of Homeland Security under Michael Chertoff, was certainly a key one.  Can we 
attribute this to the evisceration of FEMA under the Bush administration?  Did its enfeeblement 
also enfeeble the response of the National Guard, the military when it was called in, and local and 
state agencies?   At the present writing, October, 2005, it is not clear and much more research is 
needed to understand the response to Katrina and Rita.  For we have three observations, and the 
lessons from them remain to be investigated:  the response to four hurricanes in Florida in the 
previous year; the response to Katrina; and the response to Rita.  
It is possible that FEMA was not deteriorating, but just overwhelmed by Katrina, and 
recovered somewhat under Rita.  The response to Rita has been declared much better by some 
news stories and almost as bad by others.16 Rita should have been easier.  It was less destructive; 
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citizens were more likely to evacuate early based on the experience with Katrina; major cities 
were not hit; top FEMA officials would be unlikely to again be unable to alert the President; and 
state guards and the military were already mobilized.  Here are four possible interpretations of the 
varying responses to the Florida hurricanes, Katrina, and Rita.
1). FEMA’s natural disaster potential deteriorated steadily through 2005, as it was used for 
other purposes, but this was not noticed in 2004.   The hurricanes in that year were not as serious 
as those in 2005, and we did not get as many news stories about failures in 2004.  (A close 
investigation of the Florida responses would be needed to judge the importance of this 
explanation.)  
2). The response to the Florida hurricanes was good, despite the deterioration, because Florida 
was a politically key state for the administration; Louisiana was not, and Texas was already in 
Republican hands.  Therefore FEMA officials paid more attention to Florida.  (FEMA approved 
payments in excess of $31 million to Florida residents who were unaffected by the 2004 
hurricanes, for example.)17 Research has shown that presidents designate areas as eligible for 
disaster relief, and give out much greater assistance, when these areas are politically important for 
them.  Political scientists have found that nearly half of all disaster relief is motivated politically 
rather than by need.18   The fact that President Bush had yet to establish a plan for housing 
evacuees, or a commission to oversee the rebuilding of New Orleans and other coastal cities in 
three states a month and a half after the hurricane, suggests a lack of political incentive.     
3). Katrina and Rita (“KatRita” ) were so much more powerful and damaging that even a well-
performing FEMA would have been overwhelmed.  This explanation does not assume 
deterioration on the part of the agency’s ability to deal with natural disasters.  It assumes a tipping 
point, and when disasters are involved, the tipping point may bring about a sudden, rather than 
gradual, decline.  Once it is challenged beyond its capabilities, the failures can be sudden and 
wide-spread even  if the organization is not weak.
This explanation is persuasive.  But the problem is that the failures of FEMA in KatRita at 
all levels seem so enormous and widespread it is hard to argue that common sense and obvious 
responses would evaporate so widely.  Disaster agencies have to be flexible and innovative, even 
if the challenge is overwhelming.  This one frequently appeared to revert to rote training and 
inappropriate rules.   
4. The final explanation offered is that undoing an agency that had been performing well 
takes time, and that this undoing was speeded up greatly by having an unprecedented task.  While 
the previous explanation has obvious merit, this explanation maintains that substantial 
undermining of the agency had taken place, and KatRita exposed this more fully than the Florida 
hurricanes of 2004 could have.  
The examples given at the beginning of this article, and there are many more, seem to go well 
beyond “prosaic” failures, or even the “overwhelming” explanation in alternative number three.  
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They did not involve panic, enormous overload, nor unfamiliar tasks or settings, which would 
accompany failures in unprecedented events.  They involved going by the rules.   Rather than 
being flexible and innovative, even when the challenge was overwhelming, these personnel 
appeared to revert to rote training, insistence upon following inappropriate rules, and an unusual 
fear of acting without official permission.   This could be the result of the agency’s downgrading 
the importance of responding to natural disasters, replacing or losing personnel skilled in that
area, and diverting funds to the commercially, and politically, more attractive alternatives of 
buying equipment such as chemical detection devices, bio-hazard suits, and perimeter 
surveillance devices, and paying for industrial and port upgrades that have little to do with 
terrorist threats.   
Organizational dynamics could be at work, also.  I suggest that as the top ranks of the agency 
lost experienced personnel with high morale and commitment, who were replaced by political 
appointments, the next level would gradually lose confidence in their superiors, and their morale 
would slacken.  I know of no statistics regarding FEMA, but nationally the Bush administration 
has increased the number of political appointees for government agencies by fifteen percent since 
2000.19 (In President Clinton’s second term, the percentage of political appointments declined.)  
FEMA has always had many political appointees; most agencies do.  But if they increased by 
fifteen percent it would have an impact.  
In time, the low morale of upper managers who were not political appointments would spread 
to lower management, and then to employees in general.  In an organization with low morale it 
may be that sticking to the rules to protect your career is better than breaking them even if the 
rules are inappropriate.  This defensive posture might spread to allied agencies, such as the 
Transportation Security Administration, which is already less concerned with safe transit than
terrorists’ potential to use transportation as a weapon.  A hypothetical situation could prompt 
these questions: Is the TSA official in charge of the security of a local airport very likely to tell 
his employees to stop doing their principle job and just let the evacuees through?  Not if he knows 
that FEMA officials are not sending water and food to the airport because airport staff cannot 
send the proper requisitions because the faxes are out. The message may be that in perilous times 
it is best to go by the book.  (While not unreasonable, this is not substantiated by research, as far 
as I know).  This is a different explanation than “they panicked” or “the storm was so large and
the task so unprecedented.” 
A further consideration is that the reorganization of FEMA into the Department of Homeland 
Security imposed a top-down, command-and-control  model on an agency that most experts say 
should maximize the power of those at the bottom,  Maximizing the ability of the lowest level to 
extemporize and innovate will minimize the bureaucratic responses that so characterized FEMA.  
A frequent criticism of FEMA was that the centralized DHS model, and the removal of authority 
for preparedness to other parts of DHS, would inhibit its responsiveness to unique events.20
We are left with at least two interpretations.  One is that FEMA was not hurt by incorporation 
into the Department of Homeland Security.  It performed well in 2004, had an unprecedented task 
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with Katrina and could be expected to fail, but recovered and performed reasonably well in Rita, 
which was less devastating than Katrina but more so than the Florida hurricanes.
A second interpretation is that FEMA was progressively deteriorating; the deterioration was 
not picked up by the press in 2004, but was evident when the Katrina challenge was greater. The 
agency did only marginally better with Rita, a lesser challenge and with the advantages of very 
recent experience, more credible warnings, and mobilized relief forces.    
Each disaster is unique, and routines, such as pre-positioning and ordering ice ahead of time, 
certainly help.  These appear to have been inadequate in KatRita.  More important, the ability to 
scramble, extemporize, and innovate, seems to have degraded.  (Privatization fans have a point 
that some of the most creative responses came from private business, but this may reflect the state 
of FEMA rather than a public/private comparison.)21 It is possible that this was the most 
important failing.  If so, it may be attributed to the use of the organization for purposes other than 
those for which it was designed.  It may have been used to reward political friends and loyalists, 
to further an image of being “tough on terror” for political image reasons, and to make 
expenditures that favored private enterprises and political constituencies rather than on training 
and on first responders.  
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Hurricane Katrina shattered belief that the nation’s homeland security system was
ready for a major terrorist attack. Public administrators staff that system. Katrina pro-
vides an opportunity to review the central normative premise of public administration:
competence. This article briefly reviews the changing competence frameworks that have
guided public administration since the 1880s. Over the last one hundred years, administra-
tors have been seen as artisans, scientists, social reformers, and managers. The ineptness
of the public sector’s response to Katrina reminds us – however briefly – that for the last 30
years, government has been seen as the enemy, the problem to be solved – not the partner
in finding solutions. The result is a demoralized and dysfunctional public workforce. The
American homeland can never be secure until the public workforce recreates the spirit of
competent service so glaringly absent in the wake of Katrina.
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What has happened down here is the winds have changed. 
Clouds roll in from the north and it started to rain. 
“It’s absolutely horrible,” says one of the women.  “Babies aren’t getting food.” 
“And they’re all black babies,” says the second woman. 
“Old people are dying in wheelchairs.  And they’re just leaving them to die,” says the first one. 
“People can’t get out of the city,” says the second. 
The scene is a metropolitan airport.  It is early September.  The nation is watching Katrina on 
television.  The two women are in their early twenties.  They are on break from their job at an 
airport coffee kiosk. 
A man, waiting for his plane, hears the conversation. 
“What are you guys going to do to make sure that never happens again?” he asks. 
“What do you mean?” says the first one. 
“What’s happening is horrible.  You’re right.  So what are you going to do about it?  What are 
you going to do to make sure Americans never have to go through anything like this again?” 
“What can we do?” shrugs the second one. 
The man says nothing. 
“Besides,” says the first one, “no one’s going to listen to anything people our age say.” 
The man mumbles something unintelligible and walks toward his gate. 
The woman is right.  What is she going to say?  “Y’all need to do a better job implementing 
the National Response Plan.”  Or, “We need more of those communities to be NIMS compliant.”  
And even if she does have something to say, to whom is she going to say it?  Whose job is it to 
fix the preparedness mess unmasked by Katrina? 
Rained real hard and it rained for a real long time. 
Six feet of water in the streets of Evangeline. 
There is one profession responsible for making sure Americans are not systematically 
ignored the next time catastrophe strikes: public administrators.  It is ultimately their job to 
prevent terrorism, respond to disaster, and lead the tedious and often thankless task of recovering 
from catastrophe. 
All the talk over the past four years about the perniciousness of “stovepipes” obscures the 
foundation that connects those pipes: public service.
1
Public administrators, at least in theory, are responsible for conducting the public’s business, 
acting in the public’s interest, and conscientiously balancing formal requirements with the 
wisdom to do the right thing. 
That is theory.  The reality of public administration is considerably less Panglossian. 
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State, local and the national governments performed incompetently preparing for Katrina and 
responding to Katrina.
2
Strategies were ignored.  Plans were not executed.  Resources were 
wasted.  We spent four years preparing for the unthinkable.  The thinkable happened and we 
were not ready. 
The entire preparedness system – staffed essentially by public administrators – failed to 
perform government’s primary job: to secure the unalienable right to life.  With a few notable 
exceptions,
3
individuals and agencies were unable to bring together the knowledge, skills, 
abilities, or resources to do what the unraveling situation required. How could this incompetence 
be?  How could this incompetence have happened? 
Katrina provides an opportunity to think about what historically has been the normative 
bedrock of public service: competence. 
The river rose all day. 
The river rose all night. 
The history of public administration in the United States is a story of the changing 
relationships between public servants and their polity.  The Founding Fathers paid some attention 
to the administrative problems associated with running a nation, but during the initial century of 
the American empire, there was a general aversion to the idea of a permanent group of civil 
servants.   
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson – then a professor at Bryn Mawr College – made the first serious 
claim that administering the public’s business should be a professional discipline.  Wilson wrote 
that the discipline’s central focus should be effectiveness and efficiency.  
It is the object of administrative study to discover, first, what government can 
properly and successfully do, and secondly, how it can do these proper things 
with the utmost possible efficiency and at the least possible cost either of money 
or of energy.
4
Wilson’s effort to bring competence into public work was motivated by a desire to remedy 
what he termed “a civil service which was rotten full fifty years ago.”
5
In words that read like 
they were prepared for testimony to the U.S. House Select Committee on Hurricane Katrina, 
Wilson wrote (in 1887): 
The poisonous atmosphere of city government, the crooked secrets of state 
administration, the confusion, sinecurism, and corruption ever and again 
discovered in the bureaux at Washington forbid us to believe that any clear 
conceptions of what constitutes good administration are as yet very widely 
current in the United States.
6
The corruption and incompetence in the public sector of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century contributed to the growth of the progressive movement.
7
In time, that led to civil 
service reform and to the demand, in Robert Biller’s phrase, “that the public’s business be 
conducted with competence, efficiency and care.”
8
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Some people got lost in the flood. 
Some people got away alright. 
In the first few decades of the 1900s, the “public’s business” remained an 
inconsequential part of the America enterprise.  The nation was under the normative sway 
of the “rugged individualist” and the economic direction of corporate interests.  Herbert 
Hoover spoke of government as an umpire, not a player in economic life.  He believed 
that government involvement in the private sector would threaten democracy and 
individual freedom.
9
By 1932, twenty five percent of the U.S. workforce did not have a job.  The Great 
Depression drained the ruggedness from the individualist mythos and forced a 
reconsideration of government’s role in American life.  Franklin Roosevelt’s election 
accelerated an expansion of government that lasted for fifty years.
10
 For people who 
grew up during the Great Depression, getting a government job, with its reliable 
paycheck and steady tenure, was a good career move.  
From the 1900s until the late 1940s, public administration’s competence framework 
was constructed by practitioners who were guided by what Wilson called “stable 
principle.”  People learned to do their work as apprentices.  Elders who relied on 
experienced-based principles – what in today’s homeland security world might be called 
“doctrine” – tutored the new workers.  In many respects, public administration was a 
guild. 
The river has busted through clear down to Plaquemines. 
Six feet of water in the streets of Evangeline. 
In 1946, Herbert Simon challenged the prevailing competence frame by arguing that a 
true science of administration could not be built on those stable principles, or what he 
called “proverbs.”  Administration had to be based on the products of operational 
definitions of concepts and empirical theory – i.e., normal science.
11
 Simon and other 
intellectual leaders transformed public administration from a domain where competent 
practitioners were guided by heuristics, to a realm where competence was defined by an 
“administrative science” that provided objective guidance about the right things to do and 
the right ways to do them.  Government service became another – although somewhat 
second-class – home for the archetypical Organization Man.
12
 
The socially chaotic 1960s and the early 1970s brought renewed attention to the role 
government could play in improving people’s lives.  The normative premise of what 
came to be called the New Public Administration was captured by Todd LaPorte’s vision 
that “the purpose of public organization is the reduction of economic, social and psychic 




Public service attracted people who wanted to end economic and social inequality, 
both in the United States and in other countries.  Competence was defined largely by 
having good intentions and the skills to turn those intentions into programs that improved 
people’s lives.  
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society marked the twilight years of public administration as 
an activity to enhance “life opportunities” for Americans.  People started getting elected 
by arguing that government was the problem.  Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, 
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Bush, and Clinton sought to end – at least semantically – the “era of big government.”
14
 
From the time Johnson decided not to run for a second term through the 2001 terror 




The waxing distrust of government, and the growing economic opportunities in the 
private sector contributed to the considerable decline in the desirability of government 
jobs.
16
 In the 1980s and 1990s, public service was frequently perceived as an 
organizational sanctuary for the unambitious, for people who could not succeed in the 




President Coolidge came down in a railroad train, 
With a little fat man with a note-pad in his hand. 
Woodrow Wilson’s 118-year-old dictum that “the field of administration is a field of 
business” is today’s dogma.  The private sector – even in the face of Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco, ImClone, Adelphia, Global Crossing and other examples of incompetence and 
corruption – remains the primary normative framework for public sector administrative 
aspirations.  The language of business has suffused the public sector in ways too 
numerous to recount.  Agencies have business plans and supply chains; they use 
benchmarks to identify best practices and industry standards.  Public administrators are 
public managers.  Citizens morphed into clients and customers.  The DHS Secretary talks 
about his desire to “re-engineer” preparedness and “re-tool” FEMA.
18
 
The comparatively few remaining administrators who entered government in the 
1970s will be leaving public service within the next few years.  Fifty percent of federal 
workers are eligible to retire in the next four years.  Three quarters of those people are 
senior executives.
19
 These administrators depart with their substantive and tacit 
knowledge, and with memories of a time when government and business operations were 
not synonymous.  
Government service continues to be uninviting.  As a February 2005 report from the 
Partnership for Public Services described the dilemma, “Many Americans view 
government careers as uninteresting or unappealing, or believe the federal workplace is in 
need of reform, making it difficult to attract and retain talent.”
20
 Have you ever heard a 
child say, “When I grow up, I want to be a public administrator?”
21
 
The president say, ''Little fat man isn't it a shame 
What the river has done to this poor cracker’s land." 
Public administrators have taken a beating for over thirty years.  What once was a 
domain of service is a fallow of despair.
22
 Homeland security – with its myriad agencies 
defiled by the mediocrity of its Katrina response – symbolizes the status of much of the 
public sector. 
A 2005 survey of people who work for the national government found “only 12 
percent of the more than 10,000 DHS employees who returned a government 
questionnaire said they felt strongly that they were ‘encouraged to come up with new and 
better ways of doing things’.”
23
 It is difficult for imagination or initiative to flourish in 
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an organization where only 3 percent of the workers are confident personnel decisions are 
"based on merit," only 18 percent feel strongly that they are "held accountable for 




One could argue – based on the Katrina, Rita and Wilma headlines about response – 
that public sector incompetence is chiefly the result of unqualified leaders.  But that 
explanation is too narrow.  Followers are as critical to the competence equation as the 
men and women who carry the title of leader.
25
 Incompetence is the result of government 
workers who accept less than an impassioned best from elected officials, appointed 
leaders, co-workers, and themselves.  Incompetence is the result of a governance 
philosophy that belittles governance. 
So what to do? 
Mechanistically-minded reformers have already noted a need for structural and 
functional corrections to our preparedness system.  DHS will be re-organized on the basis 
of its Second Stage Review – an analysis conducted before the Hurricanes.  There are 




The mechanical prescription to “find the problem and fix it” may be too powerful to 
allow consideration of an alternative strategy.
27
 The machine metaphor has guided a 
century of reform efforts. 
The public sector has been organizing, reorganizing, searching for excellence, 
downsizing, reinventing itself, outsourcing, and hiring competence for years.
28
 The 
Katrina cataclysm offers yet another opportunity for what one government executive 
called the “Troika of Doom” to move into action: think tanks will sell ideas about 
improving preparedness to substantively inexperienced political leaders, who then award 
contracts to favored Washington Beltway companies.
29
 What comes out of this largely 
unexamined churn will be more paper producing, acronym generating, PowerPoint 
numbing programs for “improving” the nation’s preparedness.   
There is another approach to reinvigorating public sector competence and 
preparedness.  It looks first to the spirit of public service rather than the sterility of 
standards. 
Louisiana, Louisiana. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
Americans disagree about the rightness of involving American troops in the 
Terrorism Wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere.  But practically every American 
“supports our troops.”  There is an admiration, compassion and appreciation for what 
these warriors have volunteered to do.  The military’s warrior ethos does not come solely 
or even most directly from standards-based training.  It comes from an inner belief – 




To be effective, the ethos of public sector has to come from a similar source.  It 
cannot be mandated by law, “incentivized” by bonuses, or built in to a program.  The 
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competence of the public administrator is more organic than mechanical.  It has to be 
grown and nourished.   
For the next catastrophe – whether hurricane, terrorist attack, or pandemic – 
Americans are told to be ready to take care of themselves for 72 hours to several weeks 
before the cavalry arrives.  Self-reliance is good counsel for the public sector as well.  
The responsibility for returning competence to the core of public work rests with 
individual administrators.   
Steven Covey writes about the “circle of influence and the circle of concern.”
31
 
Public workers have been slimed by the abysmal Katrina response.  Those who care 
about that should be concerned about competence in the public sector.  But each person 
has a different circle of influence; a different way to contribute to eliminating what 
Woodrow Wilson called “the poisonous atmosphere…, the crooked secrets…, the 
confusion, sinecurism, and corruption.”
For a few emergency managers with many years’ experience it might mean a 
willingness to disrupt their lives and finances to rebuild a federal system that died from 
neglect.  For someone just starting government service, it could be no longer tolerating 
the co-worker who spends hours everyday checking email and surfing websites.  For 
another person, it could be taking the responsibility to eliminate unproductive meetings.  
It could be refusing to notionalize the difficult parts of a preparedness exercise, and 
instead insisting that participants “exercise in the red zone.”  It could be creating new 
ways to work effectively with other agencies, contractors, and the private sector.   
Louisiana, Louisiana. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
A dominant metaphor characterizes each era of public administration’s evolution as a 
discipline.  At first, administrators were artisans, skilled at the public’s business.  Next, 
the competent ones aspired to become scientists, guided by the truth of empirical reality.  
In the 1960s and 70s, administrators struggled to enact the metaphor of social reformer, 
looking to improve life.  The present era depicts public administrators as managers.   
All metaphors eventually lose their power.  Katrina convincingly demonstrated the 
sedentary emptiness of the “public administrator as manager” metaphor.  But it is not 
clear what will replace it.   
For a brief time, Katrina had the potential to transform the nation’s expectations about 
government and the public sector.  That time may be gone.  In less than four months, the 
attention of unaffected publics has moved on to other matters.
32
 Organizational curtains 
have veiled the dispirited chaos of the preparedness world.  The public sector risks 
descending further into denial.   
Ten years before Wilson wrote his generative public administration essay, Japan’s 
Tokugawa period came to an end and with it that nation’s feudal society.  The social 
turmoil brought forth ronin, samurai who no longer had a master.  Ronin were forced by 
their circumstances to think freely, to develop structural independence, and to lead the 
way to Japan’s new social system.
33
 
Public administrators who care about their calling are in an analogous state.  Like 
ronin, they too work in a realm that has lost its masters and principled center.  Individual 
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administrators have an opportunity to develop a new ethos of competence by breaking the 
tradition of psychic feudalism that is the public sector.  It requires acting from personal 
courage instead of personal fear.  It requires personal adaptability, autonomy and an 
insistent excellence.
 34
 It requires – in Gandhi’s phrase – being the change you want to 
see.  
They're tryin' to wash us away. 
They're tryin' to wash us away.
35
 
The unthinkable is still out there: detonation of a nuclear device, biological attacks, 
terrorist assaults on schools.  Thinkable catastrophes are also visible: a major earthquake 
in San Francisco, a chemical plant explosion in New Jersey, and Avian flu everywhere.  
The public sector has a second chance to get better prepared. 
Spirit does not return easily.  It will take years to return the ethos of competence.  It is 
not obvious that we have that much time.  But no one is going to bring competence back 
except the people who care about the service part of public service.
In 1776, Thomas Jefferson wrote: 
Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should 
not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all 
experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while 
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to 
which they are accustomed. 
Jefferson and the fifty-five other men who signed the Declaration of Independence 
asserted that whenever any form of government fails to accomplish its basic purposes, 
…it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its 
powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their 
Safety and Happiness. 
What happened after Katrina struck was the insufferable sadness of systemic 
incompetence.  The American people deserve a government and a public service that 
does not allow that to happen again. 
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In October 2005, Michael D. Brown, former Undersecretary, Department of Homeland Security 
for Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Director, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), testified before a committee of the United States Congress on the federal 
response to Hurricane Katrina.   U.S. Representative William Shuster, (R-PA) in his questioning 
of former Undersecretary Brown, said:
We've talked a lot about unifying command today and I want to try to get more in 
detail on that. I think it's, first, important for you to explain to us your view of 
what the Unified Command looks like to the American people, because I don't 
think anybody understands what that looks like. We might understand it in 
military terms but it's different when FEMA is on the ground. So could you give 
us, sort of, a sketch of what it looks like?1
Representative Shuster was correct to characterize a military Unified Command as different from 
a Unified Command as envisioned by National Incident Management System (NIMS).  In the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, the need for clear and coherent command arrangements during a 
disaster response has become obvious.  A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need for 
a Unified Command to deal with large-scale man-made or natural disasters.  Most would agree 
that a strong local, state, federal, volunteer agency, and private sector partnership is required; 
however, there is no nationally understood, accepted, and implemented definition of what 
constitutes a workable Unified Command in a catastrophic disaster.  
This article describes the general concepts, background, and history of Unified Command, as 
well as the use of Unified Command principles in the disaster response to the 2004 Hurricanes in 
Florida and to the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi. 
Unified Command: General Concept 
A Unified Command is, in its essence, a mechanism to define and achieve a set of objectives in 
situations where two or more political or functional entities have authorities and/or assets.  In a 
unified command approach, representatives of the entities meet to set goals and decide how each 
can contribute to the achievement of those goals.  There can be strong, formal command and 
control relationships between and among the entities, as is the case in a military Unified 
Command, or the command and control linkages can be based on informal but structured 
arrangements that recognize federal responsibilities and the legal sovereignty of state and local 
governments under our federalist form of government.  In a disaster response involving elected 
and appointed officials, consensus building and a collaborative approach to problem solving are 
important aspects of Unified Command.
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Unified Command in a Military Context
The initial concept of a Unified Command derives from the military.  It is an organizational 
arrangement in which commanders retain control over their units and assets while supporting the 
objectives of a larger command. Within the U.S. military, the term and practice of Unified 
Command have been used for some decades, especially since the National Security Act of 1947, 
later strengthened by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1986.2 The military has a straightforward and simple model to achieve unity of effort where 
different services work together. Department of Defense (DOD) doctrine defines Unified 
Command as “a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and 
composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments that is 
established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice 
and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." 3
Military Unified Commands are made up of units that are assigned to the command through a 
joint document called the Unified Command Plan (UCP).  The general mission is assigned by the 
President and the Secretary of Defense and in the National Military Strategy is further defined by 
the Combatant Commander.  Within the United States military establishment a Unified 
Command is characterized by a geographic Area of Responsibility (AOR) which is assigned to a 
single combatant commander who has the authority to directly assign, or through other command 
arrangements, two or more “joint” forces from different services – Army, Navy, Marine Corps, 
and Air Force – within the designated AOR.  An example would be the Commander, United 
States Pacific Command who directs the operations of all U.S. military forces in the Pacific 
AOR.4
Is the military model for Unified Command in any way useful within the context of local, 
state, and federal response and recovery operations in a domestic disaster?  Probably not.   
Military command implies strong command and control, and the possibility of censure if 
direction by the combatant commander is not followed.  In a civilian disaster response, there is a 
complex environment of multiple layers of government, each with its own elected and appointed 
officials responsible to their own constituents. Other, less hierarchical, directive organizational 
models, based on consensus building, must be developed and adopted. 
Unified Command in the Fire Community
After the disastrous wildfires in Southern California in 1970, firefighting agencies came together 
to form FIRESCOPE (Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies) 
and develop the FIRESCOPE Incident Command System.  This was later modified and, in 1982, 
was adopted as the National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS).5  ICS is defined 
by The National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) as a “standardized on-scene emergency 
management concept specifically designed to allow its user(s) to adopt an integrated 
organizational structure equal to the complexity and demands of single or multiple incidents,
without being hindered by jurisdictional boundaries.”6 Unified Command is the command and 
control arrangement in incidents where agencies from different jurisdictions are involved.  As 
defined by the NWCG, Unified Command is a part of ICS where “unified command is a unified 
team effort which allows all agencies with jurisdictional responsibility for the incident, either 
geographical or functional, to manage an incident by establishing a common set of incident 
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objectives and strategies. This is accomplished without losing or abdicating authority, 
responsibility, or accountability.”7
The success of the NWCG model for ICS and Unified Command led to its adoption for other 
disasters like oil spills and medical responses.  The Oil Pollution Control Act of 1990 (OPA-90), 
which was enacted following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, mandates the use of NIIMS/ICS.  OPA-
90 also mandates that when a spill occurs, the management of the incident will use a Unified 
Command that includes the responsible federal official, state or local official, and the responsible 
party. The U.S. Coast Guard, in drafting the bill, included the responsible party because it will be 
liable for expenses in oil spills and so should participate in the overall management of, and 
decisions about, the expenditure of funds.8
Unified Command in the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS)
In the aftermath of the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, the President directed Tom Ridge, 
the Secretary of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security, to develop a plan that 
would include a comprehensive “all hazard” approach to disaster management.  Released in 
2003, The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is intended to provide a consistent 
nationwide approach for federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments to work 
effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, prevent, respond to, and recover from domestic 
incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.  NIMS, parts of which were adapted from 
NIIMS, embraced ICS and articulated its concepts: common organizational structure and 
terminology; guidance for building organizations from the bottom up, using rules for establishing 
an effective span of control; “typing” or categorizing resources; and Unified Command.9
NIMS provided the doctrinal basis for the development of a National Response Plan (NRP).  
In a phased implementation, begun in December 2004, the NRP replaced the 1993 Federal 
Response Plan as the guidance for federal consequence management operations.  The change in 
nomenclature from “Federal” to “National” was both symbolic of the fact that the NRP was to 
address not only Federal, but also local, state, volunteer agency, and private sector engagement 
in disaster responses, and an effort to combine into one document several separate federal plans. 
The NRP addresses the “national” engagement in all sorts of hazards, including terrorist 
events, radiological accidents, oil spills of national significance, and others.  Equally important is 
the fact that it was intended to address both consequence management (response activities to 
assist states in helping victims of disasters) and crisis management operations (law enforcement 
activities meant to prevent or apprehend and prosecute terrorists).10 NIMS provides a 
standardized approach to incident management; it describes a uniform set of processes and 
procedures that emergency responders at all levels of government will use to conduct response 
operations.  It is designed to address “all hazards” and addresses each of the dimensions of 
emergency management: prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation.  The 
remainder of this article focuses on response aspect of the NRP.
NIMS defines Unified Command as:
[An] application of ICS (the Incident Command System) used when there is more 
than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political 
jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the 
Unified Command, often the senior person from agencies and/or disciplines 
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participating in the Unified Command, to establish a common set of objectives 
and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.11
As a technical point, the NRP does not use the term “Unified Command” to describe the joint 
state/federal partnership in managing the disaster response.  The NRP uses the term “Joint Field 
Office Coordination Group.”  NRP says that “Utilizing the NIMS principle of Unified 
Command, JFO activities are directed by a JFO Coordination Group.”12  The JFOCG includes 
federal and state officials with primary jurisdictional responsibility or functional authority; the
State Coordinating Officer and the Federal Coordinating Officer are included in this group.  
While there are differences between a JFOCG and a Unified Command, the term “Unified 
Command” is used here to describe the group of individuals who sat at a table together and 
managed the disaster response in Mississippi. 
While the NRP focuses on relationships between and among federal agencies during 
responses to major disasters, it recognizes the lead role of state and local responders. There is no 
dispute that the state and local officials retain their roles and responsibilities for domestic 
incident management.  According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, “The 
Federal Government will assist State and local authorities when their resources are 
overwhelmed, or when Federal interests are involved.”13  In terms of what form the planning 
should take, the 2004 introduction of NIMS directed the use of ICS in domestic disaster 
response. 
Transition from the FRP to NIMS in major disaster response in the field
A partial transition to NIMS from the Federal Response Plan model was achieved in Florida by 
the State-Federal Emergency Response Team in 2004 in the responses to the four presidentially 
declared hurricane disasters: Hurricanes Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne.  A Unified 
Command was implemented at the highest level through the partnership and collaborative efforts 
of the State Coordinating Officer and the State Emergency Response Team, and the Federal 
Coordinating Officer and the Federal Emergency Response Team.14
However, a full ICS response structure was not fully implemented, especially those measures 
to achieve acceptable spans of control through the use of geographic branches within the 
operations section.  Florida has a robust emergency response system and a long history of 
successfully responding to hurricane disasters.  Many lessons from the four 2004 hurricanes were 
used in structuring the response to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, where the applicable 
portions of the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System were 
used to structure the entire response to a major disaster response for the first time.15
Who Sits At The Table?
The participants of a Unified Command can vary depending on the nature of the disaster and 
may change during the course of a disaster response.  Four elements fundamental in determining 
the personnel to be included in the Unified Command are Authority and Responsibility, Co-
location, Parity, and Training and Common Understanding.
Authority and Responsibility.  Jurisdiction or authority to direct resources that apply to the 
disaster response is a fundamental prerequisite for members of a Unified Command.  Our 
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federalist system of government provides for the sovereignty of the state in managing a disaster 
within state borders: the Governor is in charge of the disaster response.  The Governor has the 
ability to delegate authorities to designated individuals: the Governor’s Authorized
Representative and the State Coordinating Officer.  During the 2004 Hurricanes in Florida, 
Governor Jeb Bush designated Craig Fugate as the Governor’s Authorized Representative and 
Frank Koutnik as the State Coordinating Officer. In Mississippi, in 2005, Robert Latham was 
Governor Barbour’s Authorized Representative and Michael Womack was the State 
Coordinating Officer.  
On the federal side, when the Governor of a state receives a Presidential declaration for a 
major disaster, the President appoints a Federal Coordinating Officer, whose authority resides in 
the Stafford Act.  The FCO has no authority to direct the state response, but does provide 
technical assistance, and expertise, and is authorized by the Stafford Act to mission-assign 
federal agencies, with or without reimbursement, to support the requests of the Governor and 
his/her representatives.16 I was the FCO for the response and recovery in the Florida Hurricanes 
in 2004, and for the first weeks of the response to the Katrina disaster in Mississippi.
Co-location.  It is important that the members of the Unified Command be able to meet regularly 
and be available to consult with one another.  In the 2004 Florida hurricane responses, Craig 
Fugate and I were “joined at the hip.”  We traveled together to the devastated areas after all four 
storms and sat at the same table during the response phase of the disaster.  In the days leading up 
to and just after landfall of the storms, I operated out of a mobile command center that was 
located in the parking lot of the Florida State Emergency Operations Center.  When briefing 
Governor Bush, Craig and I did so together. Following landfall in three of the four hurricanes, 
the state-federal team moved forward to the most impacted counties for both situational 
awareness and to demonstrate that the unified state-federal command was on hand to assist the 
local elected and appointed officials. 
In 2005, in the response to Katrina in Mississippi, I was similarly aligned with Governor 
Barbour’s Representative, Robert Latham. Pre-landfall, an Initial Operating Facility (IOF) was 
established at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, the state capitol.  
Following the passing of the storm, Robert and I moved forward to establish a joint IOF in the 
parking lot of the Harrison County EOC.  Our deputies remained in Jackson with the majority of 
the team to handle the requests for assistance from throughout the impacted areas of the State as 
well as the requests Robert and I developed from our interface with leaders along the coast.  
Later, we returned to Jackson, moved the joint emergency response team into a Joint Field Office 
(JFO), and established a Branch Field Office in Biloxi to manage operations in the six southern 
counties and the joint division supervisors in those jurisdictions.  
Each day, the Unified Command held a morning Strategy Meeting to establish joint 
objectives for the next operational period and an afternoon Action Planning meeting to determine 
the adequacy of resources to meet the objectives.  This close contact between individuals with 
decision making responsibilities results in an awareness of each other’s actions and facilitates 
timely decision making.
Parity: Members should be relatively equal in stature/rank. The composition of the Unified 
Command will vary from state to state and with each disaster; however, a basic premise of the 
Unified Command is that its members be of roughly the same stature in terms of rank or position.  
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There should not be a large disparity in responsibility or authority between individual members 
of the Unified Command. This avoids dominance by any member by virtue of his or her relative 
rank or position.  
Training and Common Understanding. Under the NIMS, common understanding is achieved 
through a comprehensive and shared knowledge of the Incident Command System.  Members of 
the Unified Command must be trained and experienced in ICS as well as their assigned positions 
within the structure. With the directive to adopt NIMS from the Department of Homeland 
Security, FEMA instituted training in ICS for emergency managers.17   State emergency 
management officials in Mississippi participated in NIMS training in the summer before 
Hurricane Katrina struck the coast. The FEMA emergency response team sent to Mississippi 
contained individuals who were involved in the FEMA ICS doctrinal and training program 
development.  This training, and the experience of the federal emergency managers, proved 
invaluable in the rapid adoption if ICS, the establishment of the Unified Command, and the 
development and implementation of the Incident Action Planning process in Mississippi. 
Who Sits At The Table In A Unified Command?
 Individuals with primary authority – the Governor’s Representative, the State Coordinating 
Officer and the FCO – are the core of the Unified Command.  Depending on the nature of the 
disaster, others from the state, such as the Adjutant General, or from the federal side, the Defense 
Coordinating Officer, might join the command.  In Florida, the Unified Command consisted of 
Craig Fugate and me as the FCO.  In Mississippi, Robert Latham, the Director of the Mississippi 
Emergency Management Agency, his Deputy Director, Michael Womack, and I, as the Federal 
Coordinating Officer served as the three initial members of the command.  Later, the Adjutant 
General and the Commissioner of Public Safety were added as full members of the Unified 
Command and participated in the action planning-cycle meetings. They were added to the 
leadership team because their assets were critical to the overall success of operations and had to 
be fully integrated into the overall effort.  On the federal side, the Defense Coordinating Officer 
also sat in on the Unified Command meetings. 
Joint Incident Action Planning 
In ICS doctrine a major function of the Unified Command is the “action planning process” to 
develop an Incident Action Plan.  The joint Incident Action Plan is the engine that drives the 
response/recovery effort.  In Mississippi, each day began with a Strategy Meeting in which the 
Unified Command, joint Operations Section Chiefs, joint Logistics Section Chiefs, and other 
supporting groups established the joint state-federal objectives for the operational period.  The 
strategy meeting was followed by a joint Operations-Logistics meeting to coordinate the 
necessary measures to accomplish the objectives.  Later in the day, a joint Action Planning 
meeting was held to finalize the objectives for the next operational period.  Mississippi’s joint 
Incident Action Plan contained ICS forms 202 (incident objectives and Area of Responsibility 
map), 203 (organizational list), 204 (assignment list), 205 (communications plan), 207 
(organization chart), and 220 (air operations worksheet).  All of these proved extremely valuable 
in guiding response/recovery operations.18
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Requests for resources were developed by the local emergency managers and relayed to the 
Operations Section of the Unified Command in Jackson. In the most-devastated counties, unified 
State-Federal Division Supervisors assisted county emergency managers and elected officials in 
identifying priority resource requirements.  Based on the joint operational objectives, the unified 
Operations Section coordinated the most effective way to fill the requirements:  State, 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), volunteer agency, or federal (FEMA or 
one or more Emergency Support Functions) resources were considered.  The resource identified 
to meet the local requirement was requested through an Action Request Form (ARF).  If Federal 
resources were selected, one or more Emergency Support Functions were ‘mission assigned’ or 
FEMA bought or provided available resources.   The resources were coordinated with the State 
for distribution to the requesting jurisdiction and/or geographic branch of the Operations Section.  
Resources were tracked using the Joint Assignment List, ICS form 204. 
Modifications to ICS in the Hurricane Katrina Response
In “pure” ICS, as practiced by the fire service for example, the Unified Command exists only at 
the highest level.  The sections, branches, and divisions below the Unified Command are 
directed by the most qualified member in that unit of the organization.  In the response to the 
Hurricane Katrina disaster in Mississippi, we found this aspect of the ICS did not fit our 
organizational needs for this joint state-federal response.   We realized that there was a need for 
“Unified Command” up and down the organization in order to address political and operational 
realities, and the fact that there might be no local “incident commander” with the capabilities to 
field a coherent response. 
 ICS, in its original configuration, is based on a “bottoms up” approach in which the local 
Incident Commander and his/her Incident Management Team develop an incident action plan 
and request required resources.  In a catastrophic event this is impossible if the people at the 
“bottom” are overwhelmed and unable to fully form coherent response organizations. One of the 
modifications we made to the basic ICS was to have joint section chiefs in each of the ICS 
sections – one chief from the state and an equal chief from FEMA (a “Unified Command” at the 
section level).  These two individuals worked together to accomplish the goals assigned to their 
section and reported jointly to the FCO/SCO Unified Command. We extended this “Unified 
Command” concept to the geographic branch directors and the division supervisors in the local 
areas. 
The 2005 Katrina response in Mississippi was the first time joint division supervisors were 
co-located with emergency managers at the county level consistent with ICS doctrine.  During 
the 2004 responses in Florida, FEMA liaisons were placed in some critical counties; this was 
primarily to provide advice to the local officials. County liaisons were just “liaisons” and did not 
have the authority to direct state or federal resources.  Establishing joint geographic Branch 
Directors and Division Supervisors worked extremely well.  “Pure” ICS may work well for fires 
and smaller disasters, but some substantial modifications are required for large scale events.   
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Communication of objectives 
Under ICS doctrine, joint operational objectives are determined by the Unified Command and 
articulated to key members of the State-Federal Response Team down the chain using the 
Incident Action Plan. It is important that every level in the chain understand the joint goals and 
that level’s role in achieving those goals.  The objectives passed to the branch directors and 
division supervisors serve to facilitate the planning efforts of the Unified Commands at that 
level.  In Mississippi, the objectives were also highlighted during press conferences held by 
Governor Barbour, with the participation of the SCO, the FCO, and other appropriate state and 
federal officials. A critical piece of the joint Unified Command is consistent, coordinated public 
messaging.  In both Florida and Mississippi, a Joint Information Center (JIC) was established 
early to ensure consistent messages were going out to the public.
Span of control
One of the features of ICS is the decentralization of decision making; once the priorities have 
been set and communicated to the branches, the joint branch directors then have the authority to 
make decisions to support the priorities.  ICS guidelines recommend that a manageable span of 
control is one supervisor to five to seven subordinates. Under the FRP, the span of control was 
much higher resulting in centralization of control and an unworkable number of “direct reports” 
to the FCO.  One important point: ICS requires more personnel in leadership positions than the 
former FRP organization.  Despite a shortfall in FEMA leaders, an acceptable span of control 
was achieved in Mississippi through the use of personnel from other federal agencies such as 
U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management.  These individuals are often trained in ICS 
as a part of their primary jobs and performed well in the NIMS response.
Issues for Discussion
Based on my experiences in Florida during the four hurricanes of 2004 and in Mississippi during 
Katrina in 2005, several issues regarding Unified Command were unresolved.
Unified Command in a domestic disaster: Authority
Unified Command in a disaster like Hurricane Katrina is different than Unified Command in a 
military or firefighting setting in that many of the participants are elected officials who may have 
diverse objectives and constituents.  In a Unified Command with strict command relationships, 
an incident commander who acts outside the objectives and goals of the Unified Command is 
subject to censure. This is not the case in domestic disasters where elected officials have agendas 
that might not align completely with the objectives of the overall Incident Action Plan.   Thus, 
the success of domestic response operations requires that all parties agree to cooperate and 
support not only the joint objectives, but the methodology to achieve those objectives.  I believe 
that in Mississippi this was achieved, for the most part, because objectives were based on the 
priorities of the local officials; and they understood their concerns were being heard and acted 
upon, even in the face of resource shortages.  
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How does the “Unified Command” actually work when there are no well-defined lines of 
authority like those that underlie the Department of Defense’s definition of the Unified 
Command structure?   A clear vesting of authority in emergency managers is vital for the 
formation and functioning of an effective Unified Command.  Florida Governor Jeb Bush in his 
testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, said
Florida’s team is led by a Unified Command, to coordinate efforts, share 
resources, make decisions and provide direction with one voice. During a disaster, 
I designate Craig Fugate, Director of Emergency Management, to serve as the 
chief coordinating officer of our state response.  I delegate statutory authority to 
him so he can do his job effectively and report directly to me.19
Governor Bush established his vision for an effective Unified Command and provided the 
requisite legal authority to empower his representative to direct state operations. Similarly, the 
Stafford Act gives authority to the FCO; the authority of the FCO comes directly from the 
President and that authority is vested in the FCO when the appointment is recorded in the Federal 
Register as part of the disaster declaration. In some states, the State Constitution gives 
considerable authority to local jurisdictions; this can make things a bit murky when attempting to 
establish hierarchical arrangements in a Unified Command.
FCO as a member of the Unified Command
In defining the Unified Command in a disaster response, the NRP does not include the FCO as a 
member, but says “The FCO assists the Unified…Command.”20  It is my belief this view should 
be revisited. Despite the fact that the FCO may not have “command authority” in the state, 
he/she has the responsibility to oversee the use of federal resources in the disaster operations.    
This commitment of federal resources is significant and decisions must be coordinated and 
synchronized with the overall effort in a timely manner – this is the function of a Unified 
Command. If, in a catastrophic event, the federal government is to “push” resources down to the 
state, rather than waiting for requests, it is imperative that the senior federal official with 
responsibilities for the commitment of resources have a “seat at the table” in a unified command 
structure.  In both Florida and Mississippi, the priority was on the victims and the Unified 
Command, under the leadership of the state governors, performed well in coordinated and 
directed operations. In my experience, a federal-state joint Unified Command facilitates timely 
and effective decision making.
Unified Command in a disaster: Multi-state disasters
Katrina exposed a weakness in the National Response Plan: there is no specific discussion of 
multi-state disaster management options. Hurricane Katrina impacted three states and each state 
received a separate disaster declaration from President Bush. As called for in the Stafford Act, 
the President appointed three federal coordinating officers, one for each state that received a 
declaration. 
 There were large differences in the response to the three disasters that arose in part from the 
extent and nature of the damage, the ongoing flooding in Louisiana, the differences in 
jurisdictional authority, the use of federal troops in Louisiana, and, I believe, in the use of ICS 
9Carwile: Unified Command and Katrina
Homeland Security Affairs (http://www.hsaj.org), 2006
and Unified Command in Mississippi.  Initially, each response was separate and federal 
resources were managed by the Emergency Response Team (ERT) in the Emergency Operation 
Center in each state.  
On Sept 3, a Principle Federal Official (PFO) was appointed by Department of Homeland 
Security Secretary Michael Chertoff to cover all three disasters.21 Based on my understanding of 
the NRP and my training as a member of the PFO cadre for DHS, I did not feel that the 
appointment of a PFO affected the authority or mandate as FCO in any way.  Reports were sent 
to the PFO to give him situational awareness regarding developments in Mississippi.
The position of PFO was created by HSPD-5 in 2003.  By NRP definition 
[The] PFO is personally designated by the Secretary of  Homeland Security to 
facilitate Federal support to the established Incident Command System (ICS) 
Unified Command structure and to coordinate overall Federal incident 
management and assistance activities across the spectrum of prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. The PFO ensures that incident management 
efforts are maximized through effective and efficient coordination. The PFO 
provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the 
Secretary of Homeland Security.22
More specifically, the PFO does not become the Incident Commander, nor direct or replace the 
incident command structure. He also does not have directive authority over the Senior Federal 
Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO), Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), or other federal and 
state officials.23
On September 21, the Presidential appointments of the three Federal Coordinating Officers 
were terminated and the PFO was appointed FCO for each of the three states.24 While I 
continued to perform most of the duties of the FCO in Mississippi, my authority as a member of 
the Unified Command became problematic.  Under Unified Command principles, participants 
must be co-located and should be the primary holders of legal authority. 
This situation highlights the complex command and control issues associated with multi-
state-federal response operations within the context of our Federalist system of government. As 
there is a high likelihood of disasters that can strike across state borders, whether due to a 
terrorist event, a tsunami on the West Coast, an earthquake on the New Madrid fault, or a 
pandemic flu, this important subject must be addressed.  The position of FCO is clearly intended 
by the Stafford Act to provide an individual to serve as the President’s representative to the 
Governor in one state.  The NRP, building on HSPD-5’s designation of the Secretary of 
Homeland Security as the President’s “principal federal official” for domestic security, lists 
several responsibilities for a designated PFO.  Most of these revolve around providing situational 
awareness, coordinating federal efforts, and serving as senior spokesperson. The PFO currently 
has no operational authority under the NRP.  
During Hurricane Katrina operations, there were efforts to designate one federal official as 
the individual in charge of federal operations in the three states impacted most significantly by 
the storm.  These efforts were not entirely successful.   They highlighted the need for serious 
discussion of how the federal response should be most effectively managed in a multi-state 
catastrophic disaster.   Is there a need for a level of federal organization, above the state level, to 
coordinate the response over state borders?  Should this be a federal oversight organization, or a 
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regional group that includes representatives of the impacted areas, or an organization of federal 
agencies to coordinate resources much like the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise does 
for large wildfires?   
In my opinion, what is really needed in a multi-state operation is not a single entity to direct 
operations in two or more states; each state should be assigned an independent FCO to work 
directly with the Governor and his/her representatives.  A multi-state disaster scenario requires, 
on the federal side, an adjudicator of resource conflicts and a provider of situational awareness 
for the National leadership. I believe the organizational level of Area Command within ICS may 
provide a useful model on which to base discussions.
Any discussion of multi-state management of disaster response will require discussion with 
the states.  In my experience, while state leaders are very supportive of one another during 
disasters, they would not like to be part of a “regional approach” that in any way inhibits direct 
dialog with the national leadership in Washington.  Additionally, most state leaders believe that 
their states have unique circumstances that warrant individual attention and solutions.
Role for the Department of Defense
Does the Department of Defense fit into the Unified Command?  Should they have a seat at the 
table from the beginning?  The federal military has substantial assets that should be called upon 
in a catastrophic disaster.  A DOD representative, the Defense Coordinating Officer, is pre-
designated and, when a major disaster is declared by the President, he or she is assigned to the 
Emergency Response Team to coordinate the use of DOD assets.25  A seasoned DCO and his 
staff, the Defense Coordinating Element, were present in the Mississippi joint state-federal 
Emergency Response Team during the Hurricane Katrina Response.  The DCO sat in on all 
Unified Command meetings.  Active duty military troops under Joint Task Force Katrina were 
not deployed to Mississippi.  Some small active duty units, such as the USN Seabees, were 
stationed in the state when the Hurricane Katrina struck and played a role in the response.  Under 
EMAC, the deployment of significant numbers of National Guard resources from other states 
provided the Adjutant General of Mississippi with adequate forces to accomplish his assigned 
missions. Because of this, the DCO was not considered a full member of the Unified Command 
leadership in Mississippi.  
U.S. Northern Command, established in 2002, has, in addition to its homeland defense 
mission, also the mission of coordinating and providing active-duty defense support to civil 
authorities.26  In the event that active duty Title 10 forces are needed in the state to assist in the 
response, a DOD representative should be a full member in the Unified Command leadership. 
Well beforehand, however, there needs to be clarification about the interface between the 
National Guard command and NORTHCOM.  Should only one officer, representing both the 
National Guard and active duty forces, be a part of the Unified Command?  Or could both the 
Adjutant General and a senior active duty officer representing NORTHCOM simultaneously be 
members? Unity of effort and unity of command are both principles of war, and important 
operational features of successful military command and control relationships; this would also be 
true in a disaster response in which military forces are involved.  Scott Wells, the FCO in 
Louisiana for the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, during testimony on December 8, 2005 before the 
Senate Committee investigating Hurricane Katrina, characterized the active duty military as an 
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“800-pound gorilla” that brought tremendous resources but operated independently.27  For this 
reason, the command relationship between National Guard and Title 10 commanders should be 
worked out prior to any deployment of Federal forces.  These relationships should not only be 
well understood, but also practiced in exercises before a large disaster strikes.  In this case, it 
would be appropriate for the military commander(s) to be a full partner with the FCO and the 
SCO in determining the IAP and goals for the response.  The Governor of the state would remain 
in charge.  
The response in Mississippi
Anyone who followed the news on the Katrina response in Mississippi realized that in the 
immediate wake of the disaster there were problems with the delivery of commodities such as 
ice, water, and MREs (Meals Ready to Eat).28  A detailed look at this aspect of the disaster 
response revealed that this was primarily a result of the condition of the roads leading into the 
devastated areas and the inability of FEMA logistics to deliver the amount of commodities 
requested. However, the ICS and Unified Command structure handled requests from the field 
and had visibility over resources that arrived in the staging areas.  ICS and Unified Command, 
especially with the modifications made in Mississippi, worked well and should be part of any 
disaster response.  If sufficient commodities had been received in a timely manner, this aspect of 
the response would have been viewed as a success.
Former Undersecretary Brown expressed his frustration that in the initial response to the 
Katrina disaster in Louisiana there was no Unified Command established in that state.29 I have 
not commented on the Katrina response in Louisiana; that response  presented some very serious 
challenges to the emergency managers because of the ongoing flooding due to the levee break
and the large number of people trapped and later displaced by the flooding.  A study of the 
Louisiana operations could elucidate decisions made in the early hours and days of the disaster 
that resulted in differences between the response in Mississippi and in Louisiana.
Conclusions
Hurricane Katrina provided the first major test of NIMS, the NRP, ICS, and Unified Command. 
In Mississippi, the Unified Command system worked well in reducing the chaos of this
catastrophic disaster.  A major factor in the success was the prior ICS and NIMS training of the 
individuals in the Unified Command and their staffs.
Hurricane Katrina, much like Hurricane Andrew in 1993, has the potential to make an 
indelible imprint on the manner in which America responds to large scale, multi-jurisdictional 
disasters.  As the various hearings and public dialogue continue, I believe, based on my 
experiences with the very strong State of Florida emergency team during the four hurricanes of 
2004 and participation in the 2005 State of Mississippi-Federal partnership, there are important 
lessons to be learned in achieving workable inter-governmental organizational structures.
A doctrine for large scale domestic response and recovery operations, especially in multi-
state disasters, must be developed. Hurricane Katrina operations in Mississippi were far from 
perfect, but the use of the ICS, the Unified Command, and the partnership of state and federal 
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responders, down to the lowest levels, provided a functional tool to allocate the available 
resources in a way that minimized overlap and met the objectives of the joint incident action 
plan.
The next step is to re-examine the National Response Plan in light of the political and 
strategic realities of operating in a “really big one.”  In a catastrophic event, either man-made or 
natural hazard, there will be pulls and tugs from many directions – elected and appointed 
officials of sovereign jurisdictions, the media, the leadership in Washington – in an environment 
of managing shortages.  The organizational models contained in the NRP do not address these 
realities.  Much work needs to be done on developing more useful models, perhaps based on a 
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Abstract
The concept of predictable surprises, i.e. failures to take preventative action in the
face of known threats, was outlined by Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins in their book
by the same name. This paper discusses predictable surprises as primarily organizational
events that result from failure of organizational processes to support surprise-avoidance
rather than surprise-conducive actions by individual members. The analysis contends that
learning organizations are characterized by processes that support surprise-avoidance. The
affective heuristic is useful to prevention studies since it points to aspects of social cog-
nition that are central to envisioning consequences for low probability events. Surprise-
avoidance organizational processes are central to using the affective heuristic to bolster
rational decision-making.
The paper asks whether the preparation and response of federal agencies in New Orleans to
Hurricane Katrina was a predictable surprise. The discussion examines the role of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers in preparing the levee protection system, asking whether its or-
ganizational processes supported surprise-avoidance, or were surprise-conducive. FEMA’s
Katrina response is also reviewed with the same concerns. The actions of each agency
are considered along four characteristic traits of predictable surprises. The study offers
several policy proposals, some presented by the Secretary of Homeland Security and others
stemming from insights developed in the current analysis.
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INTRODUCTION 
How can a surprise be predictable?  Paradoxically, many people think low-probability events are 
just that: low probability; not impossible but very unlikely.  People find it difficult to sustain a 
high level of preparedness for events that are unlikely to happen on any given day, especially if 
the preparation requires spending scarce time and resources.  As Max H. Bazerman and Michael 
D. Watkins observe in their recent book, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have 
Seen Coming, And How To Prevent Them, “We don’t want to invest in preventing a problem that 
we have not experienced and cannot imagine with great specificity.”
1
We all share a cognitive trait that inclines each of us, as individuals, to take the risk not to 
invest sufficient time and resources in the present to prevent a large, but low-probability, loss in 
the future, and choose instead to take smaller, certain losses in the present by investing less in 
preventative efforts.  As a result, spending on prevention is too often minimized until the threats 
are more tangible, until people can imagine their results.  At that point, it is often too late to 
avoid a large loss. 
In an effort to understand these dynamics in the perception of risk, researchers in risk 
perception and risk communication explicitly address the interplay of rationality and emotion in 
peoples’ decisions about risk.  Traditionally, the study of risk assumed that emotion (the affect) 
limits the degree of rationality in a decision-making process.  It was assumed that emotion 
predisposes us to make one decision rather than another based on our perceptions of good or bad 
consequences.  However, there is another side to the point.  
Researchers in risk communication sometimes refer to the phenomena as an affective 
heuristic that can either limit rational decision-making, or enhance it.
2
By affect, we mean 
letting emotions about what is good or bad drive us in assessing the risk of doing something one 
particular way rather than another way.  Heuristic means using those emotions as a rule of thumb 
for guiding the choices we make rather than having those emotions drive our choices.  Therefore, 
following a hunch or gut instinct based on experience or professional judgment, though 
sometimes posing difficulty for planning and coordination can in principle enhance rational 
decision-making rather than limit it.  The key question is how organizations can use the affective 
heuristic to enhance rational decision-making, and how it sometimes works against rational 
decisions. 
We have all heard the Monday morning quarterbacking retort often made by people in charge 
when other people criticize decisions that went wrong.  In fact, some of the official responses to 
efforts to understand how government at all levels prepared for, and responded to, Hurricane 
Katrina seem to echo the retort that criticisms are just Monday morning quarterbacking.
3
Yet 
reluctance to assess decisions can result in a failure to learn from poorly thought out choices, 
where emotion limited rather than enhanced the rationality of the chosen course of action.  
Bazerman and Watkins believe it is possible to develop criteria for deciding whether a surprise 
was predictable, and envisioned, but not acted on preventatively.   
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The analysis here asks whether the definition of a “predictable surprise” is applicable to 
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath in New Orleans.  It is not obvious that the event meets the 
criteria for the characterization, though at first glance most people probably assume it does.  
Bazerman and Watkins define a predictable surprise in the following way: 
Unlike an unpredictable surprise, a predictable surprise arises when 
leaders unquestionably had all the data and insight they needed to 
recognize the potential for, even the inevitability of, a crisis, but failed to 
respond with effective preventative action.
4
Our key focus is whether the impact of Katrina on the New Orleans levee system was 
predictable, along with an associated concern about whether the federal preparedness of the levee 
protection system by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and response to the catastrophic disaster 
by FEMA, were surprising. Bazerman and Watkins outline four major characteristic traits of 
predictable surprises. 
1. Leaders know problems exist and will not solve themselves. 
2. Organizational members realize a problem is getting worse. 
3. Fixing the problem requires significant cost in the present with no  
immediate benefit (rewards for avoiding the costs of prevention are uncertain but 
potentially larger than incurring the costs). 
 4. Humans tend to maintain the status quo if it functions (minorities protect their  
own interests, subverting efforts by leaders to implement change).
5
We will consider each point in detail in the following discussion, and assess the fit of each to 
the planning for, and response to, the devastation from hurricanes like Katrina.  The key analytic 
goal here is to outline organizational innovations that exhibit the capacity to address the most 
serious shortcomings evident in the federal preparation for, and response to, Hurricane Katrina.  
The organizational goal is to increase the likelihood that, in the future, representatives of federal 
agencies in catastrophic disaster situations, i.e. FEMA and the Corps of Engineers, will 
effectively collaborate with state and local officials as well as the private sector.  The emphasis is 
on how federal agencies initiate and maintain support and collaboration since, by definition, a 
catastrophic disaster overwhelms local and state resources.   
Bazerman and Watkins contend leaders can encourage surprise-avoidance or surprise-
conducive organizational processes.  The analysis below outlines the relevance of each type of 
organizational process to the key federal agencies involved in the Hurricane Katrina disaster, the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA.  Surprise-avoidance, as outlined by Bazerman and 
Watkins, is a characteristic goal of learning organizations.
 6
 
Learning Organizational Processes and Surprise-Avoidance 
A range of investigations is underway regarding the preparedness of the levee system to survive 
a Category 3 hurricane, including the Army Corps of Engineers’ study of its own design and 
maintenance preparations, with the American Society of Civil Engineers overseeing.
7
The 
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original legislation in 1965 that authorized the hurricane protection project was only intended to 
protect against Category 3 hurricanes, expected every 200-300 years.
8
In addition, Team 
Louisiana (a state sponsored team of academics and independent engineers), U.S. Senate and 
House committees, the Louisiana Attorney General, the FBI, and the National Science 
Foundation are involved.  As the investigations continue, observers indicate that the failure of the 
levees points to issues in the way they were designed and prepared by the Corps of Engineers.  
Observers note that the Corps of Engineers failed to recognize the relevance of basic design and 
maintenance flaws, contending the oversight speaks to the institution itself as much as to the 
design of the levees.  Combine that position with the common understanding that FEMA failed 
to mount an effective response to Hurricane Katrina and the organizational attributes of federal 
preparedness and response efforts in New Orleans become important concerns. 
One basic lesson to learn from Hurricane Katrina is that organizations managing 
preparedness for flood control and hurricanes, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, as well 
as organizations managing responses to disasters, such as FEMA, can benefit from developing 
learning organizational processes.  Those same processes make it more likely that staff will 
avoid surprises by recognizing them, prioritizing the challenges, and mobilizing resources to 
prevent them from developing.                 
Humans tend to take risks more seriously when the outcomes are vivid to us.
 9
 Bazerman and 
Watkins argue that the challenge of leadership is to “provide the vision for change, even when 
the need is not yet vivid.”
10
 They emphasize the importance of leaders encouraging staff to 
remain aware of the conditions underlying predictable surprises, by providing organizational 
processes designed to “recognize emerging threats, prioritize action, and mobilize available 
resources to mount an effective preventative response.”
11
 
A basic step in preparing an organization to use the affect of its people to enhance their 
efficiency and effectiveness is for its leadership to admit that it is not perfect, that operations 
require continuous improvement.  Professional criticisms of operational performance must flow 
up the organization as well as down, with the organization encouraging such contributions.  
Indeed, a learning organization does the following: 
• defines a clear mission, designed to inspire workers to do their best; 
• creates a culture that emphasizes professionalism; 
• provides top-notch technical training; 
• provides leadership development for managers; 
• pushes responsibility down the ranks so employees in the field are authorized to 
act quickly; and 
• advocates continuous improvement.
12
 
Learning organizations are challenged to promote a level of awareness sufficient to enable 
surprise-avoidance capability from their members.  Indeed, the structure of large and complex 
organizations increases the difficulty leaders’ face in anticipating predictable surprises.
13
 As the 
complexity of organizations, or even project teams, increases, the way expertise is coordinated 
tends to develop into silos.  Organizational silos often disperse responsibility as well as 
information.
14
 In other words, organizational silos encourage staff to “let someone else” deal 
with recognized problems, essentially supporting surprise-conducive processes.   
The following discussion makes the point that surprise-conducive processes are one likely 
result of diminished professional identity in organizations like FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps 
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of Engineers.  Developing surprise-avoiding processes means providing staff with the authority 
and resources to make decisions and an organizational hierarchy that listens for informed, 
professional judgments from subordinates, especially those in the field preparing for, or facing, 
challenges posed by the threat of disaster.  This analysis begins with a discussion of what the 
leadership at the federal, state, and local levels knew about the vulnerability of the New Orleans 
levees. 
Leaders know problems exist and will not solve themselves  
Leadership, as noted above, is a key point of interest when considering the way organizations 
attempt to avoid, or mitigate the impact of, predictable surprises.  There is little dispute of the 
point that local, state, and federal leaders knew about the vulnerability of the New Orleans’ levee 
protection system and the threats it posed to the city.
15
 Although some officials initially claimed 
that no one expected the levees and floodwalls in New Orleans to collapse, most experts knew 
about the vulnerability for many years.  Indeed, the Houston Chronicle ran a story in December 
2001 by Eric Berger offering the following assessment. 
New Orleans is sinking. And its main buffer from a hurricane, the 
protective Mississippi River delta, is quickly eroding away, leaving the 
historic city perilously close to disaster. So vulnerable, in fact, that earlier 
this year the Federal Emergency Management Agency ranked the potential 
damage to New Orleans as among the three likeliest, most catastrophic 
disasters facing this country. The other two? A massive earthquake in San 
Francisco, and, almost prophetically, a terrorist attack on New York City. 
The New Orleans hurricane scenario may be the deadliest of all. In the 
face of an approaching storm, scientists say, the city's less-than-adequate 
evacuation routes would strand 250,000 people or more, and probably kill 
one of 10 left behind as the city drowned under 20 feet of water. 




Surprisingly, a recent Congressional Research Service Report, New Orleans Levees and 
Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection, indicates that “Failure (often called a breach) of 
levees and floodwalls reportedly was a contingency not central to emergency planning and 
response.”
17
 Indeed, Governor Blanco recently released an overview of her actions in preparing 
for and responding to Hurricane Katrina in which she states that “No one expected, or predicted, 
that the levees would fail in the manner which occurred after Hurricane Katrina.”
18
 The question 
is whether officials knew about the potential for breaches, regardless of whether people agreed 
on the scenario most likely to produce them.  The evidence, outlined in the following two 
sections, indicates the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers knew about the threat of breaches, as 
opposed to overtopping, since the early 1980s.  Moreover, all concerned agencies, including 
those at the local, state, and federal levels, knew about the threat of overtopping and consequent 
flooding in even a Category 3 hurricane. 
The Times-Picayune’s special edition issue from June 2002, titled “Washing Away,” 
provides key insights into New Orleans’ social, cultural, and geographical history, making it 
clear the vulnerability of the area to hurricanes was well known.  The Times-Picayune 
summarized the choices faced by New Orleans in trying to manage a situation in which an area 
at or below sea level experiences sinking land and a rising Gulf of Mexico.                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
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Higher levees, a massive coastal-restoration program and even a huge wall 
across New Orleans are all being proposed. Without extraordinary 
measures, key ports, oil and gas production, one of the nation’s most 
important fisheries, the unique bayou culture, the historic French Quarter 
and more are at risk of being swept away in a catastrophic hurricane or 
worn down by smaller ones.
19
 
The receding coastal wetlands were a well-known fact, increasing the vulnerability of Louisiana 
and New Orleans to hurricanes.  A statement offered to the Times-Picayune by the general 
manager of the South Lafourche Levee District, Windel Carole, makes it clear, noting "The 
biggest factor in hurricane risk is land loss.  The Gulf of Mexico is, in effect, probably 20 miles 
closer to us than it was in 1965 when Hurricane Betsy hit."
20
 Therefore, anyone with limited 
knowledge of the history of hurricanes along the Gulf Coast was aware of the vulnerability of 
New Orleans to a Category 4 hurricane like Katrina.
21
 Thus, as the environment surrounding the 
levees increased in its threat potential, the basic design choices made in constructing and 
maintaining the levees increased in importance. 
Few people questioned the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ competence, or diligence, in its 
oversight of the levee protection system.  Although a contractor dispute (discussed below) 
pointed to the Corps of Engineers’ failure to give fundamental consideration to soil composition 
in levee design, overall the authority of the Corps of Engineers went unquestioned by outside 
parties.  Indeed, the draft report of Team Louisiana’s investigation is expected to indicate, as its 
lead investigator, Ivor Van Heerden, testified to Congress, that the levee at the 17
th
 Street Canal 
was built with “too little regard for the inherent weakness of the soil under the canal banks.”  The 
problem was repeated in the other major breaches in the levee system in New Orleans.
22
 So, on 
the preparedness side, basic design flaws in the construction and maintenance of the levee 
infrastructure went unaddressed.  The Army Corps of Engineers is currently investigating its role 
in the levee design and maintenance and, aside from an interim report, has not offered its own 
assessment of the preparedness failures evidenced in the levee breaches.
23
 This issue is 
discussed in more depth in the next section of this paper. 
On the response side of the disaster, the federal government developed the National 
Response Plan (NRP) in December 2004 for leaders to use in situations just like the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster.  The NRP included provisions for dealing with catastrophic disasters in which 
state and local governments are overwhelmed.  These provisions go into effect when the 
President declares an Incident of National Significance (INS), and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security activates the Catastrophic Incident Annex.  In fact, a Presidential declaration of Katrina 
as an INS, issued on August 27, 2005, covered the states hit by the hurricane before it ever 
touched the coastline.  It was, however, the first real test of the NRP and some confusion resulted 
in exercising it.  Examining the confusion can provide lessons to take away from the response 
efforts. 
Interestingly, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff did not appear 
to recognize the implications of the designation made by the President for several days.  
Secretary Chertoff found it necessary to announce an INS again several days after the President, 
but still failed to activate the Catastrophic Incident Annex – even though the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster met not just one, but all four, criteria for an INS outlined in HSPD-5.
24
 In early 
September, DHS spokesperson Russ Knocke explained that Chertoff’s re-declaration of 
Hurricane Katrina as an INS was intended to create an “administrative paper trail” for the 
President’s earlier announcement.
25
 A month later, in mid-October, he contended that, “The 
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annex is intended to be used during no-notice catastrophic incidents when there is no awareness 
of an impending disaster and no pre-staging of people, resources, and response forces.”
26
 In fact, 
reports indicate that the federal government’s authority to respond to an INS did not result from 
Homeland Security Secretary Chertoff's memo, but from a statement issued by the White House 
on the night of August 27 while President George W. Bush was at his Crawford, Texas ranch.
27
 
Secretary Chertoff’s memo came thirty-six hours after the storm hit, declaring the Katrina 
disaster an INS, and, as discussed below, well after the only FEMA agent in New Orleans, Marty 
J. Bahamonde, knew the severity of the situation.   
The President’s statement assigned William Lokey, a subordinate, as the “principal federal 
official” rather than FEMA Director Michael Brown.  Chertoff’s memo re-declared an INS and 
assigned Director Brown as the “principal federal official.”  We can assume the leadership at the 
federal level was well aware that the devastation from a hurricane like Katrina posed catastrophic 
risks, since the President declared it an INS before it hit land.  Neither of the INS declarations 
activated the key provisions of the NRP that would support the proactive allocation of assets and 
capabilities by FEMA.  As retired Admiral James Loy (who, as DHS deputy secretary, helped 
draft the NRP) indicated, one of the “dramatic lessons” to learn from the Hurricane Katrina 
response is in clarifying how and when to use the Catastrophic Incident Annex.
28
 Perhaps the 
baseline criterion to use in activating the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex is whether 
proactive actions are required of FEMA and the agencies it coordinates to respond to any INS 
declaration. 
At first consideration, it is unclear why it was necessary to change the President’s 
designation of the “principal federal official,” especially if the Secretary of Homeland Security 
did not intend to activate the Catastrophic Incident Annex.  Learning organizations push 
responsibility down the ranks so individuals faced with challenging situations are empowered to 
respond to them.  Changing a Presidential designation so that the highest ranking bureaucrat is 
“officially” in charge makes it clear that FEMA, and by implication DHS, did not approach the 
challenges posed by the disaster with the point of view of a learning organization but, rather, as a 
top-down bureaucracy.  Indeed, the inability of Marty J. Bahamonde, FEMA’s only agent on the 
ground in New Orleans immediately following the levee breach, to get the attention of the 
leadership in Washington D.C. is indicative of such an organization.   
In describing his reporting to FEMA headquarters on Monday, August 29, Bahamonde told a 
Senate Committee “I believed at the time and still do today, that I was confirming the worst case 
scenario that everyone had always talked about regarding New Orleans,” i.e. as one of the top 
three most serious disaster scenarios in the United States.
29
 There are clear indications from the 
Katrina response that FEMA is not organized in a manner conducive to learning, or to proactive 
response efforts in case of an INS.  It is not unfair to characterize the agency’s processes as 
surprise-conducive. 
Many news stories have discussed the exodus of personnel from the agency as the 
Department of Homeland Security integrated FEMA into its organization, and the negative 
impact of that reorganization on the professional identity of FEMA staff.  A survey of employees 
last year found that eighty percent said the agency was weaker after joining DHS.
30
 In addition, 
emails between FEMA officials in the field and their managers in Washington D.C. make it clear 
that Bahamonde, as the only FEMA official in New Orleans immediately after Katrina hit, was 
not empowered to solve problems on nearly the scale needed.
31
 Moreover, it appears that the 
agency’s leadership either discounted, or ignored, much of his information about the dire 
circumstances in the Superdome, and the city in general.
32
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Organizational members realize a problem is getting worse 
Katrina, as a Category 4 hurricane, is one of sixteen such hurricanes to hit the United States over 
the past century.  There were three Category 5 storms during that same time-period: Camille 
along the Gulf Coast in 1969; Andrew in 1992; and an unnamed storm hitting the Florida Keys 
in 1935.  All told, there were 314 hurricanes recorded in the Atlantic Ocean since 1950.  Of 
those, seventy-two hit the United States’ coastline, with fifty striking along the Gulf Coast.  
Fourteen of the hurricanes hitting the Gulf Coast came on land within seventy-five miles of New 
Orleans.  Five of those fourteen hurricanes were Category 3 or greater with one – Betsy in 1965 
– a major hit on New Orleans.  Based on the numbers, it is certainly not surprising that 
hurricanes have been a longstanding concern, especially around New Orleans.
33
 
Before Katrina hit New Orleans, FEMA already considered the likely damage from a strong 
hurricane hitting the city to rank in the top three potential catastrophes facing the country.  
Moreover, a 2004 tabletop exercise on a hypothetical Hurricane Pam hitting New Orleans 
pointed to some strengths, but also significant weaknesses, in the readiness of authorities to 
respond to the likely devastation.  A scheduled follow up exercise on evacuating New Orleans 
was not funded.  Then Katrina triggered the actual evacuation plans of the state and city.  As we 
know, these evacuation plans did not execute well.  It seems fair to say that FEMA and the Army 
Corps of Engineers were well aware of the ongoing deterioration in New Orleans’ capacity to 
withstand Category 3 hurricanes, much less a Category 4 or 5. 
In the aftermath of Katrina, several investigations are underway relating to FEMA’s 
performance in particular, but also into the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ preparedness efforts, 
i.e. planning and design of the levees.  The Opening Statement of Chairman Tom Davis of the 
House Government Reform Committee, in recent hearings on the response to Katrina, included 
the following key issues and questions: 
I suspect we will find that government at all levels failed the people of 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. I believe we will hear from Michael 
Brown, for example, that there simply was no unified command structure 
or clear lines of authority in Louisiana.  That means we’re confronted with 
profound questions about not only what went wrong with FEMA, but what 
may be wrong with our government at all levels when it comes to disaster 
preparation and response. Are we lacking a culture of urgency? A culture 
of getting things done? Or is it that, even when we have the best possible 
planning and prediction available, we come face to face with the vast 
divide between policy creation and policy implementation?
34
 
A partial answer to the questions raised by Chairman Davis comes from what the former 
FEMA Director, Michael Brown, did not mention in his own testimony.  Director Brown did not 
mention the National Response Plan or the “Incident of National Significance” concept 
anywhere in his testimony.
35
 His concept of FEMA’s role, as evidenced by his testimony, failed 
to consider the implications of an INS declaration for the overall framework within which the 
agency works.  The leadership at the federal level clearly failed to provide the proactive resource 
allocation and engagement that the challenges of Hurricane Katrina required.  The response 
efforts were largely reactive, i.e. bureaucratic. 
Bureaucracies work by the rules in order to remain accountable.  There were a number of 
criticisms of the federal bureaucracy’s slowness to respond to Katrina’s aftermath.  To some 
extent, it resulted from a duel of competing statutes in the thinking of those responding to the 
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disaster of New Orleans post-Katrina.  A Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, “The 
Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal Issues,” recently indicated that: 
Unless the President determines that a disaster implicates preeminently 
federal interests, the declaration of an emergency under the Stafford Act 
requires that the governor of the affected state first make a determination 
that the situation is of such severity and magnitude that the state is unable 
to respond effectively without federal assistance, which determination 




It is unclear whether the respective federal agencies understood the significance of an INS 
designation for the modality of the federal response.  Federal officials, especially FEMA, stated 
several times that they needed the state of Louisiana to make specific requests.  Yet, the NRP 
clearly makes the point in several places that federal officials need to take the initiative during 
incidents of national significance since local and state officials are likely overwhelmed by the 
event.  It even calls upon FEMA to encourage and facilitate voluntary offers of assistance. 
As the first sentence of our quote from the CRS document implies, an INS is in fact a 
statement that a disaster implicates preeminently federal interests.  In point of fact, and as the 
CRS report indicates, such a declaration makes the Posse Comitatus Act less restrictive in its 
prescriptions of what federal troops can do in responding to disasters.
37
 Nevertheless, the federal 
agencies responding to Katrina appeared to assume otherwise for several days into the disaster 
response effort.  The delay in the federal response is discussed below in terms of differing groups 
attempting to sustain their own status quo.  However, the immediate manifestation of those 
efforts to sustain a status quo was evidenced by the way key actors like Director Brown and 
Secretary Chertoff understood their own roles in the process. 
In his testimony on the role of FEMA, Director Brown described it solely in the context of 
the Stafford Act, never mentioning the way in which an INS can alter the stipulations in the 
Stafford Act if the Secretary of DHS activates the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the NRP.
38
 
Moreover, in Secretary Chertoff’s testimony he asserted that the NRP does not “give him any 
special powers that the FEMA director didn’t have when President Bush declared a federal 
emergency the Saturday before Katrina struck on August 29.”
39
 FEMA did take proactive steps, 
as Director Brown’s testimony indicates, by identifying Federal assets and capabilities, deployed 
strategically out of harm’s way but within proximity.  As indicated in the previous section, 
FEMA failed to maintain a proactive stance regarding movement of those assets and capabilities 
to the disaster scene after the hurricane passed.  For example, on September 3 only a tiny fraction 
of the active duty U.S. military was engaged in rescue and relief efforts.   
The situation frustrated senior military officers who attributed the issues in part to complex 
relationships with FEMA.  Newhouse News Service quoted an officer (who asked not to be 
identified) as saying, "There is a tremendous amount of frustration here, that we have assets 
stacked up ready to go and we don't have the requests for them…. All we can do is nudge the 
folks at FEMA and say, `How about if we do this or that?’"  On the other hand, FEMA 
spokesperson Natalie Rule contended her agency's coordination efforts with the Pentagon were 
driven by the flow of requests from the State of Louisiana.  "The military has been joined at the 
hip (with FEMA) since this storm was approaching Florida…We work with the state and look to 
the state as to what they need…If (a state request) has something to do with military assets, we 
would tap into those."
 40
 Indeed, DHS Secretary Chertoff has recognized the problem FEMA 
faced in using its own resources.  He has promised to “re-engineer” the agency.  The top two 
8 Homeland Security Affairs Vol.  [2005], No. 2, Article 7
http://www.hsaj.org/hsa/volI/iss2/art7
weaknesses Chertoff intends to address are FEMA’s logistical planning before and during 
disasters and its delivery of services to victims in the aftermath of disasters.
41
 
On the face of it, Chertoff’s “re-engineering” plan appears to address issues like the failure of 
FEMA to use its own pre-positioned assets and capabilities effectively, such as the difficulties in 
using military assets, and the reluctance of bus drivers and others to enter New Orleans because 
of the stories of violence.  He proposed one innovative structure to incorporate surprise-
avoidance processes in his recent testimony to the House Select Committee on Hurricane 
Katrina.  Chertoff indicated that DHS is organizing emergency reconnaissance teams to go into 
disaster areas in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophe to provide real time situational 
reporting of facts on the ground.  The new teams consist of FEMA specialists, Coast Guard 
personnel, and other DHS law enforcement officers.   
The team innovation announced by Secretary Chertoff is a ready example of how to constrain 
the affective heuristic’s impact on response decisions by putting in context exaggerated stories 
about what is happening on the ground.
42
 A common shortcoming of the leadership during the 
response to Katrina from federal, state, and local leaders was their allowing vivid accounts of 
looting, rapes, and murder to affect their decision-making.
43
 
More importantly, the major organizational and policy challenges lie on the other side of the 
affective heuristic, i.e. using it to enhance rationality.  Secretary Chertoff has not spoken to how 
the agency will delineate the responsibilities of federal officials vis-à-vis state and local 
authorities in an emergency.  In other words, the key issue of how FEMA can act proactively 
during an INS remains unaddressed. Much of the criticism federal officials made of local 
officials stemmed from the assumption that the federal government should take a reactive role to 
disasters.  For example, Director Brown clearly discussed the inadequacies of the local response 
from the point of view of a federal administrator.
44
 But he failed to keep in mind the way the 
NRP describes proactive actions: 
Notification and full coordination with States will occur, but the 
coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment and 
use of critical resources.  States are urged to notify and coordinate with local 
governments regarding a proactive Federal response.
45
 
Nowhere in the NRP does it say that the federal response to an INS is conditional, based on 
specific requests from the state or local governments.  Nevertheless, FEMA’s response was 
directed with that conception of the agency’s role.  Any “re-engineering” effort for FEMA must 
address this basic issue of what constitutes a “proactive” action by the agency and the scope of 




The argument thus far is that leadership at the federal, state, and local levels was aware of the 
increasing vulnerability of the levee system in New Orleans to hurricanes at Category 3 and 
above.  Key organizations, i.e. FEMA, failed to act proactively to mitigate the catastrophic 
disaster caused by the breach of the levees in New Orleans.  The next section will consider issues 
relating to judgments made about the design of the levees as well as decisions made on funding 
ongoing maintenance and upgrades. 
Fixing the problem requires significant cost in the present with no immediate benefit 
Improving the levee and floodwall system in New Orleans was a recognized challenge for 
decades, as was the challenge of a receding delta providing less protection to the New Orleans 
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area from the storm surges resulting from a hurricane.  The Breaux Act of 1990 created a task 
force involving several federal agencies and gave it the mission of restoring wetlands.  The task 
force received only forty million dollars per year to stop the erosion of the delta.  A University of 
New Orleans study estimated the effort averted only about two percent of the overall loss, 
leaving an erosion rate of twenty-five square miles of delta per year.
47
 
Basic flaws in the design of the levee protection system were first recognized over two 
decades ago, before the wetlands were so diminished.  An outside contractor, Eustis Engineering, 
was the first to express concerns about the levee vulnerability to breaching in the early 1980s.  In 
1981, the New Orleans Sewerage & Water Board developed a plan to improve street drainage by 
dredging the 17
th
 Street Canal.  The Corps of Engineers issued permits to do the dredging in 
1984 and 1992, though the Corps was not a partner in the project.  As a Times-Picayune story 
explains: 
Before the project, the canal formed a roughly symmetrical ‘U’ shape 
common to most canals.  In the sections that would later fail during 
Hurricane Katrina, its average depth was about 12 feet below sea level 
and, at normal water levels, the Orleans side had about a 20-foot buffer of 
mud between the water and what was then a bare steel floodwall.  That 
wall of sheet piling ran through the center of the levee to a depth of 9.8 
feet below sea level.  After the dredging, the bottom was 18.5 feet below 
sea level, and the canal-side levee had been shaved so narrow, water now 
touched the wall on the Orleans side.  The ‘U’ was now lopsided and the 
water in the canal had shorter paths to the outside of the levee.
48
 
Eustis Engineering contracted to do a design study for Modjeski and Masters, the consulting 
engineers on the project, and performed soil investigations on a section of the 17
th
 Street Canal 
from south of the Veterans Memorial Boulevard bridges to just north of those structures.   
They found that “the planned improvements to deepen and enlarge the canal may remove the 
seal that has apparently developed on the bottom and side slopes, thereby allowing a buildup of 
such pressures in the sand stratum.”
49
 Eustis’ concerns about a “blow-out”, or breach, of the 
levee were strong enough that the company recommended test dredging before the final design.  
The company recommended that, without test dredging, the bottom of the canal needed sealing 
with a concrete liner or building a seepage cutoff wall, like sheet pilings, to a depth of 65 feet 
below sea level versus the existing 12 feet.  Engineers studying the levee breaches consider the 
report by Eustis significant because the stretch of canal the firm studied is widely considered to 
exhibit stronger soil layers than those that breached during Hurricane Katrina.   
The most puzzling point about the dredging project is that the Corps of Engineers planned to 
follow the project by raising the floodwall from 10 feet to 14.5 feet.  It is unclear whether the 
Corps paid attention to the contractor’s concerns since most of the documents related to the work 
remain unavailable to the public.  “Although the Corps of Engineers was not a direct partner in 
the dredging, it was aware of the work and knew it would have an impact on its later project.”
50
 
Indeed, contractors working for the Corps on the later project raised their own concerns about the 
soil and foundations of the levee. 
Reports indicate that key sections of the levee system’s soil and foundation, particularly the 
floodwall on the 17
th
 Street Canal where much of the serious flooding occurred, posed serious 
problems for the contractors involved.  Court papers from 1998 show that Pittman Construction 
indicated to the Corps of Engineers as early as 1993 that the soil and the foundation for the walls 
were “not of sufficient strength, rigidity and stability” to build on.  The construction company 
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claimed that the Corps of Engineers did not provide it with complete soil data when it developed 
a bid on the levee project.
51
 
Though the construction company lost its suit against the Corps of Engineers, the gist of their 
complaints about the condition of the soil and existing foundation was not disproven.  Engineers 
now say the difficulties Pittman Construction faced were early warning signs that the Corps of 
Engineers ignored.
52
 In fact, testimony before the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs by several witnesses point to soil-related issues as key causal 
variables in the failures of the 17
th
 Street Canal, the London Ave Canal, and the Industrial 
Canal.
53
 Indeed, Van Heerden summarizes the preliminary findings well, noting: 
…in the case of the 17
th
 Street Canal, London Ave Canal and the 
Industrial Canal, levee collapse and flood breaching reflected unstable 
soils conditions and a lack of foundation support and water percolation 
seals, given the soft, porous and highly organic nature of the soils.
54
 
The Corps of Engineers officially disputed the points made by Pittman Construction regarding 
the soil conditions, though it now seems clear that the crucial breaches in New Orleans occurred 
in levees where the floodwall foundations were not as deep as the canals and that the Corps of 
Engineers was aware of the issue.  The soil then allowed water to percolate under the levee and 
floodwalls, weakening the structure so that the storm surges from Hurricane Katrina moved it 
entirely, or breached it.  Would an organization with processes in place to support ongoing 
learning, and surprise-avoidance, fail to recognize the legitimacy of the contractor’s point, 
rather than argue about purely budgetary issues related to the contract? 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is historically an insular agency, known for doing things 
its own way. It is not possible to say whether surprise-avoidance processes are in place at the 
Corps of Engineers, until the public receives more access to internal documents.  Robert Bea, a 
geotechnical engineer from the University of California at Berkeley, asserts “In my view, in the 
case of the 17
th
 Street, London Avenue, and even the Industrial Canal floodwalls, fundamentally 
what we are looking at is a failure focused on the institutional side.”
55
 The failure of Corps’ staff 
to recognize and prioritize the challenges of levee upgrades and receding wetlands to the city of 
New Orleans, and surrounding areas, strongly suggests that surprise-conducive processes 
characterize its organization.  The Corps’ organization has over the past few decades outsourced 
more work, lost many engineers to private industry, and consequently suffered a diminished 
capacity to attract top-notch engineers.
56
 
Bazerman and Watkins note that predictable surprises play out over long time frames, 
sometimes longer than the typical tenure of organizational leaders.  They contend “This creates a 
variation on the free-rider problem.  ‘Why,’ a leader might ask, ‘should I be the one to grapple 
with this problem and take all the heat when nothing is likely to go wrong during my watch?’”
57
 
In other words, members of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conceivably, made a 
collective bet that the unlikely occurrences that, in fact, did end up happening, were not worth 
the expense, from a professional or organizational initiative point of view.  We will know more 
about the decision-making in the Corps, and its relationship to local agencies with levee 
responsibilities, as additional information is made available to the public.  The sheer magnitude 
of the problems faced in the New Orleans levee protection system probably appeared 




Consider the scale of the plans offered to fix the levee challenges: A plan floated in early 
2001 involved two to three billion dollars proposed to divert sediment from the Mississippi River 
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back into the delta, rather than allow the sediment to wash down the levee system and dump into 
deep water.  The project was compared to the four billion dollar restoration initiative for the 
Florida Everglades.  However, these projects are typically funded through matching grants in 
which the state has to match a federal dollar with one of its own.  Louisiana was only able to 
match each dollar with fifteen to twenty-five cents.  Facing the scale of such a challenge, and the 
state’s limited ability to pay for its share of the costs, the response of most people was to 
maintain the status quo.  The result was a catastrophic disaster that cost many times the few 
billion dollars needed to initiate a full-scale rebuilding program for the levee protection system 
and the surrounding wetlands.  Essentially, those responsible for the levee protection system in 
New Orleans saved money in the short term only to permit one of the largest disasters in 
American history to occur over the long haul. 
Humans tend to maintain the status quo if it functions 
We will understand the way the status quo for the New Orleans levee protection system was 
maintained, in the decision-making of the Corps of Engineers and their associated local agencies, 
as more documentation is made available to the public.  On the preparedness side, the status quo 
self-evidently stopped functioning when the levee protection system catastrophically failed 
during Hurricane Katrina.  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers currently finds its authority 
questioned by many, not because of the competence of its engineers’ expertise, but rather due to 
concerns about its organizational processes that allowed such basic design flaws to go without 
sustained questioning by engineers exercising professional judgment.  More to the point, the 
Corps actually contested lawsuits brought by contractors that related directly to design flaws 
stemming from the soil foundations of the levees.
New Orleans had dodged the bullet many times, with the major force of hurricanes skirting 
around the area.  Nevertheless, most people with a reason to know about it were aware that a 
Category 3 hurricane posed a severe threat to the New Orleans’ levee protection system, and a 
Category 5 hitting land as a Category 4, as with Katrina, posed a catastrophic threat.   
Looking at the status quo during the response effort to Katrina is a bit more complex.  
President Bush declared the oncoming storm an incident of national significance before it hit the 
coastline, due to widespread concern that it portended catastrophic damage and loss of life.  As 
noted above, the NRP stipulates that the declaration of an INS will initiate a series of federal 
actions that, even though coordinated with the states and localities, nevertheless provides the 
designated authority for the “principal federal official” to initiate and take proactive steps in 
responding to a catastrophic disaster.  In other words, when responding to a disaster where the 
President declares an INS, the director of FEMA is not required to wait for a request from the 
governor of the affected state to begin providing response aid.   
The INS designation is intended to shake-up the status quo among federal agencies during 
catastrophic disasters, making agencies operate more like a network of resources than top-down 
bureaucratic organizations.  Secretary Chertoff saw it this way when he responded to criticisms 
of his failure to activate the Catastrophic Incident Annex.  As noted previously, he indicated that 
the Director of FEMA already had that authority, though director Brown did not assume the 
authority was his, and failed to act on it.  If the authority passes automatically through the office 
of the DHS secretary to his designee (an insight that does not seem obvious from the NRP), there 
was no reason to make Director Brown the “principal federal official” for Katrina response in 
place of William Lokey, the first official put in charge by President Bush’s declaration.  The 
point is reinforced by the fact that the U.S. Coast Guard’s Thad Allen replaced Brown as the 
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“principal federal official” for the Katrina response.  It appears that the designation is more 
effective if the individual starts from an authoritative position within at least one agency in order 
to command belief in his/her potential effectiveness by leaders in other agencies.  Though the 
“principal federal official” designation appears convincing on paper, in the NRP existing 
relationships between agencies at various levels of government dictate that the individual 
designated needs to already occupy a leading role in a response agency. 
Nevertheless, the INS was effective in “shaking up” the status quo between federal agencies, 
imposing a supra-bureaucratic authority with a unified command structure for federal resources 
called the National Incident Management System (NIMS).  Aside from reports about turf wars 
between the Department of Defense’s Northern Command and DHS, most federal agencies 
worked together successfully during the Katrina response.  Consider, for example, the point 
made by Frank Cilluffo, director of the Homeland Security Policy Institute at George 
Washington University, who noted, “Quite honestly, at the federal level, the coordination was 
quite robust.  It’s just the interface between federal, state and local where clearly we need to look 
to ways to improve the process.”
59
 In other words, shaking up relations between agencies at the 
same level of government is one challenge.  Shaking up relations between agencies across levels 
of government is a wholly different challenge. 
Attempts to use the NIMS to manage the support relationship with the states, to federalize the 
response into a single, unified command structure, failed following Katrina.  In the end, the 
Louisiana National Guard, Guard units dispatched from other states, and active-duty federal 
troops received direction through a joint command using the two existing command authorities, 
state and federal.  Director Brown summarized the situation in his testimony as, “We federalized 
this operation without federalizing it.”
60
 After several crucial days during the aftermath of 
Katrina, and failing to gain Governor Blanco’s consent to federalize the Louisiana National 
Guard to place it under the direction of the Federal Joint Task Force Katrina, President Bush 
designated a single military commander for the task force.  Governor Blanco wrote to the 
President: 
I also agree with your idea that – given the unprecedented requests for 
federal military assistance that I, and my fellow Governors in Mississippi 
and Alabama have made – a ‘single military commander’ of ‘Federal Joint 
Task Force Katrina’ be named for federal forces.  I believe such a decision 
is critical to improving the timeliness of fulfilling and coordinating the 
requests for federal assistance that have already been made.  This officer 
would serve as the single military commander for all Department of 
Defense resources providing support to the Department of Homeland 
Security and the State of Louisiana.  This could also enhance the 
contribution of over 25 National Guard states currently being commanded 
by the Louisiana Adjutant General.  I ask that you direct the assigned 
Federal Coordinating Officers at the Department of Homeland Security 
(FEMA) to co-locate with my Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness Office at the Federal Joint Task Force headquarters.  This 




The President’s decision followed several days of differences, described by some as a “political 
standoff,” between the federal and state governments over how to unify the command for the 
National Guard and federal troops in New Orleans.  The differences between the state and 
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federal governments regarding the need for a “unified command” delayed the arrival of active-
duty federal troops in New Orleans for several days.  It is unclear what impact it had on FEMA’s 
seeming inability to act proactively, though some of the agency’s decisions not to commit 
resources stemmed from concerns about disorder and the safety of FEMA agents.   
Governor Blanco, on August 29, a day after Katrina hit land, asked the President for 
“everything you’ve got,” including a specific request for a range of items, as well as 40,000 
troops on August 31.  President Bush sent 7,000 federal troops on September 3 after it was clear 
that the differences on how to organize a unified command were beyond reconciliation.
62
 The 
new response “status quo,” implied by the NIMS, did not prove workable in the catastrophic 




The occurrence of a hurricane like Katrina was not unexpected in New Orleans; neither were the 
complications faced in the aftermath of the storm.  Given this understanding, and the neglect in 
preparing for a hurricane like Katrina, as well as the ineffective response preparations, it seems 
reasonable to assert that Katrina as well as its aftermath was a predictable surprise.  The threats 
posed by the hurricane, and the likely aftermath, were well known and unsurprising to most who 
thought about the hurricane threat to New Orleans.  Unfortunately, much of the local, state, and 
federal leadership, especially the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, appears to have remained 
complacent about preparing the levees for a catastrophic hurricane.  As more information is 
made public, the Corps appears increasingly to exhibit surprise-conducive organizational 
processes in its oversight of upgrades and maintenance to the New Orleans levee protection 
system. 
Like any predictable surprise, the preparation and response to Katrina indicate that leaders 
need to create structures in which the affective heuristic is constrained in its ability to limit 
rationality and enhanced in its capacity to inform rationality in decision-making about hurricane 
protection.  The preparation and response to Katrina clearly poses a challenge on how we go 
about building those structures, both within bureaucracies and across them at different levels of 
government.  We have suggested a number of potential organizational changes to build structures 
that support surprise-avoidance processes, while discouraging surprise-conducive processes. 
1. Explicitly specify in the NRP that the “principal federal official” designated by 
DHS is authorized to activate the Catastrophic Incident Annex, pushing the 
authority down the organization from the DHS Secretary to his/her designee. 
2. Integrate learning organization principles into the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
FEMA, and DHS. 
3. View the status quo during disasters as a multi-level, governmental reality 
involving ongoing compromise between authorities at each level. 
4. Review the NIMS requirement for a “unified command structure” to determine 
under what circumstances joint commands suffice for the mission. 
 
When combined with Secretary Chertoff’s proposed DHS reconnaissance teams, intended to 
provide improved “situation awareness,” the organizational innovations suggested above promise 
an increase in the surprise-avoidance capability of FEMA. 
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